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Preface 
The Second World War is undoubtedly one of the most 
controversial episodes of Hungarian history. The war had a 
profound impact on every aspect of Hungary's development. Its 
long-term consequences are still being felt today, and are likely to 
be felt for generations to come. Future historians of Hungary will 
no doubt regard the war as a major turning point in that 
country's evolution. 
Mainly because of the war's momentous consequences, its 
discussion still invokes high emotions among Hungarians, 
scholars and laymen alike. Not surprisingly, opinions differ on 
virtually every aspect of Hungary's entry into, and role in the war. 
The divergence of views is only widened as a result of concerted 
and persistent efforts by certain politically-motivated groups to 
disseminate false or at least ideologically tinted interpretations 
regarding many incidents of Hungary's wartime history. Al-
though nearly four decades have passed since the war's conclusion, 
historians seeking the truth still have to grapple with polemics, 
deeply felt prejudices, and continued efforts by some to obstruct 
Clio's progress. 
Undaunted by these obstacles, a few historians continue to 
search and analyze Hungary's wartime evolution. Over the past 
few years, our journal has collected samples of their works and we 
have decided to fill the 1983 issues with these. We have divided 
them into two groups. The first deal almost exclusively with the 
origins of Hungary's involvement in the war; the second, mainly 
with the themes of opposition to the German war effort and the 
search for ways and means of dissociating Hungary from it. A 
few papers, also touching on Hungary's wartime history but not 
dealing directly with the themes mentioned above, will be printed 
in the 1984 regular issues of our journal. Occasional references to 
these papers will be made in the introduction and the footnotes to 
this volume. 
While nearly all aspects of Hungary's history on the eve of and 
during World War II are controversial, the themes featured in 
this volume are especially so. In fact, some of them are virtually 
taboo in Hungary, while others have similar status in certain 
Hungarian emigre circles. Our aim in presenting studies dealing 
with such themes is not to exacerbate the existing historical 
acrimony, but to promote a knowledge and understanding of 
some of the least-known and least-understood aspects of 
Hungary's history. We do not wish to promote or endorse a 
certain interpretation, or a set of interpretations. In fact, our 
readers will notice that the authors of this volume themselves do 
not agree on certain issues. As always in the case of our 
journal —or any other genuine scholarly periodical in the 
West—the authors' opinions are strictly their own, and are not 
necessarily shared by anyone else associated with us. 
The continued publication of our journal, and the production 
of special volumes such as this one, is made possible only through 
the support and dedicated work of a number of institutions and 
individuals. For a few years now, the University of Toronto has, 
through its Hungarian studies programme, supported the Review 
by providing help, editorial facilities, and even the occasional 
subsidy. Various facilities available at the Royal Military College 
of Canada were used by the undersigned in the editing process. 
The National Archives of the United States, in response to our 
requests made many years ago, released a collection of pictures to 
us concerning the Kassa bombing. A team of authors patiently 
cooperated in the editing process. Some of them waited for the 
publication of their papers for a period that was longer than is 
the case with many other periodicals. Many scholars, too 
numerous to mention, helped in the revising of the manuscripts 
in their capacity as readers. 
N.F.D. 
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Part I 
The Road to War 
Introduction 
National calamities of vast proportions are not unusual in 
Hungary's history. The Tatar conquest, the Turkish wars, the 
struggles against the Hapsburgs had all caused innumerable 
casualties and large-scale devastation. Both in terms of its 
immediate impact and long-term consequences, the Second 
World War was still another of these great calamities for 
Hungary. Military losses were huge. In January and February of 
1943 for example, over 100,000 Hungarian servicemen were 
lost —killed, missing or captured —when the Second Hungarian 
Army was destroyed in the massive Soviet breakthrough on the 
Don River.1 Hungary's civilian casualties, incurred mainly 
during the final phases of the war, are estimated to have been just 
as severe while about half a million people —mainly Jews — 
perished in German concentration camps.2 A similar number of 
people were lost by Hungary as a result of the exodus of refugees 
that took place at the end of the war. 
Physical destruction was also very severe. Allied bombers and 
Russian artillery left many of Hungary's cities in ruins. As they 
retreated, the Germans stripped the country of resources and 
equipment —including some 500 factories—and destroyed what 
could not be removed: bridges, power stations and whatever else 
could be of use to the enemy. War damage and German 
removals are said to have amounted to 40 percent of Hungary's 
national wealth at its 1944 level. 3 
As if these losses were not enough, the country continued to 
suffer as a result of Soviet occupation. The initial looting by the 
rank-and-file was followed by the organized confiscation of 
Hungary's wealth and resources by the occupying military 
authorities. A large part of what was left of the country's industry 
was put under Soviet military management and was forced to 
produce mainly for the occupying power. Additional wealth was 
extracted from the country under the label of reparation 
payments owed to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia. Not surprisingly, Hungary's economy soon reached a 
state of near-total collapse: by the end of 1945 the rate of infla-
tion amounted to 15 percent per hour. 
One of the most obvious long-term consequences of the war for 
Hungary had been the re-establishment of the territorial 
arrangement in East Central Europe which had been proclaimed 
by the Treaty of Trianon of 1920. This meant that the lands that 
had been returned to Hungary between 1938 and 1941 were once 
again assigned to the country's neighbours. Millions of 
Hungarians were placed under foreign rule again, rule inspired 
in some cases by a heightened spirit of revenge. Czechoslovakia, 
in particular, embarked on a campaign of repression against her 
Hungarian citizens.5 What happened to that country's Magyar 
residents in the wake of the war was just an indication of the fate 
that could await unprotected minorities in East Central Europe 
in the postwar era.6 
The most important consequence of World War II for 
Hungary was the transformation of the country into a client state 
of Soviet Russia. This was a fundamental geopolitical change. 
Having been part of the eastern protective frontier of Western 
Europe for centuries, Hungary became part of the western 
defensive perimeter of the new colossus of the East. This strategic 
transformation was accompanied by equally dramatic changes in 
the country's internal affairs. In forging a "socialist society" in 
Hungary, the Soviet Union, through its Hungarian communist 
allies, systematically destroyed many centuries-old institutions 
and replaced them with ones that had few if any roots in 
Hungarian history. The Churches, the press, the universities, the 
professions, etc., were subjected to strict state control. At the 
same time, established Hungarian traditions such as a multi-
party system and a vibrant intellectual life were stifled under the 
forcibly imposed straightjacket of Marxist-Leninist dogma. More 
important still, for many years persistent efforts were made to 
isolate Hungary from Western ideas and influences and thereby 
to severe her centuries-old links with Central and Western 
Europe. 
Naturally, this view of the Second World War's impact on 
Hungary is not shared in its entirety in communist countries. 
There, Hungary's socialist transformation is proclaimed to have 
been a beneficial development. Accordingly, the Soviet 
occupation in 1945 is portrayed as a "liberation" rather than still 
another of those national calamities that befell Hungary from 
time to time in her long and troubled history. That the war itself 
was a great tragedy for the Hungarian nation, is of course 
commonly accepted by communist commentators and historians 
as well. 
The responsibility of the Hungarian people, and especially, of 
Hungary's leaders, in bringing about their country's participation 
in World War II, this most tragic episode of modern history, has 
attracted the attention of many historians inside and outside of 
the frontiers of Hungary. It is generally admitted that 
throughout the years leading to Hungary's entry into the 
war —and even after it—two sets of factors existed which 
determined Hungary's involvement — or continued participation 
— in the conflict. One set of factors were beyond the power of 
anyone in Hungary to influence, while the other consisted of 
those that the Hungarian nation, or at least its leadership, should 
have been able to control. Where historians disagree is in 
determining which factor belonged to which of these two basic 
categories. To put it another way, some historians feel that 
Hungary and her leaders could do very little to influence the 
circumstances that led to the country's tragedy while others 
believe that a part of Hungarian society, in particular the 
political and military elite, was, through acts of omission or 
commission, primarily responsible for the fate that befell the 
nation. 8 
The factors that are commonly considered to have caused, or 
at least contributed to, Hungary's involvement in World War II 
can be characterized as being either primarily external in nature, 
or predominantly internal. Into the former category belong such 
historical circumstances as the international organization of East 
Central Europe at the time: the division of this region into hardly 
viable, small nation states. Other such factors were the existence 
of international rivalries, massive irredentas, economic underde-
velopment, in this zone of tension wedged between Germany and 
Russia. Many of these problems have been ascribed to the 
inadequacy of the order that had been devised for East Central 
Europe by the peacemakers after World War I, but it is evident 
that some serious problems would have existed in this region even 
if a wiser and more just peace settlement had been imposed in 
1919-1920. 
Among the "internal" factors making for Hungary's involve-
ment in the war the first that has to be mentioned is probably the 
universal resentment felt by Hungarians for the post-World War 
I peace settlement. This feeling united Hungarians in a way they 
had never been united before, at least not for a long period of 
time in their history. The political atmosphere and realities this 
sentiment created in Hungary were probably the most potent 
factors shaping the country's foreign policies in the period under 
consideration in this volume. But revisionism, as the politics of 
seeking a change in the peace settlement was known in Hungary, 
need not have led to an outright military alliance with Germany; 
thus it is revisionism by other than peaceful means that can be 
more appropriately labelled as a factor making for involvement 
in the war. Other internal factors were divisions within Hun-
garian society, often precisely over this question of peaceful 
vs. non-peaceful revision. One of the most important of these 
divisions was the rift between Hungary's military and civilian 
leadership. 
The milestones of Hungary's descent to the status of a Nazi 
German satellite are familiar to most students of Hungarian 
history. Some of them are discussed in fair amount of detail by 
the authors in this volume. Nevertheless, it may be useful to 
review them briefly. It can be argued that the process really 
began in 1938. This is not to dismiss the numerous 
factors —international, economic and ideological —which made 
for Hungarian-German collaboration before that year but there 
was no hard evidence until then that Hungary could be made a 
tool of German ambitions. In this respect Hitler's occupation of 
Austria was an ominous development. It made Hungary 
contiguous with the Third Reich. In the realm of international 
relations, it proved the supremacy of German influence in 
Central Europe. Italy, which had opposed Anschluss in the past, 
abdicated its position as a major power in the region. Internally 
the Austrian Anschluss strengthened those elements of Hungar-
ian society which favoured closer cooperation with Germany: the 
increasingly radicalized ethnic German community, and the 
pro-Nazi parties within Hungary's body politic. 
An even more important development in 1938 was the Munich 
crisis. This was one of those events in diplomatic history in which 
there were far fewer winners than losers, one which disappointed 
almost everyone, excepting those misguided people who really 
believed that the agreement assured "peace in our time." It is 
perhaps a little known fact that the man who was probably most 
disappointed by the settlement was Hitler himself. The records 
of German-Hungarian discussions at the time strongly suggest 
that Hitler's real aim was not a negotiated settlement, 9 but a 
limited, victorious war which would disprove and therefore 
silence those in his entourage who kept cautioning him about 
probable great-power intervention on behalf of the small 
countries of East Central Europe. A "diplomatic solution" of the 
Sudeten issue deprived Hitler of a good excuse to attack 
Czechoslovakia. Of course, he made the best of his " tr iumph" 
over the British, French and the Czechs, and further consolidated 
the Reich's diplomatic ascendancy in Central Europe. 
The country that lost most at Munich —aside from Czechoslo-
vakia—was Hungary. Only a few months earlier that country 
stood on a proud plateau of its interwar diplomatic history. It 
had reached an agreement, the so-called Bled accords, with its 
Little Entente neighbours. At the same time it was being offered 
a military alliance by the Third Reich, the region's only great 
power. But the German offer was rejected and within several 
weeks Hungary's international position took a dramatic turn for 
the worse. In the Munich agreement, Germany's and even 
Poland's claims against Czechoslovakia were satisfied, but not 
Hungary's. This was a bitter pill to swallow for the country that 
probably had the most justified claims against Czechoslovakia. 
In the end, Hungary's case was considered, and some territory 
was returned to her through the First Vienna Award, but it was 
amply evident that all this was partly a handout from Hitler, a 
favour granted by a great power to a small one. Later it became 
increasingly obvious —as Dr. Wagner points out in his paper — 
that Hungary's continued enjoyment of that favour was 
conditional on good behaviour. The German leaders would 
never forget—and would f rom time to time remind the 
Hungarians—that when Germany had wanted Hungary's milit-
ary cooperation, it was not offered. It is not an exaggeration to 
conclude that Munich marked the beginning of the end of a truly 
independent Hungarian foreign policy, one which had been 
promulgated to a large extent on the mistaken premise that the 
Western democracies, especially Britain, could and would exert 
an influence in the affairs of East Central Europe. It is not 
surprising that in the wake of Munich, Kalman Kanya, the 
architect of this independent foreign policy, had to leave 
office.10 
Despite the setbacks Hungarian diplomacy suffered in the fall 
of 1938, throughout 1939 a semblance of independence was 
maintained by Hungary —so much so that when in March of that 
year Hungarian forces re-occupied Subcarpathia, the impression 
was maintained in Budapest that the move was made on 
Hungary's initiative in disregard of Hitler's wishes. In reality, the 
occupation was secretly though reluctantly consented to by the 
Germans and constituted still another of those handouts by the 
Germans for which Hungary's leaders were expected to be 
eternally grateful. 
It was through this process of peacemeal and on the whole 
peaceful revision that Hungary, slowly and almost impercepta-
bly, drifted into the Axis orbit. The next milestone along this 
road —as Dr. Balogh explains in her study —was the crisis that 
culminated in the Second Vienna Award and the most damaging 
one, was Hungary's involvement in the Yugoslav campaign. That 
crisis, also linked to the issue of territorial revision, cost the 
country much of its reputation as well a Prime Minister Pal 
Teleki's life —through suicide. It also set the stage for the final 
and irrevocable involvement in the war less than three months 
later. 
It might be asked at this point whether it would have been 
possible for Hungary's statesmen to halt this process of 
increasingly closer association with Germany. The answer to this 
question probably has to be negative. First of all, few people at 
the time thought that this friendship would lead to serious and 
undesirable consequences, including the loss of the country's 
independence. Secondly, the success of the policy of treaty 
revision was predicated on German support and treaty revision 
could not be abandoned. As Professor Vardy points out in his 
paper, the desire for reunion with Hungarians beyond the 
borders of Trianon Hungary was a national obsession in interwar 
Hungarian society. It would be safe to say that no Hungarian 
government that failed to espouse revisionism had a chance to 
survive. Each and every Hungarian leader was expected to seek a 
remedy for the country's tragedy: a peace settlement which had 
left the nation "mortally wounded." Few in the country could 
imagine that what appeared to be the only cure for this state of 
affairs —revision in collaboration with Germany —could turn out 
to be worse than the disease. Moreover, before the days of 
impending German domination of East Central Europe, 
Hungary's governments had sought to foster revisionist senti-
ments in their country. When the German danger became acute, 
revisionism became dangerous, but it could not be stopped as 
national public opinion could not be turned around. In a sense 
then, on the eve of war, the Horthy regime became the victim of 
its own propaganda. In this sense, the tragedy of Hungary's 
interwar leadership was of its own making. 
Although by June of 1941 the process of Hungary's transforma-
tion into a German client state was well advanced, especially in 
matters pertaining to international relations, the abandonment 
of the last pretence of neutrality did not come about easily. As 
some of the authors point out in this volume, Hungary's leaders 
entered the war reluctantly, and only in the midst of great tension 
and confusion. Even after the start of the German-Russian war, 
they tried to prolong their country's neutrality but abandoned 
their efforts as a result of a series of extraordinary developments, 
culminating in an air-raid against targets in north-eastern 
Hungary, not very far from the Soviet border. 
This raid, particularly the bombing of the city of Kassa 
(Kosice), constitutes the immediate cause — or excuse as some 
historians would say — of Hungary's final involvement in the war. 
Although a largely unexplained event which is still the object of 
controversy particularly in the West, there are a few facts that 
can be told about it with some degree of certainty. The attacks 
took place in broad daylight, in the early afternoon of the 26th of 
June, 1941. Near the town of Raho, right on the Russian border, 
a passenger train was attacked. Some sources talk of an attack on 
Munkacs, a larger town at some distance from the frontier. 
Substantial damage was done only in the provincial centre of 
Kassa, about one hundred kilometers further west, very near the 
Slovak border of 1941. In fact Kassa had been one of the cities 
returned to Hungary by the Vienna Award of 1938. There, some 
thirty bombs were dropped, causing loss of life and considerable 
destruction. The planes, according to the vast majority of 
reports, were twin-engined monoplanes, and they had ap-
proached the city from the southeast and departed in the same 
direction. Reports on their markings are contradictory. The 
bombs they dropped were 100 kilo bombs. An unexploded bomb 
was dug out and photographed. The pictures show a bomb with 
Russian inscriptions. The raids were reported to military 
headquarters in Budapest as unprovoked Russian attacks, and 
the Hungarian government decided to declare the existence of a 
state of war between Hungary and the Soviet Union as a result. 
That decision constituted the last milestone on the road that led 
to Hungary's involvement in the Second World War. 
Two papers in this special volume of HSR examine the long 
term origins of Hungary's involvement in the war. Two others 
deal with the background of the incident that was the immediate 
cause, while the last study is devoted to the events of June 26, 
1941 alone, as well as the historiographical mysteries that 
surround it. The question of revisionism as a national 
phenomenon in interwar Hungary is examined in the first of the 
papers dealing with the long-term origins of Hungary's 
involvement in the war. In his study, Professor Vardy surveys the 
birth and evolution of the "Trianon syndrome" in Hungarian 
society. He analyzes the impact that the dismemberment of the 
country by the peacemakers had on the national psyche, and 
particularly on a very influential intellectual, historian Gyula 
Szekfu. Vardy points out that the lesson Szekfu and many of his 
followers drew from the First World War and its troubled 
aftermath was that Hungary's tragedy came at the moment she 
became dissociated f rom Germanic Central Europe. The 
implications of such teachings were momentous. There can be 
little doubt that many of Szekfu's readers concluded that 
Hungary's tragedy could be reversed only if she regained her 
historic association with the German world. 
While Professor Vardy examines the impact of an act of 
international politics on national attitudes and consciousness, Dr. 
Balogh describes how the latter eventually expressed themselves 
in the conduct of Hungary's foreign relations. Peaceful revision, 
she points out, became possible only when the post-World War I 
order began disintegrating in East Central Europe. Even then, it 
was a very difficult proposition, as Hungary's leaders had to 
exploit opportunities created by the German assault on the 
Versailles system without bringing disaster upon their country, 
such as involvement in war, the impairment of national 
independence, or the loss of the goodwill of the great powers. For 
some time, and to some extent, the Hungarian leadership was 
successful in this difficult undertaking, but then its luck ran out. 
Dr. Balogh argues that by 1940 the Hungarian policies of 
peaceful revision had become counterproductive. In particular, 
the diplomatic manoeuverings that led to the Second Vienna 
Award alienated great power opinion and accelerated the process 
of Hungary's satellitization. I1 
Dr. Balogh's paper on diplomatic history is followed by one 
touching on the subject of civil-military relations in the same 
period. While Dr. Balogh explored the contribution made by 
Hungary's diplomats to their country's drift toward war, 
Professor Sakmyster examines the similar efforts of some soldiers. 
He does this with special reference to the final act of this drama, 
the Kassa bombing and the declaration of war on the U.S.S.R. 
His paper then, is both a study of the long-term origins of 
Hungary's entry into the war, and an examination of the 
historical roots of the immediate cause of involvement. The story 
he tells differs from the one related by Dr. Balogh. Hungary's 
diplomats allowed their country to drift towards disaster to a 
degree —perhaps a large degree —unwittingly, while the soldiers 
Dr. Sakmyster talks about deliberately sought their country's 
entry into the war on Germany's side. His argument is that the 
Kassa bombing was probably a plot hatched by two or perhaps 
more Hungarian officers stationed in Berlin, and carried out by 
the German secret service (the Abivehr). All this seems to have 
been done behind the backs of these men's military superiors, and 
certainly without the knowledge of Hungary's civilian leaders. 
A very different explanation is given about the Kassa 
bombing's historical origins by Dr. Wagner. He also believes that 
the incident was the consequence of a conspiracy, but he argues 
that it was prepared and carried out entirely by the Germans, 
probably in retaliation for the reluctance Hungary's civilian 
leaders had shown in the past when Germany had asked favours 
of them, especially proofs of solidarity with German military 
ventures. At the end of his paper Dr. Wagner reveals 
information he had obtained during and after the war (much of 
it while he had served in Hungary's diplomatic service) 
suggesting that the Kassa raid had been carried out by German 
agents operating from Slovakia. 
The last paper deals with the Kassa incident itself, as well as 
the theories that have been advanced about it since 1941. Unlike 
the studies by Drs. Sakmyster and Wagner, it argues that there 
are reasons for doubting the conspiracy hypothesis. It also puts 
forth a possible explanation why the belief that the bombing had 
been a plot gained almost universal currency among Hungarians 
both in emigration and in Hungary. The Kassa raid may or may 
not have been the result of a plot, the paper concludes, but there 
certainly seem to have been plots to make us believe that it was. 
Differences among the five studies in this volume are obvious. 
They are written from different perspectives, with different 
emphases, and often with widely differing underlying assump-
tions. The latter is especially evident in the three papers touching 
on the immediate origins of Hungary's involvement in the war. 
Their authors, while not claiming to know all the mysteries of the 
Kassa raid, incline toward endorsing three very different 
explanations. Despite these differences, a common theme does 
appear to run throuh all five of these studies. They all describe 
an aspect or part of a great human tragedy. Professor Vardy 
explains how a great national calamity — the Treaty of Trianon — 
generated something akin to a collective political neurosis in 
Hungary. Dr. Balogh describes how the country's leaders, 
afflicted with an obsession about treaty revision, drifted closer 
and closer to the German orbit despite their beliefs in national 
honour and independence. Professor Sakmyster cites the 
examples of officers who, in their zeal to "right the wrongs of 
history," conspired to drag their country into the war in disregard 
of the wishes of both government and people. And Dr. Wagner's 
paper points out that the Germans possessed ample means of 
forcing Hungary to cooperate with them whether she wanted to 
do so or not. 12 In a sense, all these papers describe the 
desperate and, in the end futile quest of a nation for 
self-determination and justice in a world dominated by forces 
beyond the power of any small country to influence. 
N.F. Dreisziger 
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The Impact of Trianon upon Hungary 
and the Hungarian Mind: 
The Nature of Interwar 
Hungarian Irredentism 
Steven B. Vardy 
Developments in interwar Hungary were determined above all by 
the peace treaty signed in the Grand Palace of Versailles on June 
4, 1920. The terms of this treaty were so harsh and punitive that 
one looks in vain for parallels in modern European history. On 
the basis of this treaty Hungary lost 71.4% of her territory and 
63.6% of her population. Of the four beneficiary states 
Rumania alone received a larger share (39,800 square miles) of 
the country's former territory than that which was left to 
Hungary (35,900 square miles). While some of this loss could be 
justified on the basis of ethnic-linguistic considerations, this was 
not true about a sizable portion of the lost territories. As a matter 
of fact, historic Hungary's dismemberment also entailed the 
transfer of large Magyar-inhabited territories, along with close to 
3.5 million ethnic Hungarians —fully one-third of the nation—to 
the new successor states. All this was done in the name of the very 
same principle—the principle of national self-determination — 
for which historic Hungary was torn apart. It should also be 
added that, with the exception of a small territory around Sopron 
in Western Hungary, the Hungarian demand for a plebiscite in 
the detached territories was rejected, and in this manner the 
principle of self-determination was once again violated. 
Moreover, the result of this rather arbitrarily and punitively 
applied principle was the creation of several new or enlarged 
states whose ethnic composition was hardly less mixed than that 
of Hungary prior to 1918. Thus, even if we count the Czechs and 
the Slovaks as one nation (which we can hardly do), 
Czechoslovakia had 34.7% minorities, while Poland had 30.4%, 
Rumania 25%, and Yugoslavia had no majority nationality at 
all. One can hardly question that in those days the principle of 
national self-determination had to be accomodated somehow. 
While the Treaty of Trianon was an accomodation of that 
principle, it was also a violation of it.1 It is in this light that one 
has to view the Hungarian reaction to this peace treaty. 
The signing of the peace treaty was preceded in Hungary by 
the trauma of a lost war, two revolutions (a liberal-socialist and a 
communist), as well as a counterrevolution which, while restoring 
much of the old social and political system, was unable to save the 
country's territorial integrity (and not even many of its 
Magyar-inhabited territories). The regime that followed these 
upheavals was headed by Admiral Miklos Horthy (1868-1957), 
the last commander of the Austro-Hungarian fleet. The regime's 
orientation was determined almost exclusively by the psychologi-
cal shock of Trianon and by the overriding desire to undo that 
treaty, whose terms were unacceptable to all Hungarians 
regardless of social background or ideological orientation. As a 
matter of fact, the shock of Trianon was so pervasive and so 
keenly felt that the syndrome it produced can only be compared 
to a malignant national disease. 
The nature and magnitude of Trianon's psychological shock 
upon the contemporary Hungarian mind was perhaps best 
expressed by Gyula Szekfu (1883-1955), the "father" of the 
Hungarian version of the so-called Geistesgeschichte School of 
history and a dominant figure of interwar Hungarian historiogra-
phy. 
Szekfu gave vent to his feelings in the agonizing introduction to 
his first post-Trianon work, Harom nemzedek. Egy hanyatlo kor 
tortenete (Three generations. The history of a declining age) 
(1920), in which he summarized his views on the causes of his 
nation's decline and fall. Szekfu wrote: 
This book is my personal experience. In the midst of 
those trying events into which the catastrophe of 
October 1918 (the collapse of Austria-Hungary) had 
thrust us ..., I felt. . . that I would never be able to 
recover my strength and my will to work until having 
taken account of the (causes of that) decline that had 
led us to this disaster. I simply had to face up to the 
forces that have dragged my nation out of a stream of 
healthy evolution. Thus did I come to write this book, 
and.. . thus did I redeem my soul. 2 
The writing of Harom nemzedek constituted a spiritual 
catharsis through which Szekfu was able to release some of the 
psychological pressures that had accumulated within him. Not 
every Hungarian was able to follow this path and not every 
Hungarian intellectual was capable of producing a work of such 
proportions and significance. Yet, virtually every noted 
historian, sociologist and political thinker has written his own 
"Trianon book" or at least a "Trianon pamphlet ." This holds 
true even for such left-leaning cosmopolitan thinkers as Oscar 
Jaszi (1875-1957), associated with the progressive HuszacLik 
Szazad (Twentieth Century), and the literary critic and publicist 
Hugo Ignotus (1869-1949) of the equally progressive Nyugat (The 
West). 3 
The Trianon shock thus became a lasting national malady that 
ever since 1918-1920 has ravaged the minds and hearts of most 
Hungarians, notwithstanding the fact that during the past 
three-and-a-half decades the open discussion or teaching of the 
nature and impact of this treaty has been a taboo in Hungary. 4 
That this was and is the case is best demonstrated by the recent 
rumblings in certain Hungarian intellectual circles where, for the 
first time in many years, a few people dare to talk and write about 
Trianon and the psychological dislocations it has caused. We 
may add that this new daring is partially the result of these 
intellectuals' growing concern for the Hungarian minorities 
beyond Hungary's Trianon frontiers, whose plight is becoming 
better known and less tolerable even to the largely depoliticized 
and denationalized average Hungarian. 
An example of this growing concern and daring can be found 
in historian Peter Hanak's article in the July 25, 1981 issue of the 
influential Elet es Irodalom (Life and Literature). Entitled 
"Relative National Consciousness," this essay deals, at least in 
part, with the nature and development of the aforementioned 
Trianon syndrome in the period since World War II. Hanak 
writes: 
We have been unable to digest Trianon consciously 
until our very own days. (After 1945) the whole 
complex problem of Trianon was placed on this list of 
those taboos that touched the path of nationalism. 
True, we did mention occasionally that the Treaty of 
Trianon was an unjust and an imperialistic peace. But 
we also added immediately that interwar revisionism 
was conceived in the nuptial bed of nationalism. 
Moreover, even though each of these assertions were 
true individually, and each contained valid value 
judgments, neither f rom a logical, nor from a 
psychological or consciousness point of view were we 
able to resolve the contradictions between them. This 
is all the more lamentable as without examining the 
lasting shock impact of Trianon, we can neither 
approach, nor hope to understand the Hungarian 
Weltanschauung and the Hungarian national con-
sciousness in the twentieth century. 5 
Having pointed to the problem caused by the Hungarian 
nation's lack of freedom to talk about this great national malady, 
Hanak continues by giving us a most penetrating and discerning 
assessment of the nature of the impact of the Trianon-shock upon 
the Hungarian psyche: 
Our collapse in the war and (the terms of the Treaty 
of) Tr ianon have found the nation unprepared. 
Everything that up to that point used to be absolute, 
concrete and unambiguous was suddenly shattered. 
The unity of our country and of our nation vanished, 
and so did all our fictitious conceptualizations, as well 
as all historical and geographical realities...The 
trauma of defeat was so terribly deep, and it shook the 
nation's life-foundations to such a degree that for years 
and even for decades we could hardly expect 
anyone...to come up with an objective assessment (of 
this whole affair). After all, (Trianon meant) not only 
the dismemberment of a nation, but also the sudden 
relativization of such formerly absolute concepts as the 
nation and national destiny...One can hardly be 
amazed, therefore, that the initial reaction was (an 
intense desire) to revise the whole peace system... 
Trianon had in fact set a double trap for the 
Hungarian nation. On the one hand, it conscribed all 
elemental patriotism, all inclination to reconstruct 
one's nation, all justified emotions of grief into the 
service of . . . the counterrevolutionary regime; on the 
other hand, its f lagrant injustices beclouded its 
righteous aspects, namely those of its features that 
were the unavoidable consequences of national de-
velopments in Central and Southeastern Europe. As 
such (Trianon) prevented us from recognizing the 
relativity of our place and role in the world, and the 
necessity of establishing good relations with the 
Danubian peoples...Thus, the Trianon trap had a 
tighter grip of the majority of our nation than did the 
dualistic system (that preceded it). The most 
grotesque aspect of this tragic trap was that thereafter 
(Hungarian) national consciousness found itself bound 
not to a living, but to a non-existing, to a vanished 
absolute. 6 
If—as is evident from Hanak's essay —Trianon produced a 
trauma that is still haunting most Hungarians after six decades of 
history and three and a half decades of enforced silence, how 
much more was this true in the years following the implementa-
tion of this punitive treaty? Whether we like it or not, or admit it 
or not, Trianon had in fact determined almost everything in 
interwar Hungary and this was true notwithstanding the fact that 
some elements of the country's political and social leadership 
were not only "sufferers," but also unwitting "beneficiaries" of 
the Trianon disease. This basically means that those who were 
opponents of the country's socio-economic transformation and 
modernization were able to blame Trianon for all of the nation's 
problems, as well as to use these problems as pretexts for 
hindering the necessary reforms. The latter, however, were 
much fewer in number than claimed by the regime's critics and 
detractors. The Trianon disease was and —to a large degree —is 
a national malady that engulfed and still engulfs much of the 
nation. Thus one did not really have to use artificial means to 
make it into the number one cause of the nation's problems 
during the interwar period. But before turning to a more 
detailed analysis of some aspects of its impact upon the 
Hungarian mind during those years, let us briefly summarize the 
history of that age. 
The Horthy Regime 
The political system and regime represented by Admiral 
Horthy has been referred to during the last three and a half 
decades by a number of derogatory expressions. 7 Thus, it has 
been called the period of "Horthy Fascism," "Horthy 
dictatorship," as well as the age of the "counterrevolutionary 
regime"—the latter being basically a self-selected term. While 
rejecting the first two as basically untrue, and accepting the latter 
only with certain qualifications (i.e. for the early phase of the 
Horthy regime), I prefer to call interwar Hungary's political 
system "conservative nationalist," 8 and many of its social and 
cultural manifestations as "neo-Baroque." (The latter term, by 
the way, was first used by historian Szekfu, who was also one of 
the most influential ideologists of that period.) 9 Tha t the 
Horthy regime was conservative and nationalistic can hardly be 
questioned. But in addition to these two features it was also 
characterized by rabid anti-communism a powerful and polar-
ized class structure the social and political pre-eminence of the 
gentry and aristocracy a virtual caste position of the military 
officer corps an unusual emphasis upon one's descent and 
inherited or acquired titles extreme respect for authority a kind 
of traditional anti-Semitism (which in its main course had 
nothing to do with the racist anti-Semitism of the Nazis and their 
Hungarian collaborators) and most importantly, a lack of 
adequate social consciousness or concern for the country's 
impoverished rural and urban workers. Simultaneously, 
however, the Horthy regime was also characterized by a 
functioning parliamentarism, by a somewhat narrowly based, 
though hardly nominal multi-party system, and by a legal system 
that stood for "law and order" and which on the whole was just 
and fair. 
Hungary's regent, Admiral Horthy, whose name became 
almost synonymous with the period between the two world wars, 
was basically a conservative and traditionalist both by upbringing 
and temperament. He was strongly attached to the well-tried 
values of the old regime and suspicious of all new experimenta-
tions that might result in social dislocations, disorders and 
insubordinations that seemed to characterize the twentieth 
century. 
Although a convinced conservative, Horthy was neither a 
dictator nor a tyrant. As a matter of fact, he was generally 
scrupulous in observing the terms of Hungary's undoubtedly 
dated constitutional system. His ideals coincided with the social 
and political values of the age of Emperor Francis Joseph. For 
this reason, he detested radicalism and revolution in any 
form —be it from the left or from the right. In his view, these 
radical movements were all bent on destroying that harmonious 
"neo-Baroque" social order he so dearly loved. Horthy's visible 
conservatism, however, did not necessarily make him an 
opponent of the much needed social and economic reforms. But 
because he detested mass movements, he was both suspicious of 
and extremely cautious about such reforms. Nor was he able to 
conceive of reform in any other way, except gradually and within 
certain legal and social limitations. As a result, by the 1930s he 
was rapidly being left behind by all of the major reform 
movements, be they on the left, on the right, or somewhere in the 
middle, such as was the case of the so-called Populist Movement 
of that period. 
For twenty-four years after 1920, Horthy reigned undisturbed 
and unchallenged as Hungary's regent and supreme military 
commander. He had the right to convene and dissolve the 
parliament, to appoint and dismiss the prime minister, as well as 
to return undesirable bills to the parliament. After 1937 his 
powers as regent were further increased, and thereafter he could 
not even be called to account by that elected body. Horthy, 
however, never transgressed his powers, and in most instances he 
even refrained from using them to their fullest extent. He tried to 
play the role of a benevolent constitutional monarch, and partly 
for this reason he did enjoy a considerable degree of genuine 
popularity. It was his prestige and popularity that saved 
Hungary from going too far to the radical right before World 
War II, and some of his moderating influence was felt even after 
Hungary's German occupation on March 19, 1944. 
Like Regent Horthy himself, Hungary's political system was 
also basically conservative. The right to vote was limited and 
circumscribed by age, sex, property, educational and other 
qualifications (e.g. open voting in the countryside), which 
generally kept the number of the voters well below 50 percent of 
the country's adult population (i.e. between 26.6 percent and 
33.8 percent of the total population). 10 Despite this, there were 
in fact regular elections throughout the period, and these were 
held with the participation of several political parties that 
represented various shades of political opinions from the extreme 
right to as far left as the Social Democrats. Many of these parties 
were small, ephemeral and usually bound to specific 
"charismatic" or not-so-charismatic leaders. Those on the 
conservative right generally called themselves " Christian," 
"National," or both, while those in the middle or on the left 
usually referred to themselves as "Liberal," "Democratic," or 
"Socialist." Most of these parties went through various mergers, 
splits, and re-mergers as dictated by their ideological convictions 
and goals, or by the personal or national aspirations of their 
leaders. 
In the early 1920s, the two most prominent of these parties 
were the conservative nationalist Christian National Unity Party 
and the peasant-oriented Smallholders' Party, which together 
constituted the so-called "Christian Bloc." On February 23, 
1922, these two parties merged to form the Catholic-Christian 
Smallholders', Peasant, and Bourgeois Party (Kereszteny-
Keresztyeny Kisgazda, Foldmuves es Polgari Part), commonly 
known as the Party of Unity (Egyseges Part), which then served 
through the next two decades—at times under slightly altered 
names —as the party of the government, which was always in 
control. During the 1930s these traditional parties were joined by 
several new political parties of the radical right, most of whom 
ultimately merged into Ferenc Szalasi's (1897-1946) Arrow Cross 
Party—the par excellence exponent of National Socialism in 
Hungary. 
In spite of its name, the Party of Unity was far less united than 
generally presumed. Instead of being a monolithic organization, 
it was really a collection of various lesser parties and interest 
groups, all with their own special goals and programs. These 
included most everyone from the agrarians to the industrialists, 
from the pro-Habsburg legitimists to the "free electionist 
royalists," as well as the militant revisionists and the advocates of 
pragmatism and compromise in foreign policy. They were bound 
together only by their commonly shared irredentism and 
anti-communism, and by their basic attachment to the 
conservative social order. Most of them also subscribed to a 
certain amount of anti-Semitism that stemmed largely from the 
heavy Jewish participation in Bela Kun's Bolshevik revolution in 
Hungary. But outside the initial months of the counterrevolu-
tionary reaction, this anti-Semitism manifested itself more in 
polemics than in an actual governmental policy. As a matter of 
fact, anti-Semitism did not really become part of the official 
policy until World War II, and even then only grudgingly and 
largely under outside pressures from Nazi Germany. It should 
perhaps also be mentioned that in spite of the Unity Party's 
attachments to the traditional order of things, it had a significant 
number of individuals and power groups that were dedicated to 
various degrees and levels of social and economic reforms, some 
of which were in fact implemented during the 1920s and 1930s. 
Next to ever present revisionism, the first of the two interwar 
decades in Hungary was characterized primarily by a policy of 
political, economic, social and ideological-cultural consolida-
tion, insofar as this was permitted by the territorial, national, 
economic and psychological dislocations caused by Trianon. The 
man primarily responsible for this consolidation was Count Istvan 
Bethlen (1874-1947), a Transylvanian-Hungarian magnate, 
whose ancestral homeland had been attached to Rumania. 
Bethlen was a cultured, intelligent, clever and pragmatic man, 
but he was perhaps even more conservative than the regent 
himself. He began his prime ministership by terminating the 
remnants of the disorder and lawlessness connected with the two 
revolutions and the counterrevolution. This normalization was 
accompanied by the neutralization of the regime's most 
significant legitimate opposition through the inclusion of the 
Smallholders' Party into the Party of Unity, and by making the 
latter into a relatively docile instrument of his government's 
policies. 
Bethlen also initiated a foreign policy to undo the effects of 
Trianon by all possible peaceful means. His most significant step 
in this direction was rapprochement with Italy, and the signing of 
the Italo-Hungarian Treaty of Friendship and Arbitration in 
1927 (April 5). This treaty was basically the first momentous 
break in Hungary's diplomatic isolation, after years of encircle-
ment by the French-supported Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, 
Rumania, and Yugoslavia). From this time onward the Italian 
orientation remained one of the cornerstones of Hungarian 
foreign policy, which ultimately led to some tangible, albeit 
temporary success in the form of the Italian-supported partial 
revisions of Hungary's Trianon frontiers between 1938 and 
1941.11 
The relatively peaceful Bethlen Era came to an end in 1931. It 
did so largely because of the world depression, which undermined 
Hungary's fragile economy and thereby the whole Bethlen 
system. The country's increasing economic plight, the accompa-
nying poverty and unemployment, and in particular the rising 
dissatisfaction of its unemployed young intelligentsia created a 
situation that made the upcoming change unavoidable. This 
change took the form of the fall of Bethlen's conservative regime 
and the rise of a new regime and spirit that pushed Hungary 
gradually in the direction of the radical right. 
After a brief interlude, the man who replaced Bethlen in 1932 
and initiated this shift to the right was General Gyula Gombos 
(1886-1936), one of the leaders of the postwar counterrevolution. 
Gombos was a man of relatively humble birth, but with a 
phenomenal ego, who became one of the most vocal spokesmen 
of the new volkisch nationalism that engulfed Hungary in the 
wake of the Trianon tragedy. Perhaps because of his populist 
nationalism, and perhaps also because of his origins, Gombos 
appeared more amenable to social reform. But —probably under 
the influence of Mussolini and the Italian model —he wished 
these necessary social changes to take place under the leadership 
of an all-powerful folk tribune and in this case he was naturally 
thinking of himself. 
Gombos promised much, but once in power he delivered 
relatively little by way of social reform. True, he abandoned 
Bethlen's aristocratic restraint, but he replaced it primarily with 
a sonorous sloganism and with a growing air of radicalism. In 
foreign policy Gombos continued Bethlen's pro-Italian orienta-
tion. At the same time, however, he also moved closer to 
Germany. His dream and goal was a form of German-Italian-
Hungarian partnership and joint control over Central and 
Southeastern Europe a goal which, in light of the vast differences 
in the human and material resources of these three countries, 
lacked all elements of realism. Gombos's shift in foreign policy 
had momentous implications for Hungary, for it threatened to 
carry the country into the Berlin-Rome Axis, as well as toward a 
less-than peaceful solution to its revisionist claims. Moreover, it 
also resulted in the rise of various pro-German elements to 
positions of influence in the army and the state bureaucracy, 
which in turn made it even more difficult for the country's 
conservative political leadership to keep Hungary out of 
dangerous diplomatic and even military entanglements with Nazi 
Germany. 
Gombos's prime ministership also coincided with the birth of 
the first Hungarian National Socialist groups and political 
parties, including Ferenc Szalasi's Party of National Will 
(Nemzeti Akarat Partja), which he founded in March 1935. This 
party was the most important forerunner of the much better 
known Arrow Cross Party (Nyilaskeresztes Part), which subse-
quently unified most of the Hungarian Nazi and Fascist 
organizations on October 23, 1937.12 
Following Gombos's death on October 6, 1936, Horthy and his 
conservative followers decided to put a stop to this dangerous 
rightward drift in Hungary. The conservative wing of the 
government party allied itself with various anti-rightist and 
anti-German groups, including the royalist Christian Party, the 
resurrected Smallholders' Party, the Social Democratic Party and 
a number of smaller liberal groups. Their opponents consisted of 
the government party's right wing, supported by various other 
smaller rightist parties and political formations. The conserva-
tives stressed the need for domestic peace, order, traditional 
values and peaceful revisionism. The radicals, on the other 
hand, argued for social reforms, a closer relationship with 
Germany, and a more militant foreign policy to achieve 
Hungary's national goals. Regent Horthy naturally supported 
the first of these groups, but the general trend of the times 
favoured the latter. And the spirit of the times appeared to have 
captured even some of the Horthy-selected successors of Gombos 
who were appointed specifically for the purpose of stemming this 
rightward tide. As a matter of fact, two of these prime ministers 
(Bela Imredy and Laszlo Bardossy) actually accelerated this trend 
to the right, while one of them (Bardossy) was responsible for 
taking the country into the war and thereby sealing Hungary's 
fate once more. True, this declaration of war against the Soviet 
Union was made illegally, i.e. without the knowledge and 
approval of the Hungarian Parliament, but ultimately this made 
no difference. Hungary's presence on the side of Nazi Germany 
and later in the ranks of the defeated states made it impossible for 
her to retain even those regained territories to which she was fully 
entitled simply on the basis of ethnic-linguistic considerations. In 
this way the Hungarian nation and national psyche suffered 
another serious blow after World War II a blow that not even 
thirty-six years of enforced silence has been able to eradicate. 
Reaction to Trianon 
As has been seen, the interwar period in Hungary was an era of 
social and political conservatism that was increasingly under 
pressure from right-wing radicalism. This period was also an age 
of emotional nationalism that engulfed the whole nation after 
World War I and the country's dismemberment. This emotional 
nationalism was different from its immediate predecessor in that 
it gave birth to a powerful desire to act, i.e. to save whatever 
could be saved and to restore whatever could be restored. This 
activism manifested itself in many shapes and forms from the 
foundation of scores of secret societies and national defense 
leagues to the birth of new tendencies in education, literature, 
the arts, as well as historiography. In light of space limitations 
and my own interests, this paper will focus on the change in 
historical thinking and history writing as an example of the 
"Trianon Syndrome" in interwar Hungary. 
The so-called patriotic secret societies were established imme-
diately after the war, and their primary and almost exclusive goal 
was to undo by whatever means the terms of Trianon. T h e best 
known and most influential of these societies included the Hun-
garian National Defense Association (Magyar Orszagos Vedero 
Egyesiilet, MO VE), the Association of Awakening Hungarians 
(Ebredo Magyarok Egyesiilete, EME), T h e Blood Oath Society of 
the Double Cross (Kettoskereszt Verszovetseg), the United 
Christian League (Egyesiilt Kereszteny Liga), the more 
extremist Hungarian Cultural League (Magyar Kulturliga) led by 
the white terrorist Pal Pronay (1875-1945), the Federation of the 
Nameless (Nevt.elenek Szdvetsege), the Association of Etelkoz 
(Etelkozi Szdvetseg, EKSZ or EX), which was also known under 
the pseudonyms of Council of Chiefs (Vezerek Tanacsa, VT) and 
the Hungarian Scientific Association for the Protection of Ethnic-
ity (Magyar Tudomanyos Fajvedo Egyesiilet). In addition to 
their emotional nationalism and activism, the most common 
features of these associations included staunch anti-communist 
and counter-revolutionary sentiments, as well as various degrees 
of anti-Semitism, and most importantly, powerful irre-
dentism. 13 
Side by side with these and similar action-oriented secret 
societies, the interwar years also gave birth to an almost equal 
number of non-secret irredentist organizations, whose primary 
goal was to fight for revisionism by means of publishing 
propagandistic or semi-scholarly works and by establishing 
contacts with various influential Western political and scholarly 
circles. The most active of these societies included the Hungarian 
Territorial Integrity League (Magyarorszag Teriileti Epsegenek 
Vedelmi Ligaja), which began to publish a series of informative 
pamphlets on Hungary's case as early as 1919 the National 
Association of Defense Leagues (a Vedoligak Orszagos Szdvetse-
ge), established in order to coordinate the work of all 
openly irredentist associations the Hungarian National Federa-
tion (Magyar Nemzeti Szdvetseg), which eventually absorbed 
both of the above associations and the Hungarian Revisionist 
League (Magyar Revizios Liga), established in 1927 as a 
federation of about three dozen irredentist organizations, largely 
as a result of the pro-Hungarian revisionist campaign initiated by 
Lord Harold Sidney Harmsworth Rothermere, a significant 
figure of contemporary British journalism.14 Revisionist work 
and revisionist agitation, however, was also carried out by such 
influential scholarly or semi-scholarly organizations as the 
Hungarian Historical Association, the Hungarian Geographical 
Association, the Hungarian Foreign Affairs Association, and 
later also by a number of research institutes, including the 
Political Science Institute of the Hungarian Statistical Associa-
tion, the minority institutes of the universities of Budapest, Pecs, 
Debrecen and Szeged, the Hungarian Historical Institute, and 
the Transylvanian Research Institute. These research institutes, 
however, were founded only in the period between 1935 and 
1941, and consequently their impact was probably less than could 
have been otherwise.15 
While the composition of the membership and the nature of 
the irredentist activities of these various societies and associations 
were very different, they did have a common goal the revision of 
Hungary's new frontiers, even though they disagreed regarding 
the means to achieve this goal. The secret societies, for example, 
often engaged in activities that later proved to be unacceptable 
and even detrimental to the cause. Their power to act 
irresponsibly, however, was soon curtailed by Prime Minister 
Bethlen during his policy of consolidation. 
At the same time the revisionist activities of the purely 
irredentist or scholarly associations continued and even increased 
with the support of the regime. But it was soon filled with the 
spirit of "neo-nationalism," a new ideological orientation 
developed by Count Kuno Klebelsberg (1875-1932), the President 
of the Hungarian Historical Association from 1917 to 1932, and 
Hungary's Minister for Culture and Religion during the first half 
of the interwar period, from 1922 until 1931. Moreover, because 
the Hungarian crusade for the revision of the new frontiers was 
based almost exclusively on historical rights (and not on the 
principle of self-determination), the heaviest burden in demon-
strating the righteousness of the Hungarian claims fell on the 
shoulders of Hungary's historians, who, in addition, were obliged 
to readjust their views in the spirit of neo-nationalism. 
Formulated by Klebelsberg during the mid-1920s, neo-
nationalism was basically an effort to adjust Hungarian 
nationalism and Hungarian historical thinking to the new 
realities of the post-Trianon period namely, to the realities that 
constricted Hungarian political control to a small central section 
of the former Kingdom of Hungary, while at the same time 
leaving one-third of the nation on the other side of the new 
frontiers. In light of these conditions it was necessary to reorient 
the attention of the Magyars from the concept of the state to the 
concept of the nation, and from the consciousness of their 
political dominance to a belief in their continued cultural 
pre-eminence in the Carpathian Basin.16 
While emphasizing the significance of the nation over the 
state, the new ideology of neo-nationalism also stressed the 
alleged unique "state-forming capacities" of the Magyars. 
Apparently, Klebelsberg was convinced that if the Hungarians 
were able to retain their cultural pre-eminence in the area, 
then — in conjunction with their capacity for political leadership 
—• this pre-eminence would ultimately lead to the restoration of 
historic Hungary's unity. It was this belief that prompted 
Klebelsberg to demand the reorientation of Hungarian national-
ism from confrontation to cooperation with the region's other 
nationalities although this cooperation was still to be carried out 
under Hungarian political and intellectual leadership. 
The views formulated by Klebelsberg were generally acclaimed 
by most historians, who were probably more affected by Trianon 
than any other segment of the Hungarian intelligentsia —with the 
possible exception of the psychologically even more sensitive 
poets. For this reason, examining the role, attitude and activities 
of historians is a good way of measuring the impact of Trianon 
upon the Hungarian psyche. And this is both natural and 
understandable, for contrary to the situation in our own age of 
rapid change, historians of that period were accustomed to 
"living in the past." They were the products of a traditional 
world, attached to their nation's traditions. For them the 
legitimate study and research of history usually ended at least a 
half a century before their own time. They studied, re-studied 
and even re-lived psychologically the ups and downs of their 
nation's history. Thus, the shock of Trianon probably affected 
them to a far greater degree than most of their countrymen. 17 
This is all the more likely, as in addition to having lost a large 
segment of their country and a third of their nation, they also lost 
much of the "historical stage" that used to serve as a forum of 
their nation's history and of their efforts to re-create that history. 
The loss of this historical stage also meant the loss of many 
written and unwritten sources of Hungarian history, along with 
the whole intellectual-cultural environment that inspired histori-
ans in the past and served as a catalyst in practicing their art. For 
these historians, Trianon also meant the end of a relatively 
comfortable existence and a secure way of life, which turned the 
national catastrophe into a personal calamity that was bound to 
affect their relationship to Clio's art. Their initial reaction was 
one of confusion and the production of numerous so-called 
"Trianon books" and "Trianon pamphlets." Subsequently, 
however, they fell in line with the basic orientation of Bethlen's 
policy of consolidation and with Klebelsberg's philosophy of 
neo-nationalism, and undertook a systematic effort to refute the 
historical arguments that had been used to justify the Treaty of 
Trianon by attempting to prove the lack of validity of the 
anti-Hungarian claims. By doing so, however, they also ex-
pressed their disregard for twentieth-century realities, namely 
that historical arguments now had very little weight when 
confronted with the new principle of national self-determination. 
Although all Hungarian historians were one in their denuncia-
tion of Trianon and in offering their services to the cause of 
revisionism, the historian who was most effective in applying the 
principles of neo-nationalism to history-writing, and did so on a 
rather sophisticated level, was the already mentioned Gyula 
Szekfu. But Szekfu did more than that he augmented 
Klebelsberg's views with his own convictions to the effect that 
Hungary's destiny—its past and future —were linked inseparably 
to what he called the "German Christian World." 
Szekfu first summarized and synthesized his views on the nature 
of Hungarian historical evolution in 1917, in his well-known work 
A magyar dllam eletrajza (The biography of the Hungarian 
State), wherein he discussed the history of his nation within the 
context of the history of "German Christian" Central Europe, 
which he regarded as the most important single factor in 
Hungary's millennial history.18 And even though the collapse of 
Austria-Hungary and the Bismarckian German Empire seemed 
to have ended this whole German-Christian Central European 
configuration, Szekfu continued to promote this idea into the late 
1930s and the early 1940s, when he turned against it because of 
his intense dislike of Nazism. This is evident both from his 
writings and his editorial policy at the influential Magyar Szemle 
(Hungarian Review), which he founded in 1927. 19 In the second 
edition of his above-mentioned work, for example, Szekfu 
expressed the view that "the Hungarians can only hope to escape 
from their current predicament if they follow the well-trodden 
path. . . , i .e . if they walk hand in hand with Germanic Central 
Europe." In his view, this was "one of the clear-cut teachings 
of...(Hungarian) history," which can hardly be disregarded 
without perils and misfortunes to the nation as a whole. 20 
One cannot bypass this view without pointing out that prior to 
Trianon —and to some degree even beyond —many Hungarians, 
including numerous historians, held anti-German and anti-
Habsburg views. Thus, Szekfu's belief in the unavoidable 
common destiny of Germany and Hungary was far from popular 
in Hungary and it remained so nothwithstanding Szekfu's 
bemoaning of Hungary's independence and all that it implied 
after the disintegration of the realm of the Habsburgs. But to 
Szekfu, independence without power, independence at the 
expense of historic Hungary's integrity, was anything but 
desirable. As he put it: 
Those of us who amidst those nerve-wracking days of 
our collapse were able to preserve our sense of 
history...were also forced to recognize...that our 
suddenly gained freedom is only the freedom...of a 
hungry winter wolf. Having been freed from the 
clutches of Central Europe, we stood there alone and 
friendless... We were free, but a bloodied and de-
spoiled small nation.. . A free prey to be robbed, looted 
and destroyed freely by anyone who happened to be 
stronger. 
Then, as if to drive home his point, Szekfu finished his assessment 
of the situation by pointing to the harsh consequences of this 
"freedom" (i.e. separation) from Central Europe 
And the "stronger ones" did come..., and the borders 
of our free nation became ever more constricted... 
Thus did Hungary — freed from dependence on 
Central Europe — shrink back by centuries within the 
span of only a few days. 21 
Although anti-Habsburg and anti-German sentiments continued 
to pervade a sizable segment of interwar Hungary's educated 
circles, Szekfu's above analysis of Hungary's dependence on 
Germanic Central Europe was soon widely accepted. As a matter 
of fact, this belief became one of the important dogmas of 
interwar Hungarian thinking, both among politicians and among 
intellectuals. It became an important belief, alongside the 
already mentioned emphasis upon the alleged unique historical 
role to the Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin. These views 
became part of the official cultural policy initiated by 
Klebelsberg, and they were also incorporated into Szekfu's 
influential multi-volumed Magyar tortenet (Magyar History), 
co-authored with the noted medievalist and cultural politician, 
Balint Homan (1885-1951), during the late 1920s and early 
1930s.22 This work popularized Szekfu's view's on such a grand 
scale that they soon came to form the cornerstone of interwar 
Hungarian historical thinking. Szekfu's ideas influenced the 
thinking and publications of most professional and non-
professional historians and scholars in the related disciplines and 
perhaps even more importantly, also permeated the history 
textbooks of that period. 
In line with the official cultural policy of that period, the 
history textbooks —written by such prominent historians as 
Sandor Domanovszky, Dezso Szabo, Istvan Miskolczy and Gyorgy 
Balanyi — were all at pains to emphasize Hungary's and the 
Magyar peoples' relationship to Germanic Christian Central 
Europe. 23 They also stressed their nation's primary historical 
rights to the Carpathian Basin, as well as its alleged special 
capacity for political leadership and cultural pre-eminence in 
that area. Nor were they modest in pointing out their nation's 
role and sacrifice in having defended Western Christendom 
against "Oriental barbarism," a phenomenon that was not in 
harmony with the new so-called Turanian orientation that also 
gained some popularity in Hungary in the wake of the Trianon 
tragedy. 24 (This claim of having been the defenders of Western 
Christendom, by the way, was not limited to the Hungarians. 
Similar claims have also been advanced by most of the 
nationalities of Central and Southeastern Europe.) 
While portraying the unique historical role of the Hungarians 
in the Carpathian Basin and deriving therefrom a historically 
justifiable claim to the whole area, these history textbooks also 
stressed the singular geographical and economic unity of historic 
Hungary. They proclaimed its dismemberment an unnatural 
act, which was against the innate interest of the region and its 
inhabitants. These books also asserted that the abnormal state of 
affairs created by the Treaty could not possibly be upheld for a 
protracted period of time. In light of the above, it should not 
even come as a surprise that geography in interwar Hungary was 
taught as if Trianon had never taken place. Whole generations 
of youngsters grew up having only historic Hungary's borders 
etched into their minds and fully convinced that Trianon 
Hungary was but a temporary phenomenon that was bound to 
disappear like an evil nightmare. 
Although understandable, this attitude was in a sense a kind of 
self-deception that was also evident in many other spheres of 
contemporary Hungarian life. One of the most visible 
manifestations of this tendency was the increasing popularity of 
the above mentioned Turanian movement, which, within the 
context of interwar Hungary, was both a form of escapism, as 
well as a form of reaction against the so-called "faithless" and 
"treacherous" West that had abandoned Hungary. It should be 
kept in mind that the Hungarians were truly convinced of their 
singular role in having served as one of the most important 
bulwarks of Western Christendom, and they expected gratitude 
in return. Instead of gratitude, however, they were rewarded by 
a total lack of appreciation for their role, which was then 
crowned —so they believed —by Hungary's dismemberment at 
Trianon. The extent of this real or imagined "ingratitude" shook 
the Hungarians to the point where many of them, particularly 
the less sophisticated, were willing to turn their backs on the 
West, while at the same time searching for help and solace amidst 
their real or imagined relatives in the East. Some of these 
disenchanted Hungarians were willing to go so far as to call for 
purging "Hungarian Civilization" of all of its millennial Christian 
culture and faith, and for its replacement by an allegedly 
indigenous and ancient, "pure" Magyar culture and religion. A 
number of them actually proclaimed King St. Stephen, the 
Christianizer of Hungary, as his nation's number one enemy, 
while at the same time demanding that Stephen's pagan 
adversaries —such as Koppany and Vazul — be proclaimed the 
new heroes and "saint" of the Magyars. As one can expect, most 
thoughtful Hungarians declined to go along with this extreme 
and naive manifestation of Turanism, which Szekfu rightfully 
called a form of "new paganism." 25 The rise and relative 
popularity of this strange phenomenon, however, still tells us 
something. It reveals, among others, the extent of the 
psychological dislocation and the depth of the emotional misery 
in which the Hungarian nation found itself after Trianon. 
Moreover, it also reveals some of the subtle motivating forces that 
may have been responsible for pushing the nation in the direction 
of radicalism and various forms of extremism particularly in light 
of its apparent inability to receive a relatively just hearing for its 
complaints before an accepted and authoritative forum of the 
makers of world politics. Despair is probably the worst possible 
counselor, and in a state of hopelessness, individuals as well as 
nations may lose their direction and commit acts which in 
retrospect appear irrational and unthinkable. This was certainly 
demonstrated by some of the developments in interwar Hungary. 
Conclusions 
It may be concluded from the above that interwar Hungary's 
most fundamental problem was the inability of the Hungarian 
psyche to adjust itself to the new realities, i.e. to free itself from 
the national malady that we can rightfully call the "Trianon 
Syndrome." This, in turn, prevented the nation f rom trying to 
solve its most urgent social, economic and political problems in 
the spirit of realism. At the beginning of this period, the 
Hungarian reaction to Trianon was emotional, haphazard, 
misdirected and outright wrong. Later this reaction took at least 
two distinctly different forms on the one hand, the country's 
political and intellectual leaders initiated a systematic, though 
not too successful effort to undo Trianon by trying to persuade 
the treaty's makers of its fundamental injustices, while at the 
same time searching for appropriate military alliances for its 
eventual overthrow, should all peaceful efforts at revision fail. 
On the other hand, some of the earlier misdirected efforts 
continued both in the form of the increased popularity of the 
Turanist self-delusions, as well as in the rise and spread of 
another form of "new paganism" (i.e. Fascism) that offered 
quick, simplistic and often less than moral solutions to the 
nation's complex and long-standing problems. 
It can hardly be questioned that the Turanist and Fascist 
tendencies were misdirected. But one also has to question the 
wisdom of the official anti-Trianon policy of the Hungarian 
government and intellectual circles. One of the greatest mistakes 
of the official anti-Trianon propaganda machine was that it 
relied too heavily on historical arguments, which carry very little 
weight in the twentieth century. The basic inadequacy of this 
approach should have been evident to the country's intellectual 
and political leaders all the more so, as historic Hungary's 
dismemberment was done in the name of the principle of 
national self-determination. Had they been aware of this basic 
tenet, they would have placed much greater emphasis on 
pointing out the basic injustices of Trianon precisely from the 
point of view of this principle. Thus, instead of arguing as to who 
settled first in Hungary and when, they should have demonst-
rated to the world that transferring one-third of the Hungarian 
nation under foreign rule violated the very same principle which 
the peacemakers used to justify the dismemberment of a 
long-standing historical state. Naturally, this policy would not 
have resulted in the re-establishment of historic Hungary, but it 
may have produced an atmosphere more conducive to partial 
revision, i.e. for the reacquisition of the Hungarian-inhabited 
territories immediately adjacent to the new borders. Given the 
shock effect of Trianon, Hungarians apparently were unable to 
follow a path of compromise. They stressed their unwillingness to 
ever give up the idea of reconstituting historic Hungary, which 
they embodied into the slogan " N e m ! Nem! Sofia!" (No! No! 
Never!). Moreover, they tried to regain everything largely on the 
basis of historical arguments. But in doing so, they may have 
relinquished the only viable argument —outside of military 
might — that carried weight in those days: the argument based 
on ethnic and linguistic self-determination. True, as time passed, 
the Hungarian government was increasingly forced to accept the 
idea of partial revision but it accepted this notion only 
temporarily, and then began to apply it at the wrong time and 
with the help of the wrong nations. Although unintended, this 
policy made Hungary into both the "unwilling" and the "last" 
satellite of Nazi Germany for which the country and the nation 
soon had to once again pay a heavy price.26 
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Peaceful Revision: 
The Diplomatic Road to War 
Eva S. Balogh 
Anyone dealing with Hungarian foreign policy between the wars 
must dwell, however tedious it may be for his audience, on an old 
topic Hungarian revisionism and its relation to Hungary's 
eventual fate during and after the Second World War. Whether 
one accepts or rejects the view that the revision of the Treaty of 
Trianon was the sine qua non of the nation's "survival and 
independent existence," 1 the fact remains that revisionism was 
the cornerstone of Hungarian interwar foreign policy. The 
government made no secret of its ultimate goal on the contrary, it 
preached the gospel of revisionism to anyone who would listen, 
repeating its message so often and with such fervor that many 
Westerners soon became convinced that "the Hungarian people 
were not quite sane on that subject." 1 
The zeal with which Hungary promoted the cause of 
revisionism was commensurate with the difficulty of the 
undertaking. Istvan Bethlen, the man who laid the foundation of 
Hungarian interwar foreign policy, did not exaggerate when he 
claimed that although "this nation had gone through many 
catastrophes, never in her history did she face such a formidable 
task as the question of revision."3 The obstacles in the way of 
revising the Treaty of Trianon were enormous: the opposition of 
those who had benefited from the reorganization of East-Central 
Europe in 1919, the Great Powers' antagonism towards or lack of 
sympathy for the Hungarian demands, and Hungary's relative 
insignificance in economic, military and diplomatic terms. 
Without a general territorial reshuffle of the whole region 
between the borders of Germany and Russia, Hungarian 
revisionism did not have the slightest chance of success. 
As peace began to give way to war, however, revision became a 
more realistic goal. The obstacles which had formerly blocked 
Hungary's revisionist path were no longer insurmountable, and 
the futile rhetoric of the past could now be replaced by 
diplomatic maneuvering. Hungarian policy-makers took full 
advantage of the new situation. Spurred on by early diplomatic 
triumphs, they relentlessly pursued their revisionist aims. The 
result was total failure after the war the victorious Allies 
reimposed the same borders (with one minor change, and that to 
Hungary's detriment) which had been so odious to her in 1918 
and which she had tried to change for more than two decades. 
The reason for this failure, it will be argued, was not that 
revisionism was an intrinsically mistaken notion necessarily 
leading to disaster. The problem was rather that Hungarian 
policy makers, obsessed with the desire to recover Transylvania, 
went beyond the limits of prudence and common sense. 
When Bethlen began his active foreign policy in 1927 by 
signing the Italian-Hungarian treaty of friendship, he already 
believed that any reorganization of East Central Europe would 
most likely be affected by Germany and Italy. 4 He did not, 
however, foresee that Italy's foreign policy would become 
increasingly adjusted to that of Germany and that Hungarian 
politicians would be confronted with a Germany which 
could —virtually single-handedly —redraw the map of Eastern 
Europe. The long-awaited opportunity for a major reorganiza-
tion of the area seemed to be on hand, but, at the same time, the 
danger of German penetration into Eastern Europe was very real. 
The revision of the Trianon Treaty, always a complex problem, 
now seemed to be even more intricate given the nature of 
Germany's new regime and Hitler's ambitions for the Lebens-
raum. The question was how long Hungary could, as C.A. 
Macartney stated it, "pluck for herself the fruits which 
Germany's growing power brought within her reach, while 
escaping the dangers." 5 
Between November 1938 and April 1941, Hungary took full 
advantage of German patronage and, in four different stages, 
doubled her size. Ethnically, these acquisitions were a mixed 
bag. Some were populated mostly by Hungarians. Others, such 
as Ruthenia, were almost wholly non-Hungarian in composition, 
while still others (for instance, partitioned Transylvania) had 
such a mixed population that any ethnic claim was dubious at 
best. Although important as far as world opinion at that time 
was concerned, the ethnic composition of these territories was not 
the determining factor in their final fate. As the second Paris 
Peace Conference proved, national self-determination could be 
ignored as easily in 1946 as it had been in 1919. A favorable 
revision of Hungary's borders hinged, first, on the success of her 
foreign policy and, second, on the power relations affecting the 
small nations of East Central Europe. 
Hungary's revisionist drive began auspiciously enough. 
Although the First Viennese Award was the result of Italian-
German arbitration and not of the four-power guarantee which 
had originally been envisaged, the British government tacitly 
recognized the award as binding. In fact, the Foreign Office 
"received the news of it with satisfaction and even relief." 6 The 
new Hungarian-Czechoslovak border devised by Germany and 
Italy was a bit more generous to Hungary than it should have 
been on the basis of strict observance of nationality, yet the ceded 
areas had an overwhelming Hungarian majority. Moreover, the 
British had already opposed the acquisition of the Csallokoz by 
Czechoslovakia in 1919, and the outdated strategic considera-
tions invoked at that time to justify the border change were quite 
absurd by the late 1930s. 
With the outbreak of the war, Hungary's prospects for 
retaining the ceded Slovak territories looked even brighter. 
While the newly-created Slovakia became a vassal state of 
Germany and eagerly took part in the Polish campaign, 
Hungary, to the great satisfaction of the West, remained neutral. 
As a result, sympathy towards Budapest, conspicuously absent 
earlier, began to grow both in Great Britain and in France. 
British diplomats, for example, repeatedly announced that "the 
British government did not tie herself to Mr. Benes' plans 
(concerning the restoration of Czechoslovakia) and (that) the 
main goal of the war...(was) to achieve a lasting peace based on 
solid foundations," thereby indicating that a Czechoslovakia 
reestablished within its former borders was not considered to be 
conducive to peaceful conditions in the area. The French 
attitude, although on the surface warmer to Benes, was 
essentially similar to that of Britain.7 
Hungary's second territorial adjustment, the annexation of 
Ruthenia by independent military action, was a different 
situation altogether. On the basis of self-determination of 
nations, Hungary had no valid claim to the area since the 
majority of the population in Ruthenia was of Ukrainian stock 
and spoke dialects of Ukrainian. The lasting nature of this 
particular acquisition therefore depended entirely on the future 
military and diplomatic status of the Soviet Union. At the time, 
however, the annexation was greeted with a certain amount of 
sympathy in the West. 8 After the German occupation of 
Prague, both Slovakia and Ruthenia had declared their 
independence, and it was expected that both countries would 
soon become obedient servants of the German Reich. Slovakia 
fulfilled the expectations of the West, and Ruthenia, economi-
cally dominated by Germany, seemed headed in the same 
direction. The Hungarian action, which Germany had earlier 
opposed and which she now endorsed only grudgingly, advanced 
Allied interests. It prevented the creation of another German 
satellite and, by the same stroke, brought about a common 
border between Poland and Hungary. 
While the first two territorial acquisitions were defensible at 
the time and likely to be accepted by Western public opinion 
later, the third border revision between Rumania and Hungary, 
sanctioned by German-Italian arbitration, marked the beginning 
of "an impossible situation," as Prime Minister Pal Teleki later 
realized. 9 In spite of warnings from London, Paris, Rome, and 
Berlin, Budapest diplomats spent most of their energies on the 
Transylvanian question. Official statements to the effect that the 
question of Transylvania had to be settled "under any 
circumstances and at any price," indicated that, in spite of a very 
volatile international situation, the Hungarian foreign ministry 
was bent on an early diplomatic solution to an insoluble 
problem.1 0 Critics of this policy within Hungary —most 
notably, former Prime Minister Istvan Bethlen, the chief 
architect of the doctrine of peaceful revision and himself a 
Transylvanian, and Kalman Kanya, former foreign minister and 
the man responsible for Hungary's first successful revision — 
warned the government that the course it was pursuing was not 
only dangerous but also counter-productive. For the sake of a 
permanent and satisfactory arrangement, they argued, the 
Transylvanian question had to be shelved. Instead of a 
belligerent and antagonistic policy towards Rumania, Bethlen 
and Kanya suggested a rapprochement between the two 
countries. 11 But the government persisted with its plans to 
regain Transylvania. 
In the wake of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact, the 
Hungarian government feared a Russian move against Rumania, 
either in conjunction with a similar move by Germany or in 
defiance of Germany's interests. The details of the German-
Soviet secret protocol were, of course, not known at the time, but 
both the Rumanians and Hungarians had a fair idea of its sinister 
bearings on the fate of Bessarabia. There was, for instance, the 
chance that a deal existed between Russia and Germany with a 
view to partitioning Rumania on the Polish model. In that case, 
Hungary would have found herself in the centre of the German 
orbit. A contrary possibility —i.e., a Russian-German falling out 
over Russia's future role in the Balkans, was no better: this would 
have resulted in war and, consequently, in the German 
occupation of Hungary. And if Russia attacked Rumania and 
Rumania resisted, Germany again would have marched through 
Hungary in order to defend the oil wells which the Rumanians 
had threatened to destroy. The only promising solution, to which 
the Russians often alluded, was an Italian-German-Russian 
settlement of the whole Rumanian question. Since the Russians 
were sympathetic if not encouraging towards the Bulgarian and 
Hungarian claims, an arbitration by the three powers, given later 
developments, might have saved some of Hungary's new 
acquisitions after the war. But the Germans ignored the Russian 
scheme. 
In the meantime, the Hungarians were growing increasingly 
impatient to press their territorial claims against Rumania. But 
they met only resistance. The Western Allies, as during earlier 
diplomatic crises, argued that Hungary should do nothing. 
Neither France nor Great Britain wanted the extension of the war 
into the Balkans, and therefore they tried to persuade Hungary to 
postpone territorial revisions in the East until the end of the 
hostilities. 12 This time the Germans and the Italians also 
warned Hungary against reckless adventures in Southeastern 
Europe. The Italians gave friendly advice and tried to calm both 
Budapest and Bucharest. Ciano simply could not understand 
that "a country like Hungary, preoccupied with the German 
danger, (did) not seem to be able to see the danger of aggravating 
the crisis with Rumania, toward which the most dangerous 
ambitions of Berlin seem(ed) to point ."1 3 For the time being, 
however, German ambitions in Rumania remained dormant. As 
long as the generous supply of Rumanian oil flowed freely to the 
German Reich, Hitler had no intention of upsetting the status 
quo in this area. The Germans therefore told Foreign Minister 
Csaky to do absolutely nothing to disturb the tranquility of 
Southeastern Europe.14 
Under these conditions, Hungary decided not to move against 
Rumania. Yet Rumania was not convinced of Hungarian 
sincerity. During the winter of 1939-1940, Rumanian conscript 
workers died by the hundreds in a frantic effort to build a line of 
fortification against Hungary which Bucharest wits rightly or 
wrongly called the "Imaginescu" line.15 In return, the 
Hungarians mobilized two divisions and stationed them near the 
Rumanian-Hungarian border. It was a period of watchful 
waiting. 
The uneasy calm was disturbed in April 1940 when the 
Hungarians heard from a reliable source that Germany planned 
to occupy the rest of Rumania in the event of a Russian move into 
Bessarabia. 16 Although the information was incorrect and 
Hitler sternly told the Hungarians to bide their time, 17 
diplomats in Budapest became increasingly fearful of a German 
occupation of Rumania. They went so far as to ask Rome 
whether they could count on Italian help in case they put up 
armed resistance to Germany. The answer, of course, was 
negative.18 They also put out feelers in Great Britain, but the 
initial British reaction was also discouraging. London told 
Budapest in no uncertain terms that the British government 
believed neither in Hungary's military potential nor in her 
willingness to stand against the German f lood.1 9 By May, 
however, the British Foreign Office became more cordial. While 
British diplomats made it clear that Hungarian cooperation with 
Germany would have very serious repercussions, they promised 
that if Hungary protested the German move across her territory, 
even if this action were followed by the establishment of a 
Hungarian Quisling government, Hungary would be placed in 
the same position which Denmark occupied vis a vis the Allies. If 
the Regent and the government went into exile, Hungary's 
chances of receiving favorable treatment after the war would be 
good. 20 
At the end of May, impressed with the rapid German advances 
westward and fearing an early end to the hostilities, Stalin and 
Molotov decided to cash in their promissory note from Germany. 
On June 26 the Soviet government handed an ultimatum to the 
Rumanian minister in Moscow and demanded the cession of 
Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. Rumania, after ascertaining 
that no assistance was forthcoming from any other powers, had 
no choice but to submit. 
At this point, Hungary made her first diplomatic mistake. She 
pressed Germany for the "fulfillment of her justified demands on 
Rumania." 21 In return for such a favor, Foreign Minister Csaky 
was "ready to grant Germany free traffic through Hungary." 2 2 
The Hungarian territorial claims and her threatening talks of 
military action against Rumania met with extreme German 
displeasure. If Hungary moved militarily, Germany once again 
repeated, she would not only be abandoned, she would be 
severely punished. 23 After the German rebuff, the Hungarians 
gave up the idea of war, but they still pressed for a diplomatic 
solution. 
Both Great Britain and the Soviet Union responded generously 
to Hungary's diplomatic efforts. After July 2, when Rumania 
repudiated the British guarantee and moved over to the Axis 
camp, Great Britain no longer minded a "peaceful solution of 
territorial questions between Rumania and Hungary." 2 4 The 
Soviet Union, being eager to have a hand in the future 
reorganization of the Balkans, also declared to the Hungarians 
that their territorial demands were justified and that the Soviet 
government was ready "to support these claims at a possible 
future peace conference." 25 Hungary needed little encourage-
ment, and soon direct Rumanian-Hungarian negotiations began. 
In view of the extravagant Hungarian demands and the 
Rumanian unwillingness to satisfy them these negotiations were 
bound to fail. With the breakdown of the negotiations, 
Germany, determined to preserve peace for the time being in 
Southeastern Europe, stepped in to arbitrate. 
The Transylvanian case was radically different from that of 
Slovakia: there could be no diplomatic solution to the territorial 
differences between Hungary and Rumania. As Istvan Bethlen 
noted in March 1940, "a final compromise with Rumania (could) 
occur only after a victorious war," and even then only within 
the framework of a federal solution. 26 The Second Viennese 
Award was unsatisfactory both from the Rumanian and from the 
Hungarian point of view. The crux of the matter was that there 
was no such thing as a fair division of the disputed territories. 
More important, the Second Viennese Award alienated both the 
British and the Soviet governments. Although the British did not 
mind a peaceful solution to the Rumanian-Hungarian dispute, 
they very much minded the German-Italian arbitration. 
Although the Soviets considered some of the Hungarian demands 
just, they were greatly annoyed by the obvious German 
determination to exclude the Soviet Union from the affairs of the 
Balkans. Hungary's short-term victory in Vienna did not bode 
well for the future. 
As C.A. Macartney noted, Prime Minister Teleki did not 
"always possess an entirely sure political instinct.. .His Transylva-
nian ancestry and his studies had embued him with a fixed belief 
that the only possible policy for Hungary was one of 
"balance"."2 7 During the Rumanian-Hungarian crisis either he 
did not realize that this policy was no longer viable, or more 
likely, he came to the conclusion that after the great victory of the 
German armies in the West there would be nothing to balance. 
While in March 1940 he had made preparations for the 
establishment of an emigre government in case of need, in May 
he changed his mind and instructed the Hungarian minister in 
Washington to return the five million dollars deposited in New 
York for this purpose.2 8 Perhaps along with many others, he 
underestimated the Allied determination to fight Germany. In 
any case, his decision to press for territorial adjustments at the 
expense of Rumania deeply indebted Hungary to Germany. 
Shortly after the territorial settlement in Vienna, Berlin launched 
its request for the transportation of German troops through 
Hungary on their way to Rumania, and naturally the request had 
to be granted. A few months later Hungary rushed to adhere to 
the Tripartite Agreement which eventually committed Hungary 
to war with the United States. Hungary was rapidly drifting into 
the German camp. The Yugoslav events of the following spring, 
gaining Hungary her fourth border revision and usually 
interpreted as the watershed in Allied-Hungarian relations, were 
only the logical extension of erroneous diplomatic decisions made 
during the previous summer. 
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The Search for a Casus Belli 
and the Origins of the Kassa Bombing 
Thomas Sakmyster 
By early 1945 when most political observers in Europe realized 
that the defeat of Nazi Germany was imminent, all of Germany's 
former wartime allies had either declared neutrality or defected 
to the Allies. In fact, by this time only one country remained 
loyal to Hitler's Germany: Hungary. Even as the Red Army 
moved inexorably through Hungary, and even as Budapest was 
abandoned by the Hungarian government led by Ferenc Szalasi, 
Hungary still did not separate its fate f rom that of Germany. 
Only the final collapse of Hungary's military forces in Austria 
brought an end to the German-Hungarian wartime alliance. It is 
perhaps appropriate, then, to suggest that Hungary has to bear 
the ignominious title of Nazi Germany's "last satellite." 1 
By the same token, it can be argued that Hungary was also 
Nazi Germany's first ally. When Hitler came to power in 1933, 
the Hungarian Prime Minister, Gyula Gombos, was the first 
foreign leader to honour him with a visit. Until the 
Italian-German rapprochement after 1936, Hungary's ties with 
Berlin were more cordial than that of any other European state. 
It is clear, however, that these elements of the German-
Hungarian relationship from 1933 to 1945 do not tell the whole 
story. Indeed, a former American ambassador to Hungary, J.F. 
Montgomery, wrote a book after the war that referred to 
Hungary as the "unwilling satellite," and many historians and 
chroniclers of interwar Hungary have adopted this thesis.2 
According to this view, Hungary was by no means an eager and 
willing accomplice of Hitler. Most Hungarian leaders, in fact, 
regarded Hitler as a vulgar, despicable man and Nazism as an 
abhorrent ideology. They agreed to cooperate on a limited basis 
with Hitler only because the Western Powers refused to consider 
revision of what Hungarians regarded as the totally unfair and 
unwise territorial provisions of the peace settlement after World 
War I. 
According to this view, successive governments of the late 
1930s and early war years were far from loyal allies of Hitler. 
They refused to join in aggressive action against Czechoslovakia 
in 1938 and acted honourably toward Poland in 1939. Moreover, 
during the war Hungary was the least reliable of Germany's 
satellites, constantly arousing Hitler's suspicions and anger. Not 
only was Hungary's military contribution kept to a minimum, but 
despite intensive pressure from Berlin, Hungary, in the heart of 
German controlled Europe, continued until 1944 to treat Jews 
with relative tolerance and to preserve certain elements of 
liberalism and parliamentarianism. This, it has been argued, 
hardly describes an obsequious, loyal ally of Nazi Germany, but 
rather a country that, given its geographic location and 
understandable zeal for a change in the territorial status quo, 
acted honourably and at times even thwarted Hitler's foreign and 
domestic programs. 
"Unwilling satellite" or "last satellite?" As is the case with so 
many historical problems, there is truth in both these 
descriptions. The fact is that Hungarian society was deeply 
convulsed by the question of how to deal with Hitler's Germany. 
Many Hungarians were strongly attracted to the Third Reich, 
firmly believing that it would be victorious in the war, and they 
thus remained fanatically loyal to the bitter end. At the opposite 
pole were those Hungarians who, for a variety of reasons, viewed 
Nazi Germany with great distrust and even contempt. Many 
were convinced that Germany would not win the war. They thus 
struggled, as best they could in the circumstances, to ensure that 
Hungary's fa te would not become entwined with that of 
Germany. These views were predominant among those 
conservative statesmen who occupied most of the highest 
positions of the Hungarian government in the late 1930s and 
the war years. 
Perhaps the portion of Hungarian society in which pro-
German and pro-Nazi sentiments were most pronounced was the 
officer corps. During the interwar period close ties were 
maintained between the Hungarian and German officer corps. 
They had fought "shoulder to shoulder" in World War I and 
looked forward to collaboration in a future war aimed at 
destroying tjhe status quo and fulfilling the territorial aspirations 
of their two countries. These feelings of comradeship and a 
shared destiny were not appreciably diminished by Hitler's 
coming to power in 1933. Some of the more traditional and 
conservative Hungarian officers were wary of intimate coopera-
tion with Hitler's Germany but in the officer corps there was a 
growing general conviction that alliance with Nazi Germany was 
the only path to the restoration of a powerful, prosperous 
Hungary. 3 A handful of these officers were so eager to promote 
Hungary's linking up with the Third Reich that from 1938 on 
into the early stages of World War II they actively searched for a 
suitable casus belli that would draw Hungary into the conflict on 
Germany's side. 
In his memoirs, Admiral Miklos Horthy, Hungary's head of 
state in the interwar period, asserted that Hungary's entry into 
World War II had been provoked by a staged bombing of the 
Hungarian city of Kassa carried out by German pilots. General 
Henrik Werth, the Hungarian Chief of Staff, who had been 
pressing the government to join in Hitler's campaign against 
Soviet Russia, was, according to Horthy, an "interested party" in 
the conspiracy. 4 This theory was accepted by many other 
members of Hungary's interwar conservative nationalist es-
tablishment. At the same time, and somewhat surprisingly, the 
conspiracy theory has also received wide, indeed nearly 
unanimous, support from Marxist historians of contemporary 
Hungary. In the one volume history of Hungary prepared by the 
most prominent historians in Hungary today, it is stated without 
equivocation that the bombing of Kassa was planned by the 
German and Hungarian general staffs in order to draw Hungary 
into the war. 5 
This is surely one of the rare instances in which Marxist 
historians have fully embraced one of Admiral Horthy's 
interpretations of an event in modern Hungarian history. This 
curious state of affairs becomes explicable when one recognizes 
the utility of the conspiracy theory for these ideological 
opponents. For defenders of the Horthy regime, and for Horthy 
himself, it provided a convenient way to transfer responsibility for 
Hungary's entry into the war away from the Hungarian 
government to the devious Nazi Germans and to certain 
unpatriotic Hungarian military officers, many of whom were of 
German ethnic background. Those historians of Socialist 
Hungary who have dealt with the Kassa bombing have laboured 
under another kind of restraint. They could not suggest that the 
bombers had in fact been Soviet, for this would malign the Soviet 
Union, which has always denied responsibility for the bombing. 
Supporters of the conspiracy theory have thus spanned the 
ideological spectrum. Yet, despite the wide acceptance of this 
theory, the supporting evidence has been surprisingly meagre. 
No official German or Hungarian government document relating 
to the alleged conspiracy has been uncovered. Moreover, if there 
was a conspiracy, everyone on both the German and Hungarian 
sides kept his silence during and after the war. No one ever 
stepped forward to admit complicity in the Kassa bombing at the 
postwar trials in Nuremberg and in Hungary, or in biographical 
sources. Thus, the theory of a conspiracy has rested largely on 
the testimony of three individuals. One was Adam Krudy, a 
Hungarian military officer who emerged after the war as the most 
famous eyewitness of the bombing. Krudy asserted that the 
bombing was carried out by the Germans in aircraft that bore 
Axis markings. There are major inconsistencies in Krudy's 
testimony, however, and in recent years his assertions have been 
discredited by several investigators, including Julian Borsanyi 
and Nandor Dreisziger. 6 
The conspiracy theory has also rested in part on the testimony 
of two military intelligence officers, Rudolf Bamler, a high-
ranking member of the German intelligence agency, the Abwehr, 
during the early stages of World War II, and Istvan Ujszaszy, who 
in 1941 was head of military intelligence on the Hungarian 
General Staff. Ujszaszy was interrogated while in Soviet custody 
after the war. An alleged transcript of his statements pertaining 
to the Kassa bombing was submitted as evidence at the 
Nuremberg Trials. Ujszaszy stated flatly that certain German 
and Hungarian officers had manufactured the incident at 
Kassa in order to provoke Hungary to declare war. Ujszaszy's 
testimony, however, did not provide any convincing specific 
evidence. It is apparent that he did not have any first-hand 
knowledge of a conspiracy, and that his assertion was merely a 
hunch based on the suspicious behaviour of some of his 
colleagues. In any case, the reliability of his testimony is reduced 
by the na ture of his interrogation, which may have been under 
duress. 7 
The testimony of Rudolf Bamler, who in 1939 was head of 
counterintelligence in the Abwehr, must also be treated with 
caution. At an East German historical conference in 1957, 
Bamler, himself not a historian, spoke about the role of German 
military intelligence in the coming of World War II. As an 
example of the invidious activities of the Abwehr, Bamler 
referred briefly to the bombing of Kassa, which, he claimed, was 
arranged by the Abwehr in order to persuade the Hungarians to 
enter the war. Bamler made no mention of the participation of 
Hungarian officers in the conspiracy, although he did make the 
remarkable accusation that the President of Slovakia, Jozef Tiso, 
was aware of and abetted the conspiracy. 8 Bamler offered no 
documentation to support his assertions. Since Bamler in 1941 
was no longer assigned to the Abwehr (he was the commander of 
an artillery regiment) it is unlikely that he was involved in the 
alleged conspiracy. It is possible that his story was based on 
information he had gained from his Abwehr colleagues, but this 
is merely a supposition, since neither at the historical conference 
nor later did Bamler elaborate on his brief and cryptic references 
to the Kassa bombing. 
The theory of a German-Hungarian conspiracy has thus rested 
on a weak foundation of evidence, and in recent years some of the 
historians most interested in the Kassa controversy have discarded 
it as a likely explanation. Even in Hungary some historians have 
ventured to suggest that this traditional theory is flawed by 
inconsistencies and questionable supporting evidence. 9 Despite 
this historiographical trend, the purpose of this paper is to argue 
that the conspiracy theory remains both viable and plausible. 
Although startling new evidence bearing on the alleged 
conspiracy has not been uncovered, there exists certain intriguing 
circumstantial evidence bearing on the possible role of Hungar-
ian officers in a plot to create a casus belli for Hungary's entry 
into the war. On the basis of this evidence it is possible to 
conclude not that Hungarian officers definitely helped stage a 
provocation at Kassa, but that certain of them were quite willing 
to do so and in fact had urged the Germans to create such a 
provocation on two separate occasions before June, 1941. To 
demonstrate this, one need not rely on the testimony of Krudy, 
Ujszaszy, or Bamler. 
In the past one of the weaknesses of the conspiracy theory has 
been the inability of investigators to discover any Hungarian 
officers who could be specifically linked with a conspiracy. 
Several individuals have been mentioned, but no convincing 
evidence has ever been uncovered. If there was a conspiracy, it 
has been argued, surely some Hungarian officers would have 
been collaborating with German officials in Budapest. Two 
prominent German representatives in wartime Budapest, Gen-
eral Fiitterer, the air attache, and Otto von Erdmannsdorf, the 
diplomatic minister, have both denied in a convincing way any 
knowledge of a conspiracy hatched in Budapest. Skeptics also 
argue that a plot of this kind would have required that a large 
number of Hungarian officers participate. In interwar Hungary 
even the most confidential information had a way of spreading 
quite rapidly through informal channels. It seems inconceivable 
that a conspiracy on the scale of the Kassa bombing could have 
been kept a secret in Budapest not only during the war but up to 
today. 
This phenomenon can be explained, however, if one assumes 
that the alleged conspiracy was carried out by only a handful of 
Hungarians and Germans skilled in military intelligence, and 
that the plot was devised and coordinated not in Budapest but in 
Berlin. The two most prominent Hungarian officials in Berlin in 
June, 1941 were Col. Sandor Homlok, the military attache, and 
Dome Sztojay, a former General Staff officer who had been 
Hungary's minister to Germany since 1936. These two 
individuals may be regarded as prime suspects in the search for 
the Kassa bombing conspirators. 
In the two decades before 1941, Sztojay and Homlok helped set 
the stage for close military cooperation with Germany. Their 
special area of expertise was military intelligence. Before 1918 
Sztojay had been an intelligence expert assigned to the Habsburg 
General Staff in Vienna. His experience was put to good use in 
Hungary after the war, when Sztojay helped to establish an 
independent intelligence service and became its first director. 
From 1927 he served as military attache in Berlin, where he 
fostered his personal ties with Germany's military elite. The 
culmination of his efforts was an important secret agreement 
signed by the German and Hungarian general staffs in 1932. It 
called for a coordination of German and Hungarian intelligence 
gathering operations, particularly with regard to Czechoslovakia 
as a likely opponent of the two countries.10 From this point on 
German and Hungarian cooperation in intelligence matters was 
intensive. Nazi Germany did not ever establish such a frank and 
intimate relationship with any other country for the exchange of 
military intelligence. 
In 1936 Sztojay was appointed Hungarian Minister in Berlin. 
By this time he was fully convinced that Hungary's salvation lay 
in the closest cooperation, indeed even alliance, with the Third 
Reich. Sztojay felt increasingly frustrated, however, by the 
refusal of the civilian government, especially the Foreign 
Minister, Kalman Kanya, to make any direct commitment to 
Hitler's Germany. Sztojay was so convinced of the validity of his 
views that he was willing to deviate from official Hungarian 
policy in certain matters and pursue his own policies. His 
deviations were encouraged by his friends on the Hungarian 
General Staff, to whom he reported regularly. As Europe edged 
toward a crisis in 1937 and 1938, Sztojay was working secretly 
behind the scenes, without the knowledge or approval of his 
superiors in Budapest, to convince the Germans that Hungary 
could and would participate in a joint action against Czechoslo-
vakia. Whenever possible he pressed for German-Hungarian 
military staff talks to prepare for such a campaign. 11 
Sztojay's frustration over the circumspection of Hungary's 
civilian government was shared by many of his fellow military 
officers. By 1937 it was generally believed in the Hungarian 
General Staff that renewed war was certain and that a powerfully 
rearmed Germany was bound to emerge victorious in such a 
conflict. It was thus imperative that Hungary link its destiny to 
that of Germany before it was too late. Discontent in the General 
Staff was so great that in early 1938 serious thought was given to 
toppling Hungary's parliamentary system and installing a 
military dictatorship.12 Prominent among these discontented 
officers was Col. Homlok, who during 1938 and 1939 was a 
general staff officer active in various matters relating to military 
intelligence and surreptitious activities of all kinds. 
Homlok was able to establish close personal ties with 
high-ranking Abwehr officials, including Admiral Canaris. 13 
As the crisis over Czechoslovakia heated up in the late summer of 
1938, Homlok apparently was searching for a way to persuade his 
government to overcome its hesitations and join wholeheartedly 
in a German attack on Czechoslovakia. During high-level 
German-Hungarian talks in late August, however, Regent Miklos 
Horthy rejected Hitler's offer of a joint military campaign to 
dismember Czechoslovakia. It was in the aftermath of those 
dramatic talks that Homlok called on Col. Hellmuth Groscurth, 
head of Section 2 of the Abwehr, in Berlin on September 1. After 
asserting that Hungary in principle wished to join in the attack on 
Czechoslovakia, Homlok made the following statement, which is 
recorded in Groscurth's diary: "The Hungarian Chief of Staff 
requests the creation of a casus belli for an attack on Czech-
oslovakia by the dropping of Czech bombs on Hungarian 
territory by German aircraft after seizure of the first Czech 
airports. The Hungarians wish to determine the timing of the 
bombing."1 4 
It is certain that Homlok's request was made without 
knowledge of the civilians in the Hungarian government. 
Whether the Hungarian Chief of Staff, Jeno Ratz, had in fact 
authorized Homlok's approach to the Abwehr is unknown. No 
other mention of Homlok's initiative can be found in any other 
German or Hungarian document. It should be noted that 
Groscurth, who secretly opposed Hitler's aggressive policies, 
seemed to regard Homlok's plan as a verification of his suspicion 
that the Hungarian government did not want to join in the 
campaign against Czechoslovakia. Of course, events in 
September, 1938 proceeded in such a way that the opportunity 
for the Abwehr to fulfill Homlok's request did not arise. 
Later in 1938 and early 1939 Homlok continued to pursue 
projects that directly impinged on Hungarian foreign policy. In 
the fall he presided over the attempt to infiltrate Hungarian 
guerrilla bands into Slovakia and Ruthenia in order to create 
disturbances and turmoil, thus setting the stage for the entry of 
Hungarian troops to restore order. 15 Homlok soon gained a 
reputation for ruthlessness and a willingness to use unorthodox 
and even illegal methods. There is some evidence to suggest that 
he engineered a series of provocations along the Slovak border in 
January, 1939, which greatly inflamed Hungary's relations with 
Czechoslovakia. These provocations failed to produce the desired 
result, namely Hungarian seizure of Slovakia, and among more 
moderate Hungarian officials Homlok was coming into disrepute 
as an irresponsible adventurer.16 
Later in 1939 Homlok was appointed military attache in 
Berlin. After the outbreak of the war he joined Sztojay in 
pressing the government in Budapest to abandon its neutrality 
and align itself with Germany in the war. A critical junction was 
reached in the spring of 1941, when Hitler decided to send his 
armies into Yugoslavia and urged Hungary to join in the attack. 
In their eagerness to seize this opportunity, Hungary's military 
leaders strongly recommended full cooperation with Germany. 
The suicide of Pal Teleki, the Prime Minister, who opposed 
militant action, made the officers even more desperate. How 
could they overcome the shock over Teleki's suicide and persuade 
the Regent and Cabinet to accept Hitler's offer? A strategy was 
adopted to ask the Germans to create a suitable casus belli for 
Hungary, perhaps a Yugoslav provocation on the southern 
frontier. Such a proposal was presented directly to Hitler on 
April 4 by Sztojay and the Hungarian Minister of Defense, 
General Karoly Bartha. 17 
It is not known what Hitler's reaction was to this Hungarian 
proposal. When the German attack began on April 6, however, 
some bombs were dropped on the Hungarian city of Szeged and 
elsewhere in southern Hungary by what were reported to be 
Yugoslav planes. Rumours spread immediately that the bombing 
was in fact German provocation. 18 No further information 
about these bombing raids, which bear some resemblance to the 
attack on Kassa, has been uncovered. 
The second great crisis of 1941 came with the German attack 
on Soviet Russia in June. Sztojay was probably the first 
Hungarian to learn of the upcoming campaign. During a 
conversation with Sztojay in late March, Hitler strongly hinted 
that he had lost patience with the Soviet Union and that a 
German-Soviet confrontation was not far off. 19 In May, when it 
became clear that the German invasion was imminent, Sztojay 
dispatched several reports to Budapest in which he argued that 
Hungary, which had long enjoyed a reputation as a staunchly 
anti-communist state, could not possibly stand aside when 
Hitler's great crusade against Bolshevism began. In fact, 
Hungary would be well advised to volunteer its assistance 
beforehand. 20 Homlok argued along similar lines in his own 
91 
report. 
In Budapest similar arguments were being presented by 
General Werth, the Chief of Staff. The Hungarian Cabinet and 
even the normally impetuous Regent were not eager, however, to 
embark on a military campaign that did not seem to have a direct 
impact on Hungary's national interests. In any case, the 
Germans were not asking for any major Hungarian assistance. As 
the Russian campaign unfolded on June 22, Hungary's military 
leaders were thus highly frustrated and depressed. By the next 
day, however, the situation had changed dramatically. The 
Wehrmacht's special representative in Hungary, General Kurt 
Himer, now informed Werth that a voluntary offer of support by 
Hungary would in fact be welcomed by Germany. 22 
The Hungarian government, however, was still reluctant to 
take any significant military measures against the Soviet Union, 
and Hitler refused to make a direct request for Hungarian help, 
since this might eventually lead to Hungarian demands for 
territorial rewards. A stalemate was thus reached, and the 
German High Command, aware of the grumbling among the 
Hungarian officers, took the position that "if the (Hungarian) 
soldiers want to participate, they should persuade their 
politicians." 23 
In Berlin Sztojay and Homlok were almost certainly aware of 
the German military authorities attitude on June 22 and 23. It 
seems entirely plausible, indeed even likely, that when they were 
told that the Hungarian officers should persuade their govern-
ment, Sztojay and Homlok concluded that this could no longer be 
accomplished through written exhortations. The crisis seemed to 
call for the kind of bold tactic that had been used by Homlok and 
Sztojay twice before, in September, 1938 and April, 1941 a 
request for a German manufactured provocation. It also seems 
probable that in making such a request Sztojay and Homlok 
would turn not to Hitler and Ribbentrop (who in any case were 
inaccessible at the Fiihrer's headquarters), but to their friends in 
the Abwehr with whom they had worked intimately on many 
clandestine projects over the years. If this speculation is correct, 
the plot was thus hatched in Berlin shortly after June 22 and was 
carried out by Abwehr agents on June 26. 
Several objections to this theory might legitimately be raised. 
For example, why have no official Hungarian or German 
documents concerning the conspiracy come to light? The answer 
would be that no such Hungarian documents would exist because 
the plot was hatched and carried out in Berlin. It may be that no 
Hungarians other than Sztojay and Homlok were aware of the 
conspiracy. Perhaps General Werth, the Chief of Staff, simply 
instructed Homlok to do what he could to persuade the Germans 
to help create a suitable casus belli. This would not have been 
unprecedented as we have seen, the Hungarian Minister of 
Defense had made precisely this request of Hitler in April, 1941. 
Werth may even have assumed the attitude so characteristic of 
leaders presiding over clandestine and potentially embarrassing 
operations he may have told Homlok to do what was necessary, 
but that he should not report officially on the details of any 
provocation that was carried out. If this was the case, Werth 
himself may have been surprised by the bombing of Kassa, and 
he may not have been certain in his own mind that this was in fact 
a German provocation. In any case, Sztojay and Homlok would 
surely have been careful to keep the conspiracy a secret and to 
communicate with their German counterparts orally rather than 
in writing. It is also understandable that both men would have 
kept their terrible secret later in the war and especially after the 
war. Homlok was certainly capable of concealing the unsavoury 
projects in which he had participated. Early in the war he was to 
play a sinister role in a secret plan to gain German cooperation 
for the expulsion of Jews from Hungary. Homlok's actions served 
directly to undermine his government's policies and set the stage 
for the brutal treatment of Hungary's Jews in 1944. Yet Homlok's 
role in these events was not uncovered after the war, and Homlok 
carefully kept his silence and escaped any prosecution or 
notoriety. 24 
The absence of any surviving documentation on the German 
side can also be explained. The Abwehr was a highly professional 
organization that of course took rigourous measures to maintain 
secrecy in its clandestine operations. Those who participated in 
the conspiracy (the pilots of the bombers, service crew at the 
airport, etc.) were surely not told all the details of the mission. 
Probably only a small number of high-ranking Abwehr officers 
knew the full story, and some or most of them, including Canaris, 
may have died in the war. It should also be noted that most of 
the Abwehr's files and archives were destroyed in the war. Thus 
any written records relating to the Kassa bombing would likely 
have perished. 
There remains a practical question, posed by Julian Borsanyi 
in his book on the Kassa bombing. Could the Germans have 
planned and carried out the bombing of Kassa in just the few 
days between June 22 and June 26? 25 The answer is yes. The 
Abwehr had several posts and no doubt a number of officers and 
agents in Slovakia. Suitable aircraft of Russian design had been 
acquired during the seizure of Czechoslovakia in 19 3 9 . 26 Surely 
no more than one day would have been required to secure and 
prepare the appropriate planes on an airfield under Abwehr 
jurisdiction in Slovakia. It seems likely that the Abwehr had 
available reliable pilots who knew the terrain (perhaps Slovak 
pilots) and could drop the bombs with some precision once the 
target was reached. T h e Abwehr had for some time conducted 
reconnaissance flights along and even across the Soviet frontier in 
this area. (Some of these flights apparently originated at a secret 
Abwehr air base in Hungary near Budapest.)2 7 
The conspiracy theory outlined here is based only on 
circumstantial evidence. It is, however, a plausible explanation 
to the mystery of the Kassa bombing. Even if someday 
sensational and convincing new evidence is found that demon-
strates that the responsibility for the bombing rests with the 
Soviet Union, or with the Slovaks or Czechs, it still would be 
possible to say that there were some Hungarians who were fully 
capable of instigating such a provocation and had tried to do so 
even before June, 1941. 
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Former Diplomat 
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Though several decades have elapsed since the conclusion of the 
Second World War many pertinent issues remain unsolved. The 
best-known one is certainly the unfinished mission of Rudolf 
Hess. On the eve of the German-Russian war, the Hess affair was 
a momentous German effort to neutralize the West in order to get 
a free hand against the Soviet Union. But the Hess mission failed 
of necessity because by May, 1941, Adolf Hitler's Germany had 
lost its credibility in the eyes of the West. A few weeks later, the 
bombing of Kassa occurred and joined the series of unsolved 
mysteries of this greatest human drama. Like the Rudolf Hess 
mission, the bombing of Kassa is also surrounded by secrecy. 
Owing to the very nature of such events no authentic 
sources —written or printed —have surfaced since. It appears to 
have been planned and executed in complete secrecy as the 
natural outcome of long and complex diplomatic developments. 
On June 4, 1920, the Treaty of Trianon put an end to the 
existence of historic Hungary. It meant significant territorial 
losses for the country and roughly 4 million Hungarian became 
minorities in the successor states. The minority rights of these 
Hungarians remained unsettled between the wars as the successor 
states did not ensure equality for their Hungarian subjects. This 
development caused Hungarians to be preoccupied with 
revisionism, which became the cornerstone of Hungary's external 
policy. Anti-Soviet sentiment was also a prime factor in the 
country's foreign policy orientation. Since Germany found 
herself in a similar strategic constellation, revisionism and 
anti-Communism helped to forge a community of interest 
between German and Hungarian societies. Due to these 
circumstances, for years elected governments in Hungary 
misinterpreted the advent of national socialism, starting with the 
Nazi takeover on February 1, 1933. On that same day, Prime 
Minister Gyula Gombos, formerly a captain on the General Staff, 
sent an enthusiastic message to Adolf Hitler, and requested closer 
cooperation between Germany and Hungary in economic as well 
as foreign policy matters . 1 
Despite Prime Minister Gombos' desire to establish closer and 
more cordial relations with Germany, German-Hungarian 
diplomatic envoys continued to be mutually suspicious of each 
other even before the 1938 Sudeten crisis when the Hungarian 
government refused to participate in military action against 
Czechoslovakia as Germany's ally. On March 7, 1934, Italy, 
Austria and Hungary concluded the Rome Pact in order to 
coordinate their political and economic policies. At the time, 
both Austria and Hungary looked upon Italy as a natural 
counterweight to Germany's expansionist designs. This idea 
proved to be a misconceived one since Italy did not have either 
the military or economic strength to counterbalance German 
imperialism. Because of Germany's rising power in Central and 
Eastern Europe, the Rome Pact was unable to block the 
Wilhelmstrasse's ambitions. As a result, the signatory govern-
ments of the Rome Pact soon took Germany's suspicions into 
consideration and even thought of asking Germany to join the 
Rome Pact. By doing this the Rome Pact governments admitted 
that the idea that Italy could serve as a counterweight to 
Germany was nothing but an empty illusion from the very 
beginning. 2 
The first major break in German-Hungarian relations 
occurred in August 1938 as an aftermath of the Bled Conference 
in Yugoslavia where Hungary and the Little Entente states had 
just reached an agreement. The Bled Agreement of August 23, 
1938, recognized for the first time since the end of the First World 
War Hungary's right to rearmament. It also renounced the use 
of force in territorial disputes between Hungary and the Little 
Entente States.3 It is interesting to note that the Bled 
Conference occurred during the state visit of Regent Horthy and 
other leading Hungarian politicians to Germany. During the 
visit, Hitler and Ribbentrop in vain urged the Hungarians to 
commit themselves to military action against Czechoslovakia. 
These negotiations were summarized fifteen years later as follows: 
During these negotiations the Hungarian Government 
had resisted all the pressure that was put upon them to 
give a firm promise of military cooperation with 
Germany in an attack on Czechoslovakia... Not even 
Hitler's willingness at this stage, to allow Hungary to 
acquire the whole of Slovakia and Ruthenia, could 
tempt the Hungarians, in their disarmed state, to 
commit themselves to military action against Czecho-
slovakia. 4 
On November 28, 1938, foreign minister Kalman 
Kanya was replaced at German instigation for the role he had 
played at the Bled Conference. According to the Minutes of the 
Berlin meeting on January 16, 1939 between the Fuehrer and 
Istvan Csaky, the new foreign minister, Hitler strongly criticized 
the anti-German behaviour of the Hungarian government and 
had especially harsh words for Kanya's role at the Bled 
Conference. Hitler accused Kanya of being an enemy of 
Germany, and of helping to revive the Little Entente against 
Germany during Horthy's state visit to Germany. 5 
Ribbentrop's hostile attitude toward the Hungarian govern-
ment seemed to be evident in the negotiations leading to the 
Vienna Award of 1938. Ciano recorded his telephone 
conversations with Ribbentrop on the matter as follows: "The 
truth is that he (Ribbentrop) intends to protect Czechoslovakia as 
far as he can and sacrifice the ambitions, even the legitimate 
ambitions, of Hungary."5 Mussolini and Ciano wished to utilise 
Hungary as a barrier against Germany's eastward expansion. 
The German foreign ministry clearly saw this intention and 
therefore backed Slovakia against Hungary. In his conversation 
with Vojtech Tuka on February 12, 1939, Hitler "regretted that 
he had not known earlier of the Slovak struggle for independ-
ence."7 During those days Hitler showed himself as a protector 
of Slovakia against Hungarian claims. A.J. P. Taylor was not far 
from the truth when he stated that, in protecting Slovakia's 
independence, "Hitler was acting against the Hungarians rather 
than against the Czechs."8 
The relationship between Germany and Hungary never 
improved; on the contrary, it gradually worsened despite 
Mussolini's and Ciano's interventions to reconcile the two 
governments. The case of Poland was the next test of the 
worsening Hungarian-German connection. On July 24, 1939, 
just a few weeks before the outbreak of the German-Polish war, 
Prime Minister Teleki wrote two letters to Chancellor Hitler 
concerning Hungary's role in the foreseeable German-Polish 
conflict. In his second letter Pal Teleki strongly emphasized that 
"Hungary could not, on moral grounds, be in a position to take 
armed action against Poland." 9 Teleki's second letter caused 
enormous consternation in Germany's ruling circles. On August 
8, 1939, Istvan Csaky received a ruthless answer at Berchtesga-
den. Hitler felt mortally offended and declared that Germany 
did not want Hungarian assistance against Poland because as he 
said "Poland presents no military problem to us." 10 In order to 
conciliate German leadership, foreign minister Csaky apologized 
and withdrew Prime Minister Teleki's letters, explaining that 
"...unfortunately, they had apparently been misunderstood." 11 
On September 1, 1939, the German attack on Poland began. 
Hungary did not lend any assistance in this case. In contrast, the 
army of independent Slovakia joined the German forces and 
started military operations against her northern Slavic brothers. 
The Polish-Slovak war was very cruel the Poles even used 
chemical warfare against the Slovaks. 
The Slovak attack on Poland created a cordial relationship 
between Germany and Slovakia at Hungary's expense. This was 
demonstrated on several occasions afterwards. As an aftermath 
of the war, more than 200,000 Poles escaped from their country 
and found refuge as political exiles in Hungary. From a German 
vantage point Hungary's hospitality to the refugees appeared to 
be an unfriendly act, all the more so as it contrasted sharply with 
the attitude of Slovakia. On October 21, 1939, the Slovak envoy 
MatuS Cernak, was granted an audience with Hitler, during 
which the Fuehrer praised Slovakia's behaviour while sharply 
condemning Hungary's, and held out the prospect of the revision 
of the 1938 Vienna Award at the expense of Hungary.1 2 In July, 
1940, Jozef Tiso, the President of Slovakia, led a government 
delegation on a state visit to Germany. During the ensuing 
negotiations, Hitler and Ribbentrop reassured the Slovak leaders 
that their newly-established country was under the protection of 
Germany which would see to it that Hungary's hostile intentions 
against Slovakia would be prevented from materializing.13 
Germany could not rely on the Teleki government, remember-
ing only too well the uncooperative attitude of the Teleki-
influenced government relating to Hitler's actions against 
Czechoslovakia in 1938 and Poland in 1939. As a result, 
Germany requested Ciano to secure the Hungarian government's 
permission to use its transportation system by German troops 
destined to invade Greece in 1940.14 At this time Hungary's 
military leadership enjoyed a privileged position afforded by Law 
No.II of 1939 on national defense. This law brought about 
fundamental changes in the country's political structure and 
deeply influenced its military and foreign policies in the coming 
years.15 Law No.II of 1939 restored universal conscription, 
compelled all citizens between the ages of 14 and 70 to perform 
defense work even in peacetime, put under military control the 
most important branches of civilian administration including all 
industrial and agricultural production, and established the 
Legfelsobb Honvedelmi Tanacs (Supreme Council on National 
Defense), an organization which had de facto jurisdiction in 
important military, domestic, and foreign policy affairs over the 
regular government. 
As a direct consequence of the overambitious implementation 
of the National Defense Law of 1939, Hungary actually had two 
governments: civilian and military. Regent Horthy sided with the 
latter in most of the civilian-military disputes. In these crucial 
times, on September 1, 1940, Teleki wrote a letter to Regent 
Horthy complaining about the growing influence of the military 
over the civilian administration as well as the activities of General 
Henrik Werth, Chief of the Hungarian General Staff. In this 
letter Teleki accused Werth and the military of interfering with 
most branches of the civilian government including the ministries 
of Foreign Affairs, Commerce, and Industry. The military, he 
further charged, without the knowledge of competent ministers, 
concluded agreements with Germany even on export-import 
matters. Teleki also raised objections against the customary 
practice of German army (intelligence corps) officers commis-
sioned by the Royal Hungarian General Staff routinely 
participating in deciphering codes in the Hungarian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs without the knowledge and approval of the 
Hungarian Foreign Minister.16 
Regent Horthy, confident in the military, failed again to put 
an end to this state of affairs. Obviously, the Regent's political 
philosophy contributed to establishing close military cooperation 
between his country and Germany. In fact, by the time of the 
German invasion of Yugoslavia there had been well-established 
channels of communication between the two general staffs. On 
March 27, 1941, Hitler summoned the commanders of his air 
force and the army and while announcing an imminent attack on 
Yugoslavia he stated, among others, the following intentions "We 
will try to get the neighboring states to participate in a suitable 
way. Actual military support against Yugoslavia is to be asked of 
Italy, Hungary and in certain respects of Bulgaria too."1 7 At 
the same meeting Hitler announced territorial rewards for these 
countries: the Adriatic coast for Italy, the Banat for Hungary and 
Macedonia for Bulgaria.18 
Horthy and his military leaders agreed to the German request, 
while Teleki and some of his supporters had serious reservations. 
Laszlo Szabo, Hungarian military attache in Rome and a friend 
and confidant of Mussolini, belonged to the latter group and 
confidentially informed his Yugoslav colleague in Rome about 
Hitler's intention days before the German attack on 
Yugoslavia. 19 On March 30, 1941, General Friedrich von 
Paulus arrived in Budapest to begin negotiations with General 
Werth, on Hungarian-German military collaboration aimed 
against Yugoslavia. According to Paulus there were no obstacles 
in the negotiations which resulted in mutual understanding. 
On the same day, March 30, 1941, only days before the start of 
military operations against Yugoslavia, Karoly Rassay, leader of 
Hungary's liberal opposition, called on the new foreign minister, 
Laszlo Bardossy, to protest against the planned military action. 
Bardossy defended the country's participation in the planned 
military operation arguing that if Hungary did not take part in 
the action Germany would occupy the country and appoint a 
government which would fulfill all the wishes of Berlin. At this 
meeting with Rassay, Bardossy referred to the extraordinary 
pressure exerted upon the civilian government by Hungarian 
military circles to take active part in the forthcoming German-
Yugoslav war. These military circles based their judgement on 
the fact that up to this point the Hungarian army had been 
mobilized three times without being engaged in action and that if 
the current mobilization did not culminate in military action, it 
would destroy the army's morale.2 0 
As the time of Germany's military confrontation with the 
Soviet Union approached, German diplomats and generals tried 
repeatedly to bind Hungary more closely to the Third Reich. On 
May 24, 1941, Otto von Erdmannsdorff, the German envoy to 
Budapest, had a conversation with Prime Minister Bardossy 
which dealt strictly with military topics and focused on Hungary's 
eventual participation in the anticipated German-Soviet war. 21 
Henceforth, high-ranking military officers of Germany desper-
ately strove to obtain a voluntary pledge from the Hungarian 
government to participate in the coming German-Soviet conflict. 
Learning from past experience when Hungary refused to follow 
the German lead —in the Czechoslovak and Polish crises —Hitler 
and Ribbentrop clung to the principle of voluntary action. They 
did so because they could not countenance being flatly rejected 
again. In addition, the German government was rightly afraid of 
further territorial demands by Hungary which would have 
seriously complicated Berlin's relationship with its two client 
states, Slovakia and Rumania, at this stage of developments. 
In spite of the insistence of General Werth and some other 
ranking Hungarian officers, the Bardossy government stuck to its 
original standpoint that without the explicit request of the 
German government, made through diplomatic channels, the 
Hungarian government would not be willing to participate in the 
conflict. 
Under escalating German pressure, Henrik Werth, Dome 
Sztojay, and Colonel Sandor Homlok, the military attache at the 
Hungarian Legation in Berlin, in vain urged Bardossy to make a 
voluntary declaration of a military alliance with Germany in the 
approaching war. On June 14, 1941, just a week before the 
outbreak of German-Soviet hostilities, Henrik Werth sent a 
Memorandum to Prime Minister Bardossy.22 In it Werth 
impatiently urged the government to authorize him to enter into 
negotiations with competent German military leaders with the 
aim of settling the essential points of military cooperation. In 
Werth's opinion, Hungary ought to participate in the forthcom-
ing hostilities all the more because "the German armed forces will 
achieve victory (over the Red Army) and the participation of 
Hungary will last only for a very short time so that in a few weeks 
the mobilized Hungarian troops can gradually be discharged and 
can return home by harvest time." In the Memorandum, Werth 
steadfastly stressed that Hungary's territorial growth depended 
on the active cooperation of the Hungarian army with Germany's 
fighting forces, and concluded that the government should make 
a voluntary offer of a military alliance to Germany. 
On June 20, 1941, just two days before the German attack on 
the Soviet Union, Colonel Homlok prepared a report to Werth 
emphasizing that: 
I hold necessary Hungary's military participation... 
Military operations will assume the character of a 
"Blitzkrieg"...According to more cautious estimates 
the war will be finished in 3 months.. .I heard such an 
opinion that after the first great battle the Soviet 
military might will start disintegrating. 23 
Some s imu l t aneous events r e n d e r e d Hungary ' s 
position very difficult. On June 22, 1941, Italy declared war 
against the USSR and, on the same day Slovakia severed 
diplomatic relations with the Soviets. The following day, General 
Antonescu issued a Manifesto to the Rumanian army and the 
nation to liberate Russian occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina. 
Concurrently Slovakia entered the war while Hungary merely 
severed its diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union. After the 
session of the Council of Ministers, Premier Bardossy asked 
Karoly Bartha, Minister of Defense, what the outlook for the war 
was. The Minister of Defense predicted total German victory in 
six weeks time. But German plans for a Blitzkrieg were 
threatened already during the first days of the war. This is why 
soon after June 22nd Germany urged some European nations to 
participate in one form or other in the "crusade" against the 
Soviet Union. The propaganda machinery of the Nazionalsozial-
istische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei in particular tried to muster 
more nations for collective action. Despite these efforts, the 
Bardossy government unequivocally refused to offer military aid 
on a voluntary basis. 
During this highly critical period, interesting diplomatic 
actions and changes in attitude took place in Hungarian-Soviet 
relations which understandably irritated the diplomats of the 
Third Reich. It is important to put events into historical 
perspective. In order to counterbalance Germany's aid to 
Rumania in its dispute with Hungary, Molotov told Jozsef 
Kristoffy, Hungarian envoy to Moscow, as early as July 4th, 1940 
that the Soviet Union considered Hungary's revisionist claims to 
be well-founded and that she will help Hungary at the peace 
conference. 24 Somewhat later, on August 25, 1940, Molotov 
again told Kristoffy that the Soviet Union never acknowledged 
the Paris Peace Treaties and the Treaty of Trianon because these 
treaties created a Rumania which was contrary to the interests of 
Hungary, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria alike. A day after the 
outbreak of the German-Soviet war, Molotov again told Kristoffy 
that the Soviet Union has no territorial demands against 
Rumania, but he, Molotov, wanted to know the Hungarian 
government's position concerning the ongoing conflict. Because 
of the circumstances in those days, Kristoffy no longer had 
contact with his government, therefore Molotov himself gave 
instructions for the restoration of communication links between 
Budapest and the Hungarian Legation in Moscow*. But a chain 
of occurrences intervened and drastically altered the course of 
history. 
On June 22nd, in a telephone conversation with General Kurt 
Himer, liaison officer of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht at 
the Hungarian General Staff in Budapest, General Alfred Jodl 
clarified the official German stand by saying "We are accepting 
every Hungarian aid. We do not want to require anything, but 
everything which they offer we gratefully accept. It is out of the 
question that we would not want Hungary's participation."2 5 
On June 23, 1941, General Franz Haider, Chief of the German 
General Staff called General Himer, liaison officer in Budapest, 
on the telephone and stated categorically the following: 
Now it is important that the Hungarian military 
leadership bring into motion the political leadership to 
offer its voluntary help.. . We do not raise any demands 
because one shall pay for those, but we would be 
grateful for any support especially for fast-moving 
troops (mechanized army corps). 26 
The Hungarian government showed no sign of accepting 
the German stand relayed through Henrik Werth's medi-
ation nor was it inclined to change its frequently expressed 
stand of non-intervention without the official request of the 
German government. Consequently there followed an appropri-
ate shift in German strategy designed to sweep Hungary into the 
ongoing war without the delivery of any explicit German request 
through the usual diplomatic channels. 
In retaliation for the Budapest government's unyielding stance 
this shift occurred very soon. On June 26, 1941 several airplanes 
* Editor s note: The Soviet message arrived in Budapest only 
on the 24th. For further comments on these events see the paper 
by N.F. Dreisziger. 
bombed Kassa, Munkacs and Raho, thereby attempting to drag 
Hungary, the unwilling satellite, into the war. Hungary's 
military leaders made the most of this opportunity to force the 
civilian government to declare a state of war against the Soviet 
Union claiming that Soviet warplanes did the bombing. The 
question was whether this invented explanation conformed to 
reality. 
In September, 1941, two months after the bombing, I 
personally met the then Captain Adam Krudy, an eyewitness to 
the incident, in the home of a distant relative of his (at 4 
Podmaniczky Street, Budapest). Krudy adamantly insisted that 
German warplanes had carried out the bombing. His statement 
sounded logical, however, I still remember questioning the 
preciseness of his eyewitness account. It should be noted that the 
bombing incident remained a much-discussed topic in Hungary 
and the civilian population overwhelmingly regarded the official 
stand as at least questionable. 
Between October 1943 and March 1944, I frequently met with 
several members of the Slovak delegation negotiating in 
Budapest. Interestingly, the name of one delegate was Ladislav 
(Laszlo) Bardossy from Bratislava. A few of them claimed 
indirect and very limited knowledge of the bombers taking off 
f rom an airfield located in Slovakia. With a great deal of 
uncertainty, they mentioned the Spisska Nova Ves airfield. In 
the first year of Slovakia's independence (1938), this airfield had 
been bombed by Hungarian warplanes which caused strong 
anti-Hungarian sentiment across Slovakia. I tried to meet with 
high-ranking Slovak officers who served in Spisska Nova Ves at 
the time of the Kassa bombing. I knew about one who had been 
stationed in that town then and whom I had met frequently in 
Bratislava between June 1946 and November 1948: a certain 
Doctor J.P. At the time of the Kassa incident he had been a 
lieutenent-colonel and Chief of the Medical Staff of the Army of 
the Republic of Slovakia and had been stationed officially in 
Spisska Nova Ves. He related that a few high-ranking Slovak 
officers also knew about the German warplanes taking off from 
Spisska Nova Ves airfield with orders to strike nearby towns 
recovered by Hungary in 1938 through the Vienna Award of that 
year. 
I tried to confirm this explanation of the Kassa mystery by 
establishing contact with knowledgeable Slovak military and 
civilian individuals. Among them was Dr. Jan Spisiak, Slovakia's 
one-time envoy to Budapest. He always gave evasive answers. 
V 
Another was General Ferdinand Catlos, Minister of Defense of 
Slovakia. When he returned from Soviet captivity in 1948, I 
approached him in Bratislava through an intermediary who was 
a mutual friend, but General Catlos was unwilling to answer my 
relevant questions in any form. 
Finally, I would like to attach an epilogue to the event. In light 
of German-Hungarian military cooperation between the June 26, 
1941 bombing and the March 19, 1944 German occupation of 
Hungary, it is clear that even without the bombing of Kassa, 
Hungary sooner or later would have been forced to join Germany 
in its war on the Soviet Union. Germany as a totalitarian great 
power had all the means to impose its will on small nations like 
Hungary, Slovakia or Rumania —especially in times of crisis. It 
would have been the case all the more since Germany's 
adversaries, the Western great powers, happened to be 
disinterested observers at the outset of Germany's eastward 
expansion. Lord Halifax, British Foreign Secretary of that 
period well-summarized the Western attitude toward Germany 
and the small powers alike in his November 1st, 1938 statement 
"It is one thing to allow German expansion in Central Europe, 
which to my mind is a normal and natural thing, but we must be 
able to resist German expansion in Western Europe or else our 
u 27 
whole position is undermined." 
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The Kassa Bombing: 
The Riddle of Adam Krudy * 
N.F. Dreisziger 
Just as most people associate the assassination of Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand at Sarajevo in 1914 with the outbreak of the 
First World War, Hungarians connect the Kassa bombings of 
1941 with their country's involvement in World War II. But the 
air-raid of June 26, 1941 is notable not only for serving as the 
immediate prelude to Hungary's entry into the war, it is also 
remarkable for being one of the most perplexing mysteries of 
modern Hungarian history. Not surprisingly, the event has 
assumed an important place in historical writings on Hungary on 
both sides of the Iron Curtain. 
At the risk of perpetrating an oversimplification, the 
communist historiography of the Kassa incident might be 
described as being heavily influenced by "official interpretation," 
while Western writings on the subject are characterized by widely 
divergent speculations often based on peripheral source materi-
als. With historians in Hungary and other Iron Curtain countries 
rarely feeling free to question the official line, and historians in 
the West lacking access to some of the pertinent archival 
material, it is not surprising that progress in the unravelling of 
the riddles of the Kassa bombing has been slow. 
The search for the culprits has been further complicated by the 
fact that, ever since the summer of 1941, there seem to have been 
persistent and deliberate efforts to hide or distort the truth in 
connection with the raid. That it should be so is not surprising 
given the event's close connection to the question of Hungary's 
war-guilt. Historians hitherto have tended to concentrate their 
*An earlier version of this paper, entitled "The 'German 
Bombing of Kassa: A Communist Plot? A Fascist Conspiracy? 
Or Adam Krudy the Double Agent?" was presented at the annual 
convention of the American Association for the Advancement 
of Slavic Studies, In Washingon, D.C., in October, 1982. 
efforts on finding evidence for a plot behind the bombing. This 
paper will deal mainly with the conspiracies which seem to have 
been committed by those who have attempted to explain the 
incident. In particular, it will try to offer a possible —or at least a 
plausible —explanation for the changing accounts of the raid that 
have been advanced at various times by the late Adam Krudy, the 
raid's best-known eyewitness. Admittedly, an understanding of 
the mystery posed by Krudy will not solve the larger riddle, who 
bombed Kassa and why, but it might reduce the confusion faced 
by historians who wish to arrive at the truth. Exposing the secret 
of Adam Krudy might also suggest that there has been more 
intrigue, deception and double-dealing connected to the Kassa 
story than meets the eye or has been suspected hitherto. 
Hungarian Policies and Intentions in June, 1941 
There can be no denial of the fact that in the months before June 
of 1941 countervailing and often contradictory tendencies existed 
in Hungarian foreign policy on the dual question of relations with 
Germany and participation in the war. As has been pointed out 
in other studies in this volume and in publications elsewhere, 
elements of Hungary's leadership wished to avoid close collabora-
tion with Nazi Germany, especially in the spreading military 
conflict. A few civilian and several military leaders thought 
otherwise. Still others vacillated and often allowed their feelings 
on this crucial issue to be influenced by daily developments. 
During the early years of German expansion, in particular during 
much of 1938, the advocates of non-involvement in Hitler's 
ventures possessed a definite upper-hand in Budapest.1 But as 
Hitler scored his stunning victories, the opponents of a 
pro-German orientation saw their numbers and influence decline 
in Hungary. As has been mentioned in Professor Wagner's study, 
Kalman Kanya had to be removed from the direction of 
Hungarian foreign policy late in 1938. The influence wielded by 
the conservative statesman Istvan Bethlen declined by 1940 when 
his 1939 prediction for an early collapse of Nazi Germany failed 
to materialize. And Pal Teleki committed suicide when, in April 
of 1941, he felt that his country could no longer retain the good 
will of Great Britain in view of the inevitable Hungarian 
complicity in the German invasion of Yugoslavia. Notwithstand-
ing these losses, in the weeks before the fateful events of late June, 
1941, Hungary's civilian leadership continued its policy of 
non-involvement in the European war. As is well known, the 
repeated pleas of General Henrik Werth, the Chief of the 
Hungarian General Staff, for a Hungarian-German military 
alliance, were firmly refused, and the government continued to 
maintain its stand for a while even after the start of the German 
invasion of Russia on the 22nd. 2 But soon enormous pressure 
was exerted on the government to change its course. Pro-Nazi 
groups within the country clamoured for a show of solidarity with 
the "great crusade" against Bolshevism. Warning came from 
Rome that Hungary's inaction might have harmful conse-
quences. Slovakia also joined the war against the U.S.S.R., 
leaving Hungary as the only East Central European state not to 
have done so. But more important was still a message received 
from Germany to the effect that if Hungary wanted to participate 
in the campaign against Russia, she would have to join 
immediately and voluntarily. 3 The message was delivered in 
"plain and emphatic" language by General Kurt Himer, the 
German High Command's representative in Hungary, to General 
Werth who passed it on to Premier Laszlo Bardossy. Evidently 
disturbed by developments, Bardossy summoned Otto von 
Erdmannsdorff, the German Minister to Hungary, for an 
interview and told him that the matter of Hungary's participation 
was up to the country's civilian government to decide. If 
Germany desired Hungary's assistance she would have to request 
it through the regular diplomatic channels. 4 
The Hungarian Premier's response to the German demand 
deserves special attention. There may be historians who would 
dismiss it as political posturing, or even an attempt to extract 
concessions from Germany in return for Hungarian participa-
tion. But it is doubtful if Bardossy could really expect Hitler 
practically to beg for Hungary's assistance, especially when all of 
Germany's other "friends" had offered their help voluntarily. 
Bardossy's motives were probably different. In telling the 
Germans that Hungary's government would consider the question 
of participation in the war if Germany had asked for this 
officially, the Premier probably wanted to avoid his country's 
involvement in the war without having to admit openly that 
Hungary did not want to participate. Three times during the 
past three years Hitler had moved or was about to move against 
one of Hungary's neighbours, and three times the Hungarian 
leaders proved most reluctant —on two occasions they had in fact 
told Hitler in advance that they would not join him in a war. 
Taking Hitler's temper and power into consideration, Bardossy 
could not tell the Germans for a third time that Hungary wished 
to stay out of the conflict, but he hoped to accomplish this 
through requesting what the Germans had promised not to do: 
ask for Hungarian help formally. 
Because of the Kassa bombing, Bardossy could not realize his 
hope. He had been under tremendous pressure to change his 
policy, and the report about the air raids in Hungary near the 
Soviet border unnerved him, just as they unnerved Horthy, the 
elderly head-of-state. 5 Interestingly, there is evidence to the 
effect that when Bardossy was told of the "Soviet attack," he 
immediately jumped to the conclusion that the attackers must 
have been German provocateurs, determined to force Hungary 
into the war. Bardossy seems to have concluded that if the 
Germans were willing to go to such extremes to have their way, 
resistance was useless, and Hungary better accept the inevitable 
and join the war at once. 6 
Were the Russians the Culprits, after all? 
Although Bardossy's first reaction to the bombing was the same 
that was accepted in most circles later—that the bombing was a 
German plot to force the hands of the Hungarian government —it 
is by no means certain that it was the correct explanation of the 
raid. Undoubtedly, the Germans had an interest in involving 
Hungary in the war, or may have been put up to the plot by 
Hungarians desirous of their country's participation in the war. 
The Germans also had the means to carry out the raid, though 
not so easily as believers of the conspiracy explanation suggest. In 
fact, a host of arguments can be brought up against this theory. 
The most weighty is the complete lack of direct evidence. 
Traditionally, the testimony of three men has been cited as being 
more or less direct proof of the "German plot" theory. These 
men are Istvan Ujszaszy, Rudolph Bamler and Adam Krudy. 
Ujszaszy's and Bamler's revelations have been discussed in 
another par t of this volume (as well as in other publications) and 
Krudy's accounts (and some other conservative sources) will be 
analyzed later. The fact is that none of these testimonies prove 
anything in connection with the incident, and no other direct 
evidence has surfaced in the decades of search for proof. There is 
some circumstantial evidence—the best and most recent 
presented in this volume —but there is no concrete proof. 
Another problem with the conspiracy theory is the fact that the 
raid could not have been carried out by the Germans without 
much circumspection and extensive preparations. First of all it 
was necessary for the perpetrators to obtain planes that could be 
taken for Russian ones. Second, the conspirators had to obtain 
bombs of Russian manufacture. Third, they had to mount these 
bombs on their planes, a complicated task, as German bombers 
in those days did not have bomb-racks capable of holding 
Russian bombs. In fact, it seems that the bombs dropped on 
Kassa were 100 kg bombs while the standard stock of the 
Luftwaffe were the 50 and 250 kg bombs. 7 Last but not least, 
just before the raid (and right after its completion) the markings 
of the planes had to be changed. To put it briefly, much effort 
was needed for the preparation (and the subsequent cover-up) of 
such a raid, and undoubtedly many people had to be involved —a 
minimum of nine for the air crews alone. It seems hardly 
believable that not one of those party to the preparation and 
execution of the plot has come forth to tell the truth in the more 
than four decades since 1941. 
It should also be kept in mind that a secret operation on the 
scale of the Kassa bombing was quite risky. Even if the main 
requirements of the mission —the appropriate planes, the 
Russian bombs, the alterations to the bomb-racks, the changing 
of the markings —had been met, identification was still possible 
as the motors in the planes or the sound they produced could 
hardly have been changed. Then there was the chance that one 
or more of the aircraft might be shot down or would have an 
accident.8 In summary, it seems incredible that a provocation 
of this kind would be carried out in broad daylight against a 
target swarming with military personnel (Kassa served as a 
divisional headquarters for the Hungarian army, and had an Air 
Force school). 
Lacking positive proof for their theory, some advocates of the 
conspiracy explanation have argued that the attackers must have 
been German, since only Germany had a motive for the raid and 
the means to carry it out. In this connection the late C.A. 
Macartney came up with a seemingly ingenious explanation, 
according to which the culprits were neither German nor 
Russian, but Slovak pilots —flying stolen German planes —on 
their way to the Soviet Union. 9 This hypothesis is interesting but 
there are several problems with it, the foremost being the "stolen" 
planes and the Russian bombs. And Slovak pilots could hardly 
have carried out the raid in their own planes as their country's air 
force was equipped almost exclusively with aircraft that were very 
different in appearance from the ones seen above Kassa during 
the raid.1 0 With the "Slovak explanation" disposed of, we may 
ask the questions could the Russians have had a reason for staging 
the attack and did they have the means to carry it out? 
On innumerable occasions these questions have been answered 
in the negative. Actually, the first of these questions is not of 
great importance. Many bombings were carried out during the 
war against unintended targets, as Canadian soldiers fighting in 
northern France as well as the citizens of Schaffhousen in 
Switzerland found out. But there might have even been a motive 
for a Soviet raid against Hungary. Anyone who has examined the 
diplomatic exchanges between Budapest and Moscow in the days 
before the Kassa raid will realize that just before the event 
Hungary had —quite unintentionally — delivered an affront to the 
Kremlin. The fact is that through Jozsef Kristoffy, the 
Hungarian Minister in Moscow, the Soviets had made a friendly 
overture aimed to buy Hungarian neutrality but as Kristoffy's 
message was late in arriving in Budapest, all the Russians got in 
reply was the severance of diplomatic relations by Hungary. 11 
And if this was not a possible cause for the Soviets' action, then 
there is the possibility that they may have wished to retaliate for 
the Slovak declaration of war on them on the 25th. This writer 
has suggested in an earlier study that the raid on Kassa might 
have been aimed at Slovakia but hit a Hungarian target through 
a misunderstanding.12 
There remains the more important question whether the 
Soviets had the means of attacking targets in foreign territory 
such as Slovakia or Hungary. This question has rarely been asked 
by historians examining the Kassa incident probably because it 
has been generally presumed that by the 26 th of June the Red Air 
Force had suffered irreparable losses and was incapable of 
offensive action. The facts seem to contradict such assumptions 
however. First of all, the Soviet Air Force on the southern front 
received minimal damage in the initial German onslaught and 
was considered to be "very strong" by the German High 
Command in the first days of the German advance.13 Indeed, it 
has been suggested that the bulk of Russian air power was lost not 
in the Luftwaffe assault of the 22nd of June, but in the massive 
and reckless Russian aerial counteroffensive that Moscow ordered 
after it became evident that the Germans' move of the 22nd was 
not a "provocation" as Stalin had first suspected, but a full-scale 
invasion.14 
From the above it can be safely concluded that it is not at all 
impossible that the raid was the work of the Russians, intended 
probably against Slovakia. As has been mentioned, this 
possibility has been consistently denied in Hungary until 
recently.15 In a sense then, Hungarian historians —consciously 
or unconsciously, willingly or unwillingly —have been part of a 
conspiracy of silence concerning some of the evidence available in 
connection with the raid. They can be said to have been party to 
a plot to blame the bombing on the forces of Nazism. The 
originator of this communist conspiracy seems to have been none 
other than Matyas Rakosi himself, broadcasting into wartime 
Hungary from the U.S.S.R. 16 
Conservative Hungarian Explanations 
As has been mentioned, the conspiracy theory of the bombing has 
been accepted by Horthy, and many other members of Hungary's 
wartime elite. It is important to note, however, that there are a 
few former members of the old regime that reject this theory, 
while others have offered accounts that differ substantially from 
those held in communist Hungary. Among those rejecting the 
possibility that the culprits might have been German (or other) 
conspirators are two of the authors of the three-volume history of 
Hungary's interwar and wartime military that had been prepared 
in exile under the direction of the General Lajos Veress. 17 
Another emigre who offers a different perspective on the events of 
the 26th June, 1941, is Antal Ullein-Reviczky. This man, who in 
his capacity of Chief of the Press Bureau was in repeated contact 
with Bardossy on that fateful day, tells that the Premier suspected 
that German mischief may have been behind the bombing, but 
had no direct information to that effect. 18 Another former 
member of Hungary's wartime government, Vilmos Nagybaczoni 
Nagy, seems to have been also unaware of the "Krudy message" 
business at the time he published his memoirs soon after the end 
of the war. 19 Still other emigre commentators, writing much 
later, refuse to take sides on the question whether the raid was a 
conspiracy or an act of aggression (perhaps unintentional) on the 
part of the Russians. 20 
The majority of the former members of Hungary's wartime 
establishment, however, endorse the "conspiracy theory." One of 
them is Geza Lakatos, whose recollections have appeared only 
recently under the title Ahogyan en lattarn (As I Saw It). Great 
expectations might have been attached to Lakatos' account. 
First of all, he was an important and tragic figure of wartime 
Hungary's history as Premier in the fall of 1944 he was assigned 
the task of achieving Hungary's defection from the Axis camp, an 
attempt which was doomed to failure from the start. More 
important from our point of view, is the fact that for quite some 
time after the summer of 1941, Lakatos had been divisional 
commander in Kassa, a posting which should have enabled him 
to receive useful official or unofficial information regarding the 
Kassa raid. Nevertheless, his account of the incident is 
disappointing. Basically he accepts the current official 
Hungarian explanation of the event and cites the testimony of 
"Colonel Krudy." Lakatos also tells that before this version 
gained general acceptance, certain Hungarian sources attributed 
the bombing to a Czech officer in the Soviet air force who had 
been fired from his job in the Kassa post office when the city had 
been returned to Hungary by the First Vienna Award of the fall 
of 1938 —an unlikely story. The only interesting comment 
Lakatos makes about the whole matter is that in July of 1941 
Werth had told him confidentially that the Kassa bombing had 
come "very handy" for him. 21 
It would probably be safe to assume that Lakatos, as well as 
most other Hungarian memoir writers of the past three decades, 
have been influenced by what they had considered to be an 
accepted article of fai th regarding the Kassa incident. Horthy 
had spoken on the matter , historians in Hungary were at one with 
him, and the majority of historians in the West had also endorsed 
their interpretations. Under the circumstances it is evident that 
reminiscences written in the past three decades are not reliable 
sources of information on the subject. We may ask the question 
whether there are any conservative, i.e., non-communist sources 
predating the Horthy memoirs that endorse the conspiracy 
theory—along with references to the testimony of Krudy and his 
supposed message to Bardossy? As has been seen, neither 
Ullein-Reviczky's nor Nagybaczoni Nagy's work qualify in this 
category. Apparently, the only account that does, is the 
unpublished manuscript of Domonkos Szent Ivanyi. This massive 
work, in part a collection of documents and in part a semi-official 
account of Hungary's role in the Second World War, was started 
soon after the war's outbreak. Its aim, apparently, had been to 
show Hungary in a favourable light to postwar audiences. The 
work attributes the Kassa conspiracy to Hungarian and German 
military circles, working behind the backs of Horthy and the 
Hungarian government. The manuscript also refers to Krudy's 
letter to Bardossy about the Kassa bombing. 22 
The conservatives' case for the theory of the "German 
bombing" of Kassa rests really on only two sources: the Horthy 
memoirs, and the war-time writings of Szent Ivanyi. But we may 
ask the question, where did these two authors obtain their 
information? Obviously, this is an important question and we are 
fortunate to know the answer. Horthy himself reveals that he 
gained his knowledge of the events concerning the Bardossy 
decision to enter the war against Russia from Istvan Barczy, 
Hungary's Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the time.23 
And before Szent Ivanyi died in Western exile, he was asked 
where he had obtained his information about the same events. 
His answer was that he had "heard it" from none other than the 
same Istvan Barczy.24 It seems then that, as far as the 
conservatives are concerned, the whole business of the German 
comspiracy theory derives from one single person. If this is 
indeed the case, then we may ask whether it is possible that this 
man had certain personal or political motives in spreading such 
information? To speculate on this possibility it is necessary first 
to examine certain developments in Hungary in the months that 
followed the Kassa raid. 
The Dismissal of Bardossy 
As has been mentioned, in the afternoon of the 26th of June 
Hungary's authorities —as well as newspapers —pronounced the 
Kassa bombing to be the work of the Russians. This conclusion 
was reached in Budapest as a result of reports that had come 
from Kassa through military channels —civilian communications 
having been disrupted by the raid for many hours. This was the 
"official" explanation. How various Hungarian leaders ex-
plained the event to themselves and their most trustworthy 
friends is a matter of conjecture. As has been mentioned, 
Bardossy had suspected the Germans right from the start. There 
is no concrete evidence concerning the views of others, but as 
resentment against the Germans grew in Hungary, the climate 
became receptive to the acceptance of beliefs such as Bardossy's. 
That the German alliance was unpopular with a large portion 
of Hungary's elite (as well as her people), is illustrated by 
developments in the aftermath of the country's entry into the 
war. It seems that no sooner had the decision to join the war been 
made, the country's leaders began making efforts to diminish if 
not to dismantle their newest entanglement. True , lip-service 
continued to be paid to German-Hungarian friendship, and the 
Germans were given all kinds of "reasons" why Hungarian 
soldiers were needed more at home than in Russia. But the basic 
tenet of policy became the lessening of military involvement. 25 
General Werth was unhappy with these trends in government 
policy and objected to them. He was dismissed in September. 
Both he, and Dezso Laszlo, the pro-German Chief of the General 
Staff's Operational Section, were replaced by men who were more 
in tune with their civilian superiors' attitudes.26 . 
Werth's dismissal, coming as it did long before the possibility 
of German defeat in the war became evident, has puzzled 
historians. It has been seen as a "reversal" of Hungarian 
policy.27 Rather than being a major shift in policy, the 
dismissal of Werth represents a continuity in Hungarian attitudes 
to the issue of involvement in the war. Most of Hungary's leaders 
had been averse to involvement before 26 June 1941, and they 
remained averse to the idea later. Their aversion only grew as the 
country was becoming committed to Germany more and more, 
and as circumstances forced them to pretend increasing 
enthusiasm about a cause they did not really believe in. It was 
under these circumstances that another important development 
took place in Hungary early in 1942: the dismissal of Bardossy 
and his replacement by Miklos Kallay, a man with even fewer 
pro-German sympathies. 
Bardossy's demise became inevitable when, in the eyes of 
Regent Horthy and his closest advisers, he came to symbolize 
Hungary's deeper and deeper involvement in the war. Horthy in 
particular felt that Bardossy had committed himself to the 
German line more than was necessary and desirable. Professor 
Macartney aptly explained that, in blaming Bardossy for the 
country's involvement in the war, Horthy unconsciously tried to 
silence "a voice of inner self-reproach...by putting the blame on 
someone else."28 After the war Horthy accused Bardossy of 
withholding from him vital information during the crises of late 
June, 1941, including the report about the "German bombing" of 
Kassa from Krudy.2 9 How Horthy came to the conclusion that 
Bardossy had betrayed him cannot be ascertained exactly. But 
one possible explanation can be advanced from a careful 
re-examination of the story of Adam Krudy, the star witness of 
the Kassa raid. 
The Secret of Adam Krudy 
Most historians of wartime Hungary know Adam Krudy as the 
Hungarian air force officer who had witnessed the Kassa 
bombing and has claimed ever since that the perpetrators had 
been Germans. The most commonly known account of the raid 
by Krudy goes something like this: 
In the early afternoon of the 26th, Krudy was at the 
Kassa airfield. Shortly after one o'clock he noticed 
four planes approaching. They flew in a "German 
formation" and bore the "yellow markings of Axis 
aircraft." After circling the city, they dropped their 
bombs on the centre of the city. With two of his 
comrades, Krudy took to the air with their own aircraft 
and managed to get close enough to the attackers to 
determine that they were German-made Heinkel 111 
twin-engined bombers. On returning, Krudy made 
attempts to report his findings to his military superiors. 
To make sure that his message was not lost or 
disregarded by the military, he contacted Prime 
Minister Bardossy and informed him that the attack-
ing aircraft were German and bore Axis markings. 3° 
Many questions come to mind in connection with this account. 
Why would the attackers, if they were really German, fly in a 
"German formation" and have markings that betrayed their 
identity? How could planes parked on a runway catch up with 
ones already departing the scene? And there are other problems 
as well. Most witnesses to the Kassa incident reported seeing 
three planes, the German formation Krudy mentioned involves 
four. "Yellow" markings, allegedly seen by Krudy, were not the 
markings of Axis aircraft, but those of all military training craft 
in Europe at the time. The Hungarian military at Kassa did not 
have fighter planes which could catch up with Heinkel 111 
aircraft, in fact there were no Hungarian fighter planes at Kassa 
at all. What training craft there were sat on the runways low on 
fuel, and Krudy and his men did not even try to take to the air. 
The question may be asked at this point if Krudy's story is 
obviously false, what is the truth? The precise answer to this 
query may never be known. The actions of statesmen and 
diplomats can often be traced fairly accurately even from the 
distance of several decades, but those of low-ranked people 
cannot be documented. Nevertheless, some information has 
surfaced on Adam Krudy and it is both unexpected and 
intriguing. 
In June of 1941 Krudy was a young captain, a flight instructor 
with the Hungarian Air Force Academy at Kassa. The raid 
found him at the academy's airfield, on the southern outskirts of 
the city.sl He and his colleagues had just returned from the 
morning's training flights and were about to drive into town for 
lunch. Their planes sat unserviced on the runways. The 
appearance of unexpected aircraft did not cause particular alarm 
at the airfield, and some of the men present even assumed that 
the planes were coming to land: exactly twenty-four hours earlier 
two German military aircraft had made an unscheduled 
stop-over at Kassa. The approaching planes appeared strange, 
however, as no one at the airfield could recognize their type or 
manufacture. When the men realized that the planes came to 
bomb the city, they sounded the air-raid siren and opened fire on 
the attackers. Giving chase to them with unserviced training 
craft was a useless proposition so, with the attacking planes gone 
unscathed, Krudy and another of the instructors, Jeno Csirke, 
drove into Kassa to inspect the damage and to report their 
observations to their superiors at the Air Force Academy's 
headquarters. 
In the raid, the local Post and Telegraph Office was heavily 
damaged and civilian telecommunications were put out of action 
until after midnight. When the lines were restored, a request 
came from the Premier's office in Budapest for an air force 
officer who had witnessed the bombing. Csirke was summoned, 
as he lived closest. He was asked to describe the events and say 
whether the planes were German or not. He replied that the 
planes had come from the East, had dropped their bombs and 
had been fired on as they departed. To the specific question 
whether the planes were German, Csirke answered that they were 
definitely not of German manufacture. 
This is the story of the events of the 26th at the Kassa airfield as 
reconstructed from the testimony of Jeno Csirke (known later in 
Montreal as Eugene Chirke), Krudy's colleague and the man 
whom Krudy had named as having been one of those who 
accompanied him on the flight which resulted in the positive 
identification of the attackers. Csirke's story is corroborated in 
some of its details by other witnesses. 32 Perhaps this hitherto 
little-known version would accomplish little, had Krudy not been 
telling so many transparent lies. But given the nature of Krudy's 
testimony, the above version certainly appears more credible. 
There is another aspect to the Csirke version, something which is 
more difficult to corroborate. According to Csirke, no one at the 
airfield, not even Krudy, identified the planes as German at the 
time. Krudy has claimed otherwise in all of his public statements 
(given after the war) and his private conversations (the earliest of 
these we know about took place in September of 1941, and the 
latest, three decades later, not long before his death).3 3 
When the war was over, it became possible for Krudy to reveal 
his version of the Kassa raid publicly. One would expect that he 
would have been invited to testify at the war-crimes trial of 
Premier Bardossy, but this does not seem to have been the case. 
As far as this writer knows, Krudy went public with his story in 
the popular periodical Kepes Figyelo (Illustrated Observer), early 
in 1946 . 34 We cannot know how accurately Krudy's words were 
reported in this publication however, there does not seem to have 
been reasons for any deliberate misrepresentation of the "facts" 
he was trying to convey. 
The Kepes Figyelo version of Krudy's account goes like this: At 
the time of the appearance of the planes, Krudy was with two of 
his mechanics at the Kassa airfield. They immediately realized 
that the planes were German, as they flew in a "foursome" 
formation and had yellow markings. When the bombing began, 
Krudy immediately phoned the headquarters of the Air Force 
Academy and then proceeded to write an official report on the 
incident. When his report was not forwarded to the "appropriate 
authorities," he wrote a letter to Premier Bardossy telling him 
that not Russian but German planes bombed the city, and that 
the official investigation gave a false account. Krudy was hoping 
that the declaration of war might be reversed as a result of his 
letter. There is another piece of interesting information in this 
version of the Kassa raid: Krudy tells that after the bombing he 
was reproached by Hungarian military authorities for having 
failed to take to the air for the purpose of giving chase to the 
attackers. 35 
Apart from a few inherent contradictions and inaccuracies, 
this version of the raid is still plausible. A great change in this 
respect seems to have taken place by the 1950s when communist 
historians began exploring the incident, usually in the light of 
Krudy's new and more detailed accounts. It was at this time that 
the by now familiar communist explanation of the Kassa 
bombing began emerging. As has been mentioned, this involved 
the story of Krudy and his colleagues (including Csirke) taking to 
the air, catching up with the attackers, and identifying 
them —beyond any doubt — as being German. These stories even 
talked of a phone call which Krudy made soon after the bombing 
to Premier Bardossy. 36 
Today, the total unreliability of Krudy's testimony is evident to 
the few Western historians who have examined the Kassa 
incident. 37 No one seems to have taken the effort, however, to 
try to explain Krudy's motives for telling transparent lies and, 
more importantly in our opinion, for changing his story in a 
substantial way twice since that fateful day in June of 1941. Of 
course, the riddle of Krudy may never be solved satisfactorily: 
perhaps he had an overactive imagination coupled with a desire 
to keep himself in the limelight. But there may have been other 
reasons — a method to his madness, so to speak. If we would have 
a case of an eyewitness who began blaming the incident on the 
Germans during the dark days of the Rakosi dictatorship, we 
would have a relatively easy task at guessing his motivation. In 
this period ex-officers of Hungary's wartime forces often faced 
persecution, and providing support for the communists' official 
interpretation of events could have helped to save a person from 
the fate of some of his less fortunate former comrades-in-arms. 
Still another explanation could be offered if Krudy came out with 
his story at the end of, or immediately after, the war. Evidently, 
during that period it would have been in the interest of Hungary's 
wartime elite to prove that the event that had prompted them to 
become involved in the war was the product of a vile conspiracy. 
Presumably, such a story would help to lessen the responsibility 
Hungary's leaders shouldered for their decision to join Hitler's 
campaign against the Soviets. Krudy's testimony, in particular, 
could have served the specific purpose of shifting some of the 
blame from Horthy's shoulders onto those of Bardossy. The fact 
that in their writings several members of Hungary's wartime elite 
paid special attention to Krudy's account, often exaggerating its 
significance, suggests that the Krudy story was indeed meant to 
serve such a purpose. But this still does not mean that it had been 
invented for this reason. In fact, there is evidence that the whole 
affair originated before there was any indication of Axis defeat, 
and served a different, though definitely political, objective. 
The clue is the message Krudy allegedly sent about the 
bombing to Bardossy. Secondary sources are especially confusing 
(and confused) about this. Some talk about a letter, others about 
a telegram, still others about a telephone message or even a direct 
telephone call. Unfortunately for the supporters of the 
"conspiracy theory," this whole business of the "message" is 
suspect. First of all, Bardossy spent the afternoon away from his 
office —first with the Regent and then in a cabinet meeting—not 
situations in which he could be interrupted by a phone call. 
Secondly, civilian telephone communications had been interrup-
ted by the bombing, and it is inconceivable that a captain would 
be allowed to use military lines to contact the country's civilian 
leader, especially to contradict the report of his own military 
superiors. Thirdly, in his first postwar public disclosure, Krudy 
talks not of a telephone message or a telegram, but a letter 
written to persuade Bardossy to reverse the decision to go to 
war. 38 As that decision had been announced on the 27th of 
June, Krudy could not have sent his letter on the 26th (and it 
could not have reached Bardossy until days later). 
Finally, it is quite probable that the so-called "Krudy 
message," even in a letter form, has never existed. To our 
knowledge, no historian has seen its original. All references to it 
can be traced to Krudy himself, or to the aforementioned works 
by Horthy and Szent Ivanyi. The latter two persons, as has been 
pointed out above, have heard about it from Barczy. We may 
now continue probing the question whether Barczy had any 
personal motives for telling a story which may not have been true? 
Was there anything in his background that would prompt him to 
do so? Unfortunately, these questions cannot be answered with 
certainty as we know little about him. We know, however, that 
he was a trusted advisor to Horthy in fact, one of his friends.39 
We also know that at the end of the war he bitterly denounced 
Bardossy and accused him, among other things, of tampering 
with the minutes of the Ministerial Council. And there is 
evidence that Barczy hated Bardossy already in the summer of 
1941. 40 One is tempted to conclude from all this that Barczy 
may have had an interest in convincing Horthy that Bardossy had 
been instrumental in prescipitating Hungary's entry into the war 
with the full knowledge that the Kassa bombing was a "German 
provocation." To what extent, if any, Bardossy's dismissal in 
early 1942 was the result of Barczy's (and Krudy's) whispering 
campaign, may never be known. That in the long run these men 
succeeded in thoroughly discrediting Bardossy in the eyes of the 
Regent —and in those of the Hungarian public —is certain. 41 
What is most unlikely to be known ever is whether there was any 
collusion between Barczy and Krudy in these machinations which 
seem to have been designed, first and foremost, to destroy the 
political fortunes of Bardossy. 
The theory that Krudy's allegations — rather than being simple 
hallucinations, or lies inspired by the communists —were part of 
some domestic intrigue within wartime Hungary's establishment, 
explains a surprising number of riddles in connection with the 
whole "Krudy testimony" business. It explains why this man, who 
according to his colleagues at first did not consider the attackers 
to be German, changed his mind later. It explains also the 
timing of his change-of-heart: not at the end of the war when it 
would have been more logical —and much safer —but just about 
the time some of Hungary's leaders, in particular, Horthy, began 
having serious second thoughts about the whole Russian 
adventure. And it explains above all why Krudy claims to have 
contacted Bardossy, and Bardossy only, among the members of 
Hungary's elite at the time. One would presume that if he really 
wanted his government to be aware of the facts, he would have 
made efforts to reach other leaders in Budapest as well; at least 
would have tried to contact Ferenc Krudy, his own illustrious and 
influential uncle.42 
The explanation offered here concerning the Krudy story 
might even account for the man's behaviour after the communist 
takeover in Hungary at the end of the 1940s. With the 
communists' accession to power, Krudy inevitably found himself 
in an awkward situation. His earlier testimony now ideally suited 
the purposes of his country's new masters. Krudy, undoubtedly a 
staunch believer in a Christian and conservative Hungary, must 
have been very unhappy about this turn of events, yet he could 
not retract his allegations. In his frustration, he decided on 
another approach. He would dress up his story in a way that 
would not arouse the suspicion of the communists, but would be 
seen as preposterous in the West and would help to discredit the 
official communist interpretation of the affair. Accordingly, he 
began talking about "taking to the air," "catching up" with the 
attackers, and so on. He even named Csirke as one of the persons 
who had accompanied him on this mission. All this was sheer non-
sense: a successful chase couldn't have been possible, it didn't 
take place, and Csirke was there (in Montreal) to testify to this 
effect. Krudy's ploy worked. Communist historians of the 1950s 
and 1960s seem to have endorsed, without reservations, his "new" 
and "more detailed" version of the story. Overnight, Krudy, the 
secret agent of wartime "Horthyite" intrigue, became the star 
witness of communist historiography. However, instead of doing 
that historiography a service, he bequeathed it only misinforma-
tion, as well as a legacy prejudicial to its reputation. 
The Kassa incident, which may or may not have been the result 
of a conspiracy, certainly seems to have given rise to intrigues by 
those who for one reason or another wanted certain explanations 
attached to it. The complete story of these historiographical 
conspiracies may never be known. Nevertheless, it seems certain 
that, if historians ever wish to start unravelling the mysteries 
surrounding the incident itself, they will have to be much more 
careful when they assess what has been said about this affair by 
everyone, and especially by its star witness, the perplexing and 
indubitably mischievous Adam Krudy. 
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Part II 
The Search for Peace 
Introduction 
The less than four years that separate the summer of 1941, when 
Hungary became involved in the war, and the spring of 1945, 
when the war ended, constitute one of the most fateful periods of 
modern Hungarian history. These years witnessed the loss of 
much of Hungary's youth, the country's occupation by German 
forces, the deportation and subsequent extermination of the 
majority of the Hungarian Jewry, the destruction of many of 
Hungary's cities, and finally, the imposition of an occupation 
regime by the Soviet Union. For convenience's sake, this 
momentous period may be divided into shorter time-spans 
coinciding with the administration of the men who headed 
Hungary's wartime governments. The first of these, the Bardossy 
period, lasted from June of 1941 to March, 1942. This was 
followed by the two years of Miklos Kallay's premiership. Then 
came Dome Sztojay's term in office (March-August, 1944), 
followed by the short-lived government of Geza Lakatos 
(August-October, 1944). Finally, the last months of the war saw 
the regime of Ferenc Szalasi. 
While Prime Ministers came and went in Hungary, the 
dominant figure of the country's historical evolution until 15 
October 1944 was Miklos Horthy, the Regent. Although he 
probably did not relish this exalted role, the crises brought on by 
the war had thrust him into a position of increasing influence and 
enabled him to command more respect and awe than did any 
other Hungarian inside or outside the country. In reality then, a 
periodization of Hungary's wartime history would be more 
accurate if it were based on the twists and turns of Horthy's 
political outlook rather than on who headed the government. 
This is especially true of the last seven months of his regime when 
he was no longer always able to exert influence over the 
composition of his government due to increased meddling by the 
Germans. 
While the principal figure of the Hungarian political scene in 
1941-44 was Horthy, the dominant political issue was the 
question of participation in the war. Every Hungarian public 
figure in this period felt compelled to weigh the pros and cons of 
this issue, and come to some decision on the desired nature and 
extent of this participation. Most of them were eventually 
forced — by their own consciences or as a result of pressure from 
others —to grapple even with the question of ending their 
country's involvement in the war altogether. 
The essays in this part of this special volume deal with various 
aspects of wartime Hungary's quest for the curtailment of the 
country's participation in the war. T h e history of this quest has 
been told before.1 Thus most of its details are known. 
Nevertheless, a survey of its highlights might be useful as an 
introduction for the lay reader or as a review for the professional 
historian. 
As has been pointed out in the introduction to the first part of 
this volume, most of Hungary's leaders never really relished the 
thought of making common cause with Germany in a European 
war. One of them, Pal Teleki, even took his own life to protest 
the prospect of his country abandoning the policy of neutrality. 
Notwithstanding Teleki's sacrifice, the policy of non-involvement 
in Germany's military ventures was abandoned by Hungary, 
above all in the decision of June, 1941 to join the war against the 
Soviet Union. The extraordinary circumstances of that decision 
have been discussed in detail in Part I of this volume. 
The wisdom of joining the war, not adequately considered in 
those crises-ridden days of June, 1941, was soon questioned by 
Hungary's leaders. Even before the Germans suffered any serious 
reverses, some of Hungary's leaders realized that the decision to 
enter the war was a mistake, and began devoting their energies to 
devising plans for dissociating Hungary from the Axis war effort. 
This soul-searching among Hungary's leaders, and especially by 
Horthy, coincides with the Bardossy period mentioned above. It 
resulted in an important decision that manifested itself above all 
in changes in the composition of the country's civilian and 
military leadership. By the end of this period, the chief architects 
of Hungary's involvement in the war, Laszlo Bardossy and Henrik 
Werth, were no longer in office. 2 
If the months of Bardossy's wartime administration constitute 
the gestation period of the Hungarian decision to reverse the 
country's war policy, the two years of Miklos Kallay's rule can be 
characterized as the time of search for the ways and means of 
implementing that decision. In the final analysis, this search was 
unsuccessful. Ideas regarding the limiting and even ending of the 
Hungarian war effort were plentiful, but their implementation 
more often than not proved very difficult. Obstacles to 
disengagement were numerous: the most formidable were the 
strategic realities. As long as all or most of East Central Europe 
was firmly in the hands of the Wehrmacht, there could be no 
Hungarian defection from the Axis, the most Hungary could do 
was to reduce her support of the German war machine. Another 
major obstacle was the attainment of some kind of an agreement 
with the Allies. Part of the problem was arranging and 
conducting secret negotiations with Allied representatives. 
Another was the fact that the Allies spoke with many voices. 
Then there was the phenomenon of the Hungarians making what 
they considered to be significant moves toward disengagement, 
only to be told that what they had done was not enough to earn 
the respect of the Allied governments. 
Frustrated by these obstacles, the Kallay government made 
only limited gains in its quest to redefine the Hungarian 
involvement in the war. Limited though these gains were when 
seen through the eyes of those who expected a complete 
turn-about in Hungary's allegiance, they represent a remarkable 
feat of political maneuvering when seen in the context of the 
general European situation of the time. Perhaps the most 
important of the Kallay government's achievements was the 
cessation of hostilities with the Western Allies. British and 
American aircraft, for example, could fly over Hungarian 
territory undisturbed. In return, Hungary was spared strategic 
bombing for the time being. A change came on the Russian front 
also. There, what was left of the Hungarian forces after the 
winter of 1942-43 were withdrawn from fighting and were 
assigned to occupation duties. Other concessions by the Kallay 
regime were Hungarian help to Yugoslav partisans, and 
favourable treatment of British and American POWs who had 
escaped to Hungary from German camps. On the home front, 
Kallay's policy of gradual dissociation from the war manifested 
itself in a liberal treatment of opposition elements, of refugees 
from German-controlled lands and, relatively speaking, of 
Hungarian Jews. As a culmination of its policies, the Kallay 
administration became involved in a scheme calling for Allied 
paratroops landing in Hungary, and a decision to order home all 
Hungarian units from Russia. 
Not surprisingly Hitler learned of these plans and his patience 
ran out with the ever-reluctant and "double-dealing" Hungari-
ans. He decided to invade Hungary and to occupy her in 
conjunction with Rumania and other Axis satellites. In the end 
cooler heads prevailed in Berlin and the planned invasion was not 
put into effect. Instead, Hungary's leaders were summoned to 
Salzburg and were told that as long as they complied with the 
German government's wishes their country's invasion and 
dismemberment by its neighbours could be avoided. Even before 
the Salzburg discussions were concluded, German troops poured 
into Hungary effecting a quick and practically bloodless 
occupation. 
Among the conditions imposed on occupied Hungary were the 
appointment of a government acceptable to Hitler, and the 
"solution" of Hungary's Jewish question according to German 
wishes. Dome Sztojay, a former Hungarian minister to Berlin, 
was appointed Prime Minister. Next, the round-up and 
deportation of Jews was started under the watchful eyes of 
"experts" from Germany headed by Adolf Eichmann. 
In the spring and early summer of 1944 it seemed that the last 
had been seen of the Hungarian plans to leave the Axis. In the 
second half of the summer, however, these hopes were reborn, 
mainly as a result of a further deterioration of Germany's 
strategic position. The first significant development was Horthy's 
decision to abandon his self-imposed (since the start of the 
German occupation) withdrawal f rom politics, and to intervene 
personally in the deportation of the Jews. As a result, the Jews of 
Budapest escaped the horrible fate that befell their less fortunate 
co-religionists in Hungary's provinces. 3 Next, Horthy replaced 
Sztojay with General Geza Lakatos whose secret task was to effect 
Hungary's defection f rom the Axis. 
From the very start, the Hungarians' expectations were 
disappointed. They kept hoping for divisions of British and 
American paratroopers to land in Western Hungary, and they 
wanted a negotiated armistice. They were told that sending 
Western forces to Hungary was out of the question and that a 
Hungarian surrender had to be unconditional. In the end, the 
Lakatos government began secret armistice negotiations with the 
Russians. 
While one group of Hungarians was preparing the defection, 
another group conspired with the Germans to effect a wholesale 
change in Hungary's leadership. In the end, it was this 
German-backed group which succeeded. 4 Within hours after 
the announcement of the armistice, Horthy and his associates 
were driven from power and the government was entrusted to 
Ferenc Szalasi and his Arrow Cross Party. With this ended the 
Hungarian quest to terminate involvement in the war through 
action from above. From this time on, Hungarians opposed to 
the German alliance could look only to outright resistance as a 
means of accelerating the process of their country's liberation. 
The histories of Germany's wartime satellites are usually 
discussed in terms of resistance and collaboration. This 
approach proves simplistic and not very useful in the case of the 
Hungary where, in a sense, some of the chief collaborators were 
also the chief resisters. Of course, even within the country's 
leadership it is possible to identify people who favoured closer 
collaboration with Germany, and those who opposed, to various 
degrees, participation in the war. Indeed, many Hungarian 
leaders made the transition from collaboration to being 
opponents of it, and a few behaved in a highly opportunistic 
fashion and changed their position according to the dictates of 
the moment. 5 Considering these facts, the application of the 
term resistance in its most commonly used sense —the one that 
conjures up images of saboteurs and gun-toting partisans —to the 
Hungarian case does not appear useful. In the Hungarian 
context it seems far more appropriate to equate resistance with 
opposition to collaboration. Considered from such a perspective, 
the wartime history of Hungary reveals a complexity that belies 
the simplistic image of the country as Germany's subservient, 
"last satellite." 
What is true in this respect of Hungary's wartime leadership, is 
true also of the country's population. Undoubtedly, most 
Hungarians were ill-at-ease about the war. It is also true that 
they were generally wary about seeing their country transformed 
from being a reluctant German satellite to being a rebellious one, 
as this involved far too many risks. In any case a popular 
rebellion against collaboration made little sense throughout most 
of the war since during the Prime Ministership of Kallay, and 
again under Lakatos, there were repeated rumours of an 
impending deal with the Allies and defection from the Axis. Of 
course, for a while after the German occupation, and again after 
the Szalasi takeover, resistance must have seemed more logical, 
and indeed it did increase as some of the essays in this volume 
point out. But for much of the wartime experience of Hungary, 
active resistance was confined to groups that on the whole had no 
faith in the desire of the country's leaders to be anything but 
Germany's loyal agents. As such groups, including the 
communists, were very small and uninfluential, Hungary's active 
resistance movement was feeble until the final phases of the 
war.6 
The lack of an effective resistance movement did not mean 
that all elements of Hungarian society endorsed the Horthy 
regime's policy of reluctant collaboration. In fact the Kallay 
government's practice of treating with both the Germans and the 
Allies was commonly referred to as the Kallay-kettos, a 
play-on-words on kalloi-kettos, the double dance of Kallo, a 
folkdance from Kallay's home county. Some groups, such as 
opposition politicians, populist writers and concerned church-
men, favoured a more determined effort to dissociate Hungary 
from Germany. Their activities only widened as the crises of 1944 
swept the country. The effectiveness of their work was hindered 
by the mass arrests that were carried out by German security units 
(and their Hungarian collaborators) after the German occupa-
tion and again after the Szalasi coup seven months later. 
One of the papers in this part of our special volume deals with 
an aspect of the resistance instituted by Hungary's government. 
In this study, Professor Istvan Mocsy examines the Kallay 
cabinet's efforts to reach an agreement with the British regarding 
Hungary's defection from the Axis. He points out that while 
unrealistic conditions insisted on by the Hungarian government 
made progress in the negotiations difficult, in the end the quest 
for a deal with the Western Allies failed because it was not in the 
interest of the Soviets, who were able to frustrate Hungarian 
aspirations. Professor Mocsy concludes that both in this matter 
and in the settlement of the postwar fate of East Central Europe, 
it was not the "conduct or desires" of the small nations that 
mattered, "but the interests and the power alignment of the 
Great Powers." 
The three papers that follow Professor Mocsy's work deal with 
the opposition to collaboration that was generated by three 
important elements of Hungarian society: the Churches, the 
intelligentsia and the students. The first of these studies 
examines the attitudes of Hungary's Churches to National 
Socialism and the German war. According to Professor Leslie 
Laszlo, the study's author, the leaders of Hungary's Churches 
were alerted to the danger of German Nazi influence as a result of 
the treatment the Christian Churches received in the Third 
Reich. Hungary's concerned churchmen reacted to the danger 
first by seeking greater cooperation between the Catholic and 
Protestant Churches. At the same time, many churchmen 
condemned the teachings of National Socialism in books, 
pamphlets and in religious periodicals. Under a deeply religious 
and anti-Nazi Prime Minister like Pal Teleki, the Churches 
collaborated with the government in countering radical right-
wing propaganda. Still another sphere of anti-Nazi activity for 
the Church was the combatting of the ever-increasing influence 
of German Nazi ideas among Hungary's ethnic German 
population. 7 
In the next paper, Professor Mario Fenyo, the author of a 
major monograph on wartime Hungarian-German relations, 8 
discusses the subject of resistance among the Hungarian 
intelligentsia. Like the leaders of Hungary's churches, the 
country's intellectuals, in particular several young populist 
writers, perceived the Nazi threat early and tried to counteract it 
by emphasizing in their writings Hungarian values and 
traditions, and the need to preserve Hungary's independence. 
They also continued to advocate social reform and published 
periodicals for the dissemination of their ideas. All this was 
usually done with caution, Fenyo argues, without open 
denunciation of the war and the German alliance. Hungary's 
intellectuals, like their more conservative counterparts in the 
political establishment, preferred methods of peaceful opposition 
to those involving open confrontation. 
The last of the three studies dealing with particular elements of 
wartime Hungary's society examines a group closely linked—both 
temperamentally and professionally — to the intellectuals: the 
country's students. In an autobiographical essay, Professor Janos 
Horvath relates his recollections of the 1944 Hungarian student 
movement for independence. It is with this paper that we at last 
get descriptions of resistance activities in the tradition of the 
struggles of German-occupied, subjugated territories. Horvath 
describes clandestine organizational work, attempts at illicit 
publishing, police raids, arrests, interrogations and, in the case of 
the lucky few such as Horvath himself, escapes. His account also 
speaks of heroism as well as youthful naivete on the part of 
university and college students who conspired against a ruthless 
occupying power (and its local agents) in the name of national 
independence. In the end, the defeat of the Germans and their 
Arrow Cross allies was brought about not by the students (and 
other members of the resistance) but by the Red Army, which 
arrived at the gates of Budapest just as Horvath was being 
tormented by his captors for information on his associates. 
Horvath's paper completes the series of essays which has taken the 
story from Hungary's drifting toward war, to the capture of 
Budapest in the winter of 1944-45. These papers are followed in 
an appendix-like fashion by a documentary article in which 
Professor Laszlo analyses and presents excerpts from the diaries 
of one of wartime Hungary's most prominent men, Prince 
Primate Cardinal Jusztinian Seredi. This evidence, Dr. Laszlo 
argues, helps to dispel the charge made by some historians that 
Hungary's Churches collaborated with the Germans and failed to 
serve the cause of peace. Professor Laszlo's documentary study is 
in turn followed by reviews of books dealing with or touching on 
Hungary's involvement in the Second World War. 
As an epilogue to the story of Hungary's futile quest for a 
timely end to involvement in war, a few words should be said 
about the peace that eventually awaited her at the end of the 
road that she had travelled since 1941. It must be noted in this 
connection that Hungary's ultimate fate was influenced in part 
by two factors. One of these was Hungarian participation in the 
war on Germany's side, while the other was the fact that two of 
the country's neighbours —Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia —were 
considered to be Allied powers. As significant territorial 
adjustments at the expense of victorious powers were unlikely, the 
possibility of territorial rearrangement in the Carpathian Basin 
boiled down to the question of the future of Transylvania. As has 
been seen in Professor Mocsy's paper, in 1943 the British were 
inclined to favour Hungarian claims to much of that land, or 
were willing to allow the re-establishment of an independent 
Transylvania. It is also known that the United States State 
Department at times also expressed similar sentiments.9 
Unfortunately for Hungary, however, the country that had most 
to say about postwar frontiers in the Carpathian Basin was 
neither Britain nor the United States, but the Soviet Union. 
While the British and the Americans could almost look upon 
the territorial division of the Carpathian Basin as a theoretical 
question, the Russians considered this issue to be vital to their 
interests. They no doubt considered this region to be a possible 
staging area for any future attack on their country, and believed 
that one part of it —Subcarpathia —could serve as a "Piedmont" 
for Ukrainian irredentism. For these reasons they, and above all 
Stalin, maintained keen interest in this issue throughout the war. 
Soviet aspirations in the Carpathian Basin can be divided into 
two categories. In some areas the Russians had direct interests, 
elsewhere they hoped to exercise indirect control. Into the 
former category belonged Subcarpathia with its majority 
Ruthenian population. It has been argued that Stalin had 
designs on this land already in 1939. 10 
A region of intense, though indirect, interest to the Soviets was 
Transylvania. On the future of this land Russian pronounce-
ments kept shifting during the war. In 1940, when Moscow 
asserted its claims to certain Rumanian territories (the old 
Russian province of Bessarabia and other regions), the Soviets 
encouraged the Hungarians in their machinations to regain 
Transylvania. A friendly Russian attitude toward Hungarian 
revisionism continued for some time and survived even Hungary's 
joining of the German-Italian-Japanese Tripartite Pact in 
November of 1940.1 1 But good relations between Hungary and 
the USSR, born mainly out of common hostility toward 
Rumania, did not last much longer. They were weakened when 
Budapest assumed a role in the German invasion of Yugoslavia in 
April 1941, and were shattered when Hungary entered the war 
two months later. During the years that followed, Soviet plans 
regarding Hungary evolved partly as a result of consulta-
tions with Eduard Benes of the Czechoslovak government 
in exile. These plans called for the occupation of Hungary 
by Soviet troops alone, the detachment from Hungary of 
the lands she had regained between 1937 and 1941, and the 
expulsion of Hungarians from these and other regions. If there 
were doubts in Moscow about the future of Transylvania, these 
were dispelled when Rumania managed to effect a turnabout in 
her allegiance but Hungary could not. 12 The British and the 
Americans did make some efforts to influence the outcome of 
events but these proved too feeble. As is known, the British 
suggestion to establish a democratic federation in East Central 
Europe (with possible Transylvanian membership) was effectively 
opposed by the Soviets, as was Churchill's 1943 plan to send 
Western troops into the Middle Danube region from the south. 
Mainly because of their military successes, the Soviets were able 
to achieve the region's postwar reorganization single-handedly. 
The new territorial arrangement was legalized by a number of 
international agreements. The Soviet-Hungarian Armistice of 
early 1945 re-established Hungary's frontiers in the North, East 
and South as they had been in 1937. Next, a Czechoslovak-Soviet 
agreement gave Subcarpathia to the USSR. The final settlement, 
in terms of a peace treaty with Hungary, was slower to come 
about, and at times the impression was created in Moscow that 
Hungary had the right to bargain, but in the end all Hungarian 
pleas for favourable consideration of Hungary's territorial and 
ethnic interests were disregarded and the Trianon dictum was 
officially reimposed on the country with one minor exception —a 
border adjustment in favour of Czechoslovakia.13. The pain 
caused by this settlement to Hungarians was aggravated by the 
treatment given to co-nationals in the neighbouring states. In 
Czechoslovakia, for example, their property was confiscated and 
they were deprived of their citizenship (and the rights that went 
with it). Moreover, many of them were expelled from 
Czechoslovakia, or were deported to remote regions of it. 
The reasons for this harsh treatment of Hungary by the Soviets 
(and their East Central European allies) were numerous. The 
"unprovoked aggression" of Hungarians against the USSR had 
probably little to do with it. The Soviet decision to award 
Transylvania to Rumania, for example, was influenced in part by 
Moscow's acquisition of some of that country's eastern provinces. 
Through gaining territories in the West, Rumania's communist-
controlled government could ward off the wrath of the masses 
displeased by the losses in the East.14 In Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia too, Stalin expected pro-Soviet governments to 
emerge after the war, while for some time he was not sure that the 
same would happen in Hungary. Accordingly, Stalin was much 
more eager to appease those countries than Hungary. As regards 
the West's inability to influence the unfolding new territorial 
order in East Central Europe, it must be kept in mind that 
Western military leaders were most reluctant to see wrangles over 
future boundaries in that part of Europe interfere with the 
effective prosecution of the Allied war e f f o r t . A n d by the time 
the war had ended, the Soviets were in complete control of the 
Carpathian area and the West's influence there had diminished 
even further. In this manner, peace did come to Hungary in the 
end. It was a "hostile peace" as one commentator has put it,16 
one that probably exceeded in its harshness the most pessimistic 
premonitions Hungarians may have had about their future 
during the war. 
N.F. Dreisziger 
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Hungary Amidst the Great Powers: 
Documents of the Failed 1943 Peace Mission 
Istvan Mocsy 
The secret peace negotiation of 1943 between Hungary and Great 
Britain was a feeble attempt by a small state, caught amidst the 
warring Great Powers, to regain control of its destiny. Hungary 
was provoked into making the peace initiative by the sagging 
military fortunes of Germany. After the Allied invasion of North 
Africa in November 1942 doubts strengthened in Budapest about 
the ultimate outcome of the war, which, after the German defeat 
at Stalingrad and the subsequent destruction of the Second 
Hungarian Army at the Don during January and February of 
1943, hardened into a conviction that the war was lost. The 
Hungarian Prime Minister, Miklos Kallay, as well as the Regent, 
Admiral Miklos Horthy, realized that if Hungary was to avoid 
paying the full penalty due for joining Germany in war, she must 
extricate herself from the conflict at the earliest possible moment. 
As a result, during late 1942 and early 1943, their unofficial 
representatives established contact with the British Foreign 
Office and maintained them until Germany finally occupied the 
country on March 19, 1944. 
The Hungarian leaders' interest in the details of the 
negotiations was always keen. Although the negotiations had 
only a negligible direct impact on the course of the war, the 
policies of the Hungarian leaders were influenced by the hopes 
they attached to the discussions. In fact, they are the key to an 
understanding of Hungary's war-time conduct. Also, during the 
postwar accounting for war crimes some of the former leaders of 
Hungary used the secret negotiations with Britain as proof of 
their opposition to Hitler. A lack of adequate documentation, 
however, prevented a complete reconstruction of the incident 
and a clear assessment of the reasons for the failure of the 
negotiations. Built upon circumstantial evidence, earlier 
accounts of the negotiations picture them to be much more 
complex and imply that their chances of success were greater 
than was the case in reality. Most early accounts of the incident, 
written without the use of the key documents, were based upon 
secondhand information on the recollections of the involved 
Hungarian officials and particularly upon the memoirs of 
Kali ay.1 Such evidence, however, could be challenged as 
self-serving and subjective, or at least as being based upon a 
perception of events that was necessarily altered by the passage of 
time and a retrospective viewpoint. The pertinent Hungarian 
documents are permanently lost: soon after the German invasion 
of the country, to protect the participating officials and 
diplomats, they were destroyed. 
The collection of documents entitled Magyar-brit titkos 
targyalasok 1943-ban (Hungarian-British Secret Negotiations), 
edited by Gyula Juhasz, fills this void. 2 It contains over one 
hundred documents selected from the archives of the British 
Foreign Office: reports by British diplomats from the various 
neutral capitals of Europe on contacts with Hungarians, 
documents which were sent to Britain by representatives of the 
Hungarian government and notes prepared by officials of the 
Foreign Office for internal use. For over thirty years these 
papers, now deposited in the Public Record Office, were 
classified and thus unavailable to scholars. Together they correct 
some of the earlier Hungarian misconceptions about Western 
reception of the peace feelers and help to assess the importance of 
roles played by some of the participants. Above all, they permit 
an accurate reconstruction of both the underlying Hungarian 
reasoning which led to the negotiations and the policies of the 
British and other Allied powers towards East Central Europe. 
The meticulous editorial work of Juhasz, his explanatory notes 
and the extensive cross referencing help to measure the relative 
weight and significance of each document and to link them 
together to form a coherent and even an exciting narrative of the 
incident. 
The documents are introduced by Juhasz in a lengthy essay on 
Hungary's pre-war foreign policy and on the history of the peace 
negotiations. In its thoroughness, precision and objectivity, it is 
typical of the quality of scholarship we have become accustomed 
to expect from the best scholars of Hungary. It provides an 
outline of Hungary's foreign policy prior to the war and the 
connecting information that is needed for an understanding of 
the context of the negotiations. Juhasz also offers a complex 
analysis of the motivations and objectives of the Hungarian 
leaders, the reactions of the major Western powers and the Soviet 
Union and finally weighs the chances of success of the initiative. 
As a whole, the book gives us a clear example of the extreme 
difficulties the foreign policy makers of the small states of East 
Central Europe had to face both before and especially during the 
war. Here we can highlight only some of those difficulties which 
arose from the system itself within which Hungary and the other 
states of the region had to operate. 
Operating within the international political order that was 
created after the First World War, the small states could rarely 
pursue a rational and independent foreign policy based upon 
principles or self-interest and especially not when those policies 
conflicted with the interests of the Great Powers. From the point 
of view of the small states, the system itself was flawed. 
In creating a new order the architects of the Paris Peace 
Treaties wished to achieve a number of ends. Among others, 
they wished to prevent a rebirth of German militarism, to isolate 
the Soviet Union and, in general, to arrest the spread of socialist 
ideologies and the revolutionary movements. In short, they 
aimed to keep East Central Europe free from both German and 
Soviet economic and political influence. They also hoped to 
draw the newly created East Central European states into 
Western economic and political orbit and to provide for the 
security of all states under the umbrella of collective security. 
What the system lacked were means of orderly and peaceful 
change and guarantees that the vital interests of all states, large 
or small, defeated or victorious in the last war, would be equally 
protected. Not surprisingly, aside from its counterrevolutionary 
purpose, the settlement was not successful it failed to prevent the 
resurgence of Germany or to provide security for East Central 
Europe. At best it could temporarily uphold the status quo and 
enforce the decisions of the Western powers against the small 
states. But the system was unable to restrict the actions of Great 
Powers, who could always escape from the constraints of the 
system by resorting to power politics. The small states, on the 
other hand, could act in their own interest only as appanages of a 
Great Power and at times at a cost to their independence. The 
alternative was either suicidal heroism or petty Machiavellism. 
In other words, collective security became a myth and the system 
of tangled alliances reemerged, a system that left the small states 
impotent and exposed to the manipulations of the Great Powers. 
Viewed from the perspectives of the genuine economic and 
security needs of the peoples of East Central Europe, the 
principal weakness of the postwar system was due to the 
break-up —as opposed to the reform —of the Central European 
Empire of the Habsburgs. By permitting the fragmentation of 
the area into jealously competing small states, the peoples of the 
region were deprived of the means through which to uncover and 
defend their real regional interests. Each of them necessarily 
became preoccupied with security or with territorial claims. 
Thus the collective strength of the area was neutralized and all of 
the East Central European states became vulnerable. Moreover, 
divided and preoccupied with their military security and national 
ambitions, the social and economic development of virtually 
every one of those states was arrested. 
In the case of Hungary, the dismemberment of the country in 
1919 and the injustices of the territorial settlement fixed in the 
Treaty of Trianon greatly aided the defeat of the progressive, 
democratic and anti-nationalist elements. As a result, throug-
hout the interwar period, the driving force behind Hungarian 
foreign policy was nationalism and its aim, the destruction of the 
Treaty and the restoration of at least some of the lost Hungarian 
territories. (See the study by S.B. Vardy.) Those goals put 
Hungary at odds with most of the East Central European states, 
however, and prevented a collective defense of the region against 
external dangers. First Italy and then Germany were willing to 
support Hungary's revisionist policies, but German ambitions 
also endangered Hungary's independence. On the eve of the 
Second World War this contradiction confronted the Hungarian 
foreign policy makers with a difficult choice. The conservative 
Hungarian leadership and a substantial segment of the middle 
classes favoured a pro-British orientation, but such a policy failed 
to produce tangible results for the country. The result was an 
ambivalent policy. 
Unable to formulate and then pursue a clear line of policy, 
Hungarian actions came to depend upon an uncertain assessment 
of the future policies and probable actions of the Great Powers 
and upon the anticipated outcome of the struggle between them. 
Not surprisingly, during the late thirties and early forties, this led 
to a series of foreign policy miscalculations as Hungary's 
expectations of international developments were repeatedly 
violated. Contrary to Hungarian expectations the Western 
powers failed to react to the re-militarization of the Rhineland 
and in 1938, to the annexation of Austria. Hungary, anxious to 
prevent the extension of the Reich's frontiers to her borders, was 
perhaps the only country to contemplate military aid to 
Austria. 3 
Fears of further German expansion and anticipations of a 
sharp Western response in the next crisis made Hungary inclined 
to temporarily forego her territorial ambitions and to normalize 
relations with the threatened Czechoslovakia in the Bled 
agreement. 4 Western capitulation to Hitler at the Munich 
conference came as a complete surprise. Hungary also refused to 
aid Germany against Poland and was dismayed at the 
ineffectiveness of the Western military effort and especially by the 
ease of the defeat of France. Not surprisingly, the phenomenal 
initial German successes against the Soviet Union in 1941 at least 
momentarily shook the faith of even the most optimistic believers 
in an Allied victory. 5 Seduced by the illusory German successes, 
Hungary abandoned its neutral stance to join Germany in war 
against the Soviet Union. That was the final miscalculation 
which proved to be disastrous to both the Hungarian leaders and 
to the country as a whole. The replacement of the pro-German 
Bardossy with Kallay in March 1942 indicates that Horthy 
himself realized the folly of that move. Gradually, Kallay began 
to resist the repeated German demands to increase Hungary's 
economic and military contribution to the war effort, he also 
began to manoeuvre so as to regain control of the country's 
foreign policy. But all of the policy options were hedged with 
danger. 
The short term threat came from Germany and from the 
ultra-right wing domestic opponents of the regime. If sufficiently 
provoked Germany could occupy the country and install a 
subservient government drawn from the various factions of the 
extreme right. But to remain allied to Germany and to increase 
Hungary's sacrifices in the war held an even greater, long term 
danger. What the conservative leaders of the country feared 
most was the prospect of a Soviet victory and Soviet domination 
of Hungary, which was certain to result in a domestic revolution 
and a takeover of the government by the left. It was considered 
not beyond the realm of the impossible that in a peace treaty 
Hungary would be dismembered 6 or even absorbed by a greatly 
expanded Soviet state. Even in the best of circumstances, they 
feared, the recently recovered territories might be lost once 
again. The Allied invasion of North Africa seemed to have 
opened an escape route from all the dangers. But it was a narrow 
path which could be travelled only if the Western Allies 
vigorously pursued a Mediterranean and Balkan strategy. If a 
victory in Africa was quickly followed by a massive invasion of the 
Balkans, the Allies could have reached Hungary's frontiers long 
before the Soviets. That such a strategy was in the best interests 
of the Western powers was taken for granted, no one could 
believe in Budapest that the West would yield East Central 
Europe to the Soviet Union without a fight. 7 The opening of 
secret negotiations with Britain reflected these hopes and Kallay's 
desire to be prepared for the exploitation of such fortuitous turn 
of events. But once again, as prior to the war, the success or 
failure of Hungarian policies depended very little on the positive 
actions of the country, though it should be noted that the regime 
did less than was within its powers. 
During the initial contacts with British officials the representa-
tives of the Hungarian government indicated that Hungary was 
ready to open peace negotiations and, at the time when the 
armies of the Western powers reached Hungary, to open the 
frontiers to them. 8 Moreover, the Hungarian leaders were eager 
to convince the West that their economic and military 
contribution to the German war effort was made under duress, 9 
and in any case it was of limited nature. In fact, Hungary's 
contribution was intentionally held to the minimum that was 
judged to be necessary to preserve the country's independence 
and to ward off a German military occupation. The Allies also 
learned that Horthy was determined to keep Hungary's best 
military units intact and within the country's boundaries so as to 
guarantee the success of Hungary's planned switch to the Allied 
side. This was a tempting offer, potentially of great strategic 
value, though neither Great Britain nor her allies were eager to 
pay the price that Hungary wished to extract. 
The various Hungarian memoranda which reached the British 
Foreign Office make it clear that the Hungarian leaders' prime 
objective was the preservation of the conservative economic, 
social and political order.1 0 Integrally connected to that goal 
was the exclusion of the Soviet Union from East Central Europe. 
In fact, Germany presented a lesser threat to the regime than the 
Soviet Union and, therefore, Germany's defeat on the Eastern 
Front was not desirable until the Western forces reached the 
Hungarian frontiers. 11 It did not escape the eyes of the British 
officials that in approaching Great Britain and offering to 
surrender to the Western powers, Hungary wished not only to 
encourage a Balkan strategy, but also to drive a wedge between 
Britain and the Soviet Union. 12 The Hungarian leaders 
assumed that the ideological differences between East and West 
were only temporarily suppressed, and would once again surface 
when the bond of a fighting common enemy was broken and a 
new political order that was to be imposed upon East Central 
Europe had to be decided. The Hungarians pointedly reminded 
the British that Hungary was engaging in active hostilities only 
against communism and the Soviet Union,1 3 while thousands of 
Allied soldiers, escaping from German prisoner-of-war camps, 
Polish soldiers and civilian refugees and Jews were well treated 
once they reached Hungary.14 Through such arguments the 
regime tried to rehabilitate itself in Western eyes and to assure 
that in a postwar redrawing of the map of East Central Europe 
Hungary's legitimate territorial claims would not be ignored. 
They were particularly anxious about the fate of Transylvania. 
The documents repeatedly returned to this subject and pointed 
out that the division of that province in the Second Vienna 
Award, due to the hostile disposition of Germany towards 
Hungary, actually favoured Rumania.1 5 A fairer division 
would have been a return to Hungary of territories north of the 
Maros River line, but ideally, due to Transylvania's historical ties 
with Hungary and to its natural geographic and economic links 
to the Danubian basin, it should have been rejoined intact with 
Hungary. 16 If neither of these solutions were practicable, 
Hungary would have preferred an independent Transylvania. 17 
British policy toward Hungary was always filled with 
ambiguities. Though at times sympathetic to Hungarian efforts 
to stay out of German orbit, British commitment to the East 
Central European enemies of Hungary prevented a close 
cooperation between the two countries. The British documents 
frequently acknowledge that of the East Central European states 
only Hungary managed to preserve its old parliamentary form, a 
multi-party system, which still allowed a functioning of the Social 
Democratic Party, a relatively free press and the trade unions. 18 
But already in 1940 Britain informed the Hungarian government 
that "since Hungary can render us no service in the war, it is not 
worth our while to make any sacrifices on her behalf." 19 Until 
1943 British policy did not differentiate between Germany and 
her satellites. The initial reaction to the peace overtures, 
therefore, was a contemptuous rebuff "as long as Hungary 
continues to make war on our allies and supports the Axis, she 
can count on neither help nor mercy."2 0 In February 1943 
British policy began to change, for, as Alexander Cadogan put it, 
"it seems to me that in the present critical phase for Germany, 
anything that we can do to make the satellite states more of an 
embarrassment to Germany would be all to the good." 21 It 
should be noted that in both instances, in 1940 as well as in 1943, 
the telling argument for adopting a specific policy was 
expediency and self-interest and not abstract principles or even 
the specific behaviour of Hungary. 
After February 1943 British attitude softened towards 
Hungary. The British government was willing to dispel 
Hungarian fears about a new dismemberment of their country 
and, as Eden noted, Britain did not intend to punish the 
Hungarian people for the follies of their leaders. 22 On the all 
important territorial issue, Britain differentiated between 
Hungarian claims against states allied with the West and those 
made against another satellite of Germany. Hungary was 
expected to give up the territories she gained from Britain's 
Czechoslovakian and Yugoslav allies, but the British showed some 
sensitivity to the Hungarian position even in those cases.2 3 
According to Churchill, Hungary simply had to trust in the 
fairness and good will of Britain.24 On the surface, Britain 
showed disinterest and impartiality over the disposition of 
Transylvania and a capacity to understand the complexity of the 
issues involved. In her policies, however, she also showed her 
duplicity. 
In general the Hungarian-Rumanian dispute was at times an 
irritant to the Great Powers, to Germany and the Allies alike, 
especially when it deflected those countries from concentrating 
against the true enemy and when it prevented them from 
marching in locked steps with them. Often, Transylvania was 
used as a bait to induce one or the other to do the bidding of a 
Great Power. 
In 1940, at the time of the Second Vienna Award, the British 
government, in an attempt to make mischief for Germany, sided 
with Rumania, refused to recognize the Award and urged the 
Rumanians to resist.25 At the same time, Britain applauded 
Bulgaria's seizure of Dobruja from Rumania. In September 1940 
Hungary was thrown a conciliatory bone in Parliament when 
Churchill announced that he has "never been happy about the 
way in which Hungary was treated after the last war."2 6 
Churchill may have expressed his genuine beliefs, but those could 
not interfere with the pragmatic interests of a Great Power. By 
1943, Britain saw no advantage in supporting Rumania and 
became more sympathetic to Hungary, not as much because on 
the whole Rumania "behaved much worse than Hungary," but 
because of an increasing Soviet interest in Rumania. 27 The 
internal working papers of the Foreign Office began to indicate 
that Britain expected to redraw the borders between the two 
countries in favour of Hungary or perhaps, as the most equitable 
solution, to push for the reestablishment of an independent 
Transylvania. 28 
Even before the outbreak of the war, Britain was aware of the 
failure of the international order that was established in 1919. In 
some measure the concessions made at the time of the Munich 
crisis were made to correct some of its specific errors. The 
breakdown of the security system, the failure of the Western 
powers to fulfill their obligations under the old system of 
guarantees and the inability of the small states of Central Europe 
to defend themselves against a Great Power, forced the British 
policy makers to draw up plans for a new order and a new state 
system. They turned to the idea of a federalized East Central 
Europe and under its sponsorship various emigre governments in 
London agreed to link their states after the war. The 
Polish-Czechoslovak union was to form the core of a Central 
European Federation and the Greek-Yugoslav merger that of a 
Balkan union. 
In December 1942 Eden held out the possibility that Austria 
and Hungary might join the future Central European Federa-
tion. 29 The existence of these plans allowed Hungary to assume 
that Britain and the Western powers did not intend to concede 
the region to the Soviet Union. Already in 1940 the former 
Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Istvan Bethlen, in a long 
secret memorandum to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 
analyzed the prospects of the various possible combinations for a 
federal state and came to the conclusion that Hungary's interests 
would be best protected by a union of Poland, Rumania, an 
independent Transylvania and Hungary, after the return of 
Slovakia and some of the Yugoslavian territories. 30 Such a 
state, with a population of 60 million people and with Italian and 
Western support, would form a bulwark against both Germany 
and the Soviet Union. During the war, with some variations, 
31 
these plans were repeated, but each contained the idea, as a 
British official put it, of an expanded and strengthened Hungary 
surrounded by its satellites of Croatia, Slovakia and Transylva-
nia, ruling over the Carpathian basin and in alliance with Poland 
defending "Christian Democracy."3 2 Hungary, however, 
expressed strong reservations about a union in which her power 
would be reduced due to a preponderance of Slavic nations. 3 3 
The political preconditions set by the Hungarian government, 
the territorial demands and the reservations about a future 
federated state made the negotiations more difficult. But 
Hungary's hopes and British plans were shipwrecked on the 
interests and strength of another Great Power, the Soviet Union. 
The position of the Soviets was unambiguous. They rigidly 
opposed negotiations with Hungary until they themselves were in 
such a military position as to direct the course of events. Since 
1919 the Horthy regime was one of the most outspoken opponents 
of the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly relations between the two 
countries were always cool. Nevertheless, in June 1941 Molotov 
informed the Hungarian government that the Soviet Union had 
no specific observations to make on the Second Vienna Award 34 
and, if Hungary remained neutral, the Soviet Union would 
support her claims in Transylvania. 35 After Hungary had 
joined Germany against the Soviet Union, Stalin's attitude 
changed dramatically. Already in 1941 he expressed the view 
that Hungary must be punished by extending both the 
Czechoslovak and Rumanian frontiers at her expense. 36 In June 
1943 in a letter to the British Ambassador, Molotov echoed those 
sentiments when he stated that for assisting and for the crimes 
committed against the Soviet people not only the Hungarian 
government, but the Hungarian people also must be held 
responsible. 37 
Rumania was also an ally of Germany, and she participated in 
the war against the Soviet Union with greater enthusiasm than 
Hungary. Yet the Soviet attitudes towards Rumania did not 
harden, which suggests that Stalin's anger against Hungary was 
political in nature. He intended to draw Rumania into the Soviet 
orbit, to protect her against Hungary and to gain new military 
and naval bases for the Soviet Union. 38 A Rumanian state 
possessing Transylvania, out of fear of Hungarian attack, would 
be a more willing ally. In any event, since both Hungary and 
Rumania waged war only against the Soviet Union, Stalin 
believed that the final decision on the fate of those countries 
ought to belong to the Soviet government. 39 Similarly, the 
Soviet Union wished to curb the enthusiasm of the British for the 
proposed federations. The formation of large blocks on its 
borders did not favour Soviet interests, 40 and in the planned 
federations the Soviet leaders saw only Western attempts at a 
resurrection of the old cordon sanitaire. It suited Soviet plans to 
keep the small states divided the Soviet leaders preferred to deal, 
at the right moments, separately with each state. 
Partly to limit Western influence in East Central Europe and 
the Balkans, Stalin vigorously opposed the idea of a Balkan 
invasion by the Western powers. At the Teheran Conference in 
November 1943, he joined Roosevelt against Churchill to adopt 
operation "Overlord," the cross channel invasion of the 
continent, which limited Western operations to the Atlantic and 
French Mediterranean coasts. Thereafter, to divert German 
attentions from "Overlord," only the illusion of a Mediterranean 
operation remained. 41 
That decision greatly reduced the value of Hungary's offer to 
surrender. The Soviet Union was always cool to the idea of the 
negotiated surrender of Hungary. Nor was it in her interest to 
help the survival of a regime that had been her consistent foe. 
But if that regime chose to commit suicide, she had no objection. 
The Hungarian offer contained the possibility of some tactical 
advantage to the Soviet Union, but only if Hungary was willing to 
take immediate military action against Germany. In that case 
the Soviet Union was not opposed, since Germany was certain to 
occupy the country, which would have drawn away some of the 
German reserves, 42 and may have even eliminated the 
Hungarian conservatives. The British attitudes underwent some 
modification after the Teheran Conference. At the time of the 
Quebec Conference, while Churchill was still hoping for a Balkan 
invasion and a rapid advance through Italy, he was enthusiastic 
about the strategic significance of the Hungarian proposal and 
strongly opposed to frittering away the opportunity for mere 
tactical advantage. 43 But after Teheran the issue became moot 
and even Churchill's enthusiasm waned. Not able to create the 
proper conditions that would have made a Hungarian surrender 
useful, nor willing to ask the Hungarian government to commit 
suicide and to expose the one million Jews and refugees to 
German reprisals, the British government limited itself to 
demands of symbolic acts of Hungarian resistance to Germany. 
Juhasz concludes his essay with the question "Was it possible 
for Hungary to break with Germany in the fall of 1943?" 4 4 The 
strategic situation at that time did not favour such a move. He 
points out that all of the states which switched sides were able to 
do so only when the front reached them. In 1943 both the 
Western powers and the Soviet Union were still far away from the 
Hungarian borders. But the domestic political pre-conditions 
were also absent in Hungary. The Kallay government's 
willingness to accept risks was conditional, the Hungarian leaders 
were willing to act only if their main objective, the saving of the 
regime, was assured. In all of the instances, however, when a 
country revolted against Germany and switched sides, the 
conservative or fascist regimes were also overthrown by the liberal 
and anti-fascist forces. At that cost the Hungarian leaders were 
not willing to accept the risks of German retaliation. Then too, 
the Hungarian liberal opposition, though it wished to break with 
Germany on moral grounds, was both too weak and unwilling to 
force the government to surrender or to overthrow it. Their 
reluctance was due to what Juhasz calls the schizoid Hungarian 
political condition, where the pro-German elements were still in 
opposition and the liberals ended up supporting the government 
which allied with Germany. The anti-German groups recognized 
that an overthrow of the conservative government would most 
likely result only in the victory of the extreme right. 45 They had 
to recognize their impotence and did not pressure the 
government. Only the hope remained that the external events 
would force a fundamental political change in Hungary. 
The Kallay government itself gradually recognized that the 
negotiations with the Western powers no longer had a realistic 
foundation and could not assure the survival of the regime. As a 
result, the government sank into inaction. By February 1944 
Kallay had to admit that the future of the country would be 
determined less by the Western powers than by the Soviet Union 
and, therefore, Hungary had no other choice than to establish 
contacts with that power. 46 The German occupation of the 
country on March 19, 1944, however, ended all hopes of a 
negotiated surrender. Undoubtedly the character of the Hun-
garian government, its real objectives in extending the peace 
feelers, and the political contradictions of Hungarian politics 
contributed to the failure of Hungarian policy in 1943. But we 
may pose a second question did the failure of Hungary to turn 
against Germany influence the treatment of the country at the 
peace conference and in general its postwar history? In the final 
analysis the specific war-time policies and actions of none of the 
East Central European states, save those of Yugoslavia, did 
materially alter their postwar treatment. Churchill's promise, 
made in September 1943, that the "satellite states, suborned or 
overawed, may perhaps, if they can help to shorten the war, be 
allowed to work their passage home," proved to be a hollow 
one. 47 The small states were at times treated with paternalism, 
at other times with arrogance and righteousness, always with an 
air of superiority, and never as equals. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, in the decisions over the political order that was to be 
imposed upon the region, or in the redrawing of its map, not the 
conduct or desires of the small nations, but the interests and the 
power alignment of the Great Powers proved to be decisive. 
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Fighting Evil with Weapons of the Spirit: 
The Christian Churches in Wartime Hungary 
Leslie Laszlo 
There would be hard to find in history a parallel to the wild 
swings of the political pendulum which occurred in Hungary in 
the wake of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the 
end of World War I. Within less than a year, between October 
31st 1918 and July 31st 1919 to be exact, the country passed from 
a conservative constitutional monarchy, through five months of a 
liberal, though increasingly left-leaning democratic republic, to 
one-hundred days of a Soviet type Dictatorship of the Proletariat, 
and then back again to right-wing authoritarianism in a nominal 
monarchy, without a monarch. The years following these times 
of troubles were dubbed the "Christian Course" since the 
Counter-Revolution being consolidated under Admiral Miklos 
Horthy's Regency claimed to have been inspired by Christian 
moral principles. While the regime's "Christianity" was 
questionable and manifest mostly in anti-Semitic demagoguery, 
the Christian Churches did, in fact, receive important political 
favours and material aid from the government, which considered 
them the most solid pillars of a stable social order. 
The most important vehicle of Church influence in Hungary 
was, undoubtedly, its near-monopoly of public education. Not 
only were over two-thirds of the grammar-schools and teacher's 
colleges, as well as about half of the secondary schools, operated 
directly by the Churches, but they also provided religious 
instruction —a mandatory subject for all students up to the 
university level —in the "secular" state and communal schools. 
While it would be hard to measure the impact of school 
indoctrination and its residue in adult life, one would have to 
assume that such a massive and lengthy exposure —we are 
speaking of a quarter of a century, 1919-1944 —did definitely 
contribute to the belief system and character formation of the 
population. Hence also the co-responsibility of the Churches for 
the ethical-moral standards and behaviour of Hungarians during 
the times of trial which were to come. It is not enough to say that 
the clergy was of the people, that the Churches were part of the 
nation: their role was that of teachers of the nation and as such 
they cannot escape the judgment of history, be that praise or 
blame. 
This essay will attempt to give an account, even if short and 
incomplete, of the little-known efforts of the Christian Churches 
in Hungary to counter the influence of Nazism, its anti-human 
and anti-Christian ideology. To the degree that the Christian 
population of Hungary, or at least part of it, responded to these 
promptings, resisted Nazism and helped the persecuted, one can 
say that all was not in vain: indeed, whenever the depressingly 
bleak picture of those times is illuminated by rays of humane 
behaviour, heroism and charity, we do find committed Christians 
in the first row among those fighting evil. 
* * * 
Having been rescued from the atheistic Communist dictatorship 
of Bela Kun, with their former privileges and wealth restored, the 
Churches were naturally thankful to Horthy and supported his 
regime with its loud protestations of patriotism and Christianity. 
They even participated — while there were, of course, exceptions 
— in the anti-Semitic hysteria, a gut reaction by the Christian 
majority to the Red Terror of 1919 which was headed by 
communists of Jewish origin. Leading churchmen advocated 
restrictive measures against the Jews who had a disproportion-
ately large share of the economic wealth and were over-
represented in the most lucrative professions (such as medicine, 
law, journalism, theatre and the arts), and also among academics 
and university students. Although during the relatively 
prosperous years of the twenties the conservative Prime Minister, 
Count Istvan Bethlen, succeeded in taming much of the 
right-radicalism and anti-Semitism of the first years of the 
Counter-Revolution, the Great Depression, which hit agricul-
tural Hungary with devastating brutality, and then the rise of 
Hitler, once again upset the political equilibrium. 
The t r iumph of National Socialism in Germany had fateful 
consequences for Hungary as well. On the one hand, the Third 
Reich, flaunting its power and its eagerness to use it, attracted 
into its orbit Hungarian foreign policy, which was determined by 
revisionism and had up to this time leaned on Mussolini's Italy, 
while at the same time the ideas of National Socialism were 
undermining the Hungarian political and social order. All the 
factors and circumstances which made the victory of Nazism 
possible in Germany—the passionate nationalism born of 
bitterness over the lost war, the laying of blame for this defeat on 
left-wing socialism and on an international Jewish conspiracy, the 
unsolved social problems, extensive unemployment, the disillu-
sionment with the existing order on the part of thousands of 
unemployed university graduates and their readiness for 
experiments that promised radical change—all these things were 
present in Hungary also. As a matter of fact, the radical right 
wing that had appeared in the counter-revolutionary movement 
of Szeged could claim priority in raising many points also 
contained in Hitler's program. There was quite a vogue in 
Hungary for castigating the feudalism of the aristocratic 
landowning class and the plutocratic rule of Jewish bankers years 
before the world press started paying attention to similar 
pronouncements by the Fiihrer. 
Thus when Hitler denounced the Treaty of Versailles and 
called for breaking asunder —by violence if necessary—the chains 
of the dictated peace treaties it was only natural that he should be 
enthusiastically applauded by Hungarians. 
But even if we disregard patriotic fervour and other emotional 
factors, it is not at all surprising that the obvious and grave social 
ills besetting Hungary and the seeming indifference to them of 
the reactionary ruling class, which clung rigidly to its privileges, 
drove many into a camp of right-wing radicalism —all the more, 
since the communist experiment of Bela Kun had discredited for 
a long time to come the alternative of the radical left. 1 
In the beginning few people recognized Hitler's real intentions 
and the historic significance of his rule. Hungarian public 
opinion was not especially concerned about the fact that the new 
dictatorship abolished democratic freedoms in Germany. The 
Hungarian press, which was largely of a nationalistic and 
right-wing orientation, had long accustomed the Hungarian 
public to seeing mainly the defects of the democratic systems of 
Czechoslovakia or France and to sympathizing instead with the 
authoritarian governments, more akin to the Hungarian system, 
of such countries as Poland, Italy and Portugal and to admiring 
Pilsudski, Mussolini and Salazar. Later, during the Spanish Civil 
War, this same press naturally took the side of General Franco 
who was fighting against the "Reds." In the beginning it seemed 
that the change in Germany belonged in this same category the 
number of effeminate, decadent, corrupt and almost anarchic 
democracies had again been reduced by one and the German 
people had also found its heroic leader, who would, on the basis 
of a nationalist and socialist view of the world, lead his nation 
into the better European future then emerging. 
Recognition of the true face of Nazism was slow in coming, and 
even when it came it was confined to certain circles. The foreign 
policy of the Hungarian governments that followed one another 
tied Hungary ever more closely to Germany, until finally the two 
countries became wartime allies. As a result, official government 
pronouncements, as well as the press (which was under the 
direction of the government) remained friendly to Germany until 
the end, and attempted, in the interests of this friendship —and 
even more out of fear of this powerful ally—to gloss over the 
unpleasant features of Nazism. This is how it could happen that 
a good part of the Hungarian public was convinced up until the 
Final defeat at the end of the war—and many remained 
convinced even thereafter—that Hitler was a statesman of genius 
and a man of high moral character, that National Socialism was 
unquestionably superior to other ideologies, that the German 
army was invincible, and —most incredible of all —that the 
Fiihrer and those around him were pro-Hungarian. After the 
victorious conclusion of the war, or so they thought, Hitler meant 
to assign to Great Hungary, re-established with his help and 
treated as an equal partner, an important role in the New 
Europe.2 That not everyone shared these delusions can be 
ascribed partly to the efforts of the Churches. 
We must, of course, remark right at this point that just as the 
counterrevolutionary Horthy regime sympathized with the 
right-wing, authoritarian governments of Europe, the Hungarian 
Churches did not see much reason either to find fault with the 
fascism of friendly Italy. Benito Mussolini was not only a sincere 
friend of Hungary —and in this instance propaganda correspon-
ded more or less to reality 3 — and not only was he the first to take 
up the cause of revision of Hungary's postwar frontiers, but it was 
he who by the Lateran Treaty had assured the sovereignty of the 
Pope over the Vatican state and had thus gained for himself 
undying credit in the eyes of Catholics all over the world. 
In addition, many Christians, dreading communism, consid-
ered the vigorous and dynamic movement of fascism the most 
effective antidote to communism, rather than the old parliamen-
tary systems that seemed tired and chaotic. 
In replaying the happenings in Austria, the Catholic press was 
on the side of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg in their struggle against 
the godless "Reds," just as later it supported Franco in the 
Spanish Civil War. Sympathy among Catholics for the 
right-wing dictatorships was heightened in addition by the fact 
that Mussolini, Salazar, Dollfuss and Franco had established in 
the Catholic countries under their leadership the occupational 
corporations urged by the social teachings of the Popes and had 
based their new governmental systems on these corporations, 
rejecting the parliamentary system based on popular representa-
tion. Few people were aware, however, that this corporative 
constitution, supposedly superior to the parliamentary system of 
the Western democracies, served in practice merely to camouf-
lage dictatorship. 4 
Hitler's rise met a very different reception from the Churches. 
It is true that he also began his rule with the conclusion of a 
Concordat with the Holy See. But he at once proceeded to break 
it: he took away the schools and other institutions of the Churches 
and propagated a neo-pagan ideology directly opposed to 
Christianity, and he put the entire machinery of the state, the 
schools, the press and the organization of the Hitler Jugend, 
which was designed to re-educate youth, into the service of this 
ideology. The Catholic world learned of the fate that awaited the 
Churches under the aegis of the Third Reich from the occasional 
cries of protest, still able at times to break to the surface, of the 
German faithful and from the protests of the Holy See, while the 
Protestants learned the grim truth from their German co-
religionists, especially Karl Barth, who had gone into exile. 5 
The Hungarian faithful could observe at close range the 
subversive activities of the Nazis in neighbouring and friendly 
Austria. The brutal murder of Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss in 
1934 aroused universal shock and indignation. The sorrow and 
sympathy of the Catholic public was heightened by the fact that 
the press extolled Dollfuss as the model of the truly and deeply 
religious statesman. 6 
The thrust of National Socialism toward territorial and 
ideological conquests did not, however, stop at the borders of the 
German linguistic area. Its goal in Hungary was, on the one 
hand, to organize the German-speaking minority, the Volks-
deutsche, and to make them into Nazis and into the "Fifth 
Column" of the Third Reich. And on the other, it attempted, by 
extending material and moral support to the Hungarian 
right-wing movements, to bring about the establishment of a 
Nazi-type regime in Hungary, which was, of course, to be in a 
subordinate and dependent relationship to the German Herren-
volk and its Fiihrer. 
The conservative Hungarian ruling class could naturally not 
watch these activities without attempting to intervene. Regent 
Horthy and his governments were reluctant, in spite of the ever 
tightening foreign political and economic connections with 
Germany, to endure interference in Hungary's internal affairs. 
Even in the face of grave pressures, the Volksdeutsche were not 
surrendered to the mercies of the Reich until the German 
military occupation of Hungary in the last year of the war. And 
the Germans were able to establish the Arrow Cross in power only 
after the forcible removal of Regent Horthy. 7 
Depending on the fluctuations of the domestic and external 
political balance, Horthy at times appointed definitely pro-
German politicians, such as Gombos and later Sztojay, to head 
the government, while at other times he chose definite 
Anglophiles, such as Teleki and Kallay. 8 Given the existing 
situation, of course, the hands of the latter were tied as well. In 
public they had to assume a pro-German right-wing position, 
but, as will be shown later in this paper, secretly they sabotaged 
the aims of the Germans, repressed the extreme right-wing 
movements, and urged the intellectual elite of the nation to 
opposition against Nazi ideas. 
The Christian Churches also viewed with increasing concern 
the inroads right-wing radicalism was making into Hungarian 
public life. The harmonious relationship that had developed 
between the Church and the State during the 1920s cooled 
perceptibly as early as the premiership of Gombos (1932-1937), 
an imitator of Mussolini and Hitler. 9 During the succeeding 
years, when anti-Nazi forces began to organize in the face of ever 
increasing German pressure and the rapid spread of native 
National Socialist movements, the Churches willingly offered 
their cooperation. This cooperation was evident in the support 
given to the ostentatiously anti-Nazi behaviour of the legitimist 
aristocracy,10 and in the close connections maintained with the 
liberal-conservatives, who were roughly the same individuals who 
wrote for the Magyar Nemzet (Hungarian Nation), a daily that 
had been started in 1938 with an expressly anti-Nazi orientation 
by the former Prime Minister Bethlen. It was manifested also in 
the fact that, while the Christians continued to be unwilling to 
come to terms with Marxist Social Democracy on the ideological 
plane, they nevertheless considered that the existence of the 
Social Democratic Party was in the given situation not only useful 
but even necessary. With the unfortunate Austrian example 
before their eyes, they did not urge the suppression of the Social 
Democratic Party but concluded instead an unspoken armistice 
with it for the duration of the common danger.11 
We must point out as an important factor that National 
Socialism enjoyed in the case of Hungary a particularly great 
attraction in the fact that, in contrast to Marxist international-
ism, it appeared in a national guise. In this way, while on the one 
hand it won the dissatisfied lower classes with its promise of social 
revolution, it gained ground among the middle class, and 
especially among the youth of the intelligentsia, with its loud 
anti-bolshevist, anti-Semitic and above all "deeply Hungarian" 
(melymagyar) nationalistic slogans. As a result, even many 
outside observers could see only a quantitative difference between 
the National Socialist ideology and the "Szeged idea" sponsored 
by the ruling counterrevolutionary Horthy regime, and conse-
quently they did not see the danger, or took it too lightly. 12 
Resistance was further hindered by the fact that the Hungarian 
National Socialist movements differed in a very important respect 
from the German prototype. While the latter rejected 
Christianity and attempted instead to force on the German 
people a "German religion" concocted from ancient Germanic 
legends and from the "blood and race" myths of Alfred 
Rosenberg, the Hungarian extreme right —with insignificant 
exceptions —professed itself decidely "Christian." The various 
National Socialist parties in Hungary not only did not attack the 
Christian Churches in their programs, but promised positive 
protection for religion and Christian morality and assigned an 
important role to the Churches in the new order.1 3 Ferenc 
Szalasi, who after 1938 was the leader of the Arrow Cross 
movement and from October 16, 1944 was for a few months head 
of state as "National Leader," remained a practising Catholic to 
the end, and liked to imagine himself a crusader defending the 
Christian West against atheistic bolshevism. This show of 
Christianity had quite a confusing effect on the judgment of the 
faithful, and not infrequently even on that of priests and 
ministers. Their confusion was only increased when some 
bishops, priests, ministers and religious laymen raised their 
voices, in speech or in writing, against the unbridled anti-Semitic 
agitation carried on by the extreme right and branded it 
un-Christian. Was it not the Christian Churches who in the past 
had waged war most vigorously against the inroads of Jews in 
economic and intellectual life and against their deleterious 
influence on Christian morality? Had not such outstanding 
Christians as Bishop Prohaszka the Jesuit priest and fiery orator 
Bela Bangha or the great leader of the Calvinists, Bishop Laszlo 
Ravasz, been anti-Semitic? But let us leave the Jewish question 
apart, since it requires a much more detailed discussion, and let 
us examine instead what concrete activities the Hungarian 
Churches undertook to counteract the challenge of the Nazi 
attack on the basic tenets of Christianity. 
* * * 
First we should mention the fact that, as their members came to 
realize the common danger, a movement toward unity was born 
within the Christian Churches. The goal of this movement was 
the defence of the common values of Christianity against the 
anti-Christian teachings of both bolshevism and Nazism. The 
idea of union was raised by the militant Jesuit Bela Bangha, who 
had the reputation of being an implacable opponent of 
Protestants, in the issue of February, 1937, of the prestigious 
Magyar Szemle (Hungarian Review), edited by Count Istvan 
Bethlen and Gyula Szekfu. 14 His article, which created some-
thing of a sensation, was received favourably and enthusias-
tically by both sides. It was in this same year that the Franciscan 
Kelemen Kiraly returned to Hungary. As the pastor of the 
Hungarian colony in Berlin since 1934, he had observed at close 
range the heroic struggle of the "Confessing Church" (Beken-
nende Kirche) of the German Lutherans against Nazism, and he 
had also witnessed the cooperation that had developed among the 
Christian Churches of Germany. It was under these influences 
that Father Kiraly became the apostle of the unity movement. 
He recounted his experiences in Germany and urged Christians to 
join forces against the Nazi danger in numerous lectures and 
speeches, as well as in his book published in 1942 and entitled A 
kereszteny egyhazak egysege kiilonos tekintettel a nemetorszagi 
protestantizmusra (Unity of the Christian Churches with Special 
Reference to Protestantism in Germany), and in the monthly 
Egyseg Utja (The Road to Unity), which he started in 1942 with 
the approval of the Prince Primate. l o It is true that neither the 
good will and readiness of both sides to cooperate, nor the 
discussions conducted in the press and in meetings for unity, nor 
yet the exchange of views carried on in the pages of the Pester 
Lloyd by the Calvinist Bishop Laszlo Ravasz and Krizosztom 
Kelemen, Archabbot of Pannonhalma or their personal meeting 
which created a great sensation, led in the end to a de facto 
union, that is to an actual unification of the Christian Churches. 
But these attempts at achieving union did have some beneficial 
results. They put an end to the earlier fierce battles between the 
various denominations, and at the same time they made the 
clergy and the faithful aware of the danger threatening the 
Christian religion and of the need for cooperation and common 
action among the Churches in the face of this danger.1 6 Only 
with these antecedents could it happen, for instance, that when 
at the end of 1938 German pressure forced the banning of the 
Catholic weekly Korunk Szava (Word of Our Age), which had 
courageously criticized Nazism, it was the Protestans Szemle 
(Protestant Review) that came to its defense against the 
Volkischer Beobachter which had commented on the ban 
with malicious joy.17 
The most significant event on the Catholic side in the struggle 
against Nazism was without doubt the issuing by Pope Pius XI in 
the spring of 1937 of the encyclical Mit Brennender Sorge. In 
this document the Vicar of Christ, leaving aside all diplomatic 
affectations, used harsh words to condemn the persecution of 
religion in Germany as well as the teachings of Nazism as 
contrary to natural law and incompatible with the tenets of 
Christianity. 
The Hungarian Catholic press expounded the encyclical in 
detail, 18 and the Actio Catholica summarized the teaching of 
the Pope in a pamphlet written in a popular style entitled 
Nemzetiszinu poganysag (Paganism in national colours). Of this 
leaflet, which contained the criticism and condemnation of 
National Socialist ideology in the Pope's own words, 300,000 
copies were published and distributed to a wide public by the 
Catholic rectories and by the various Catholic associations and 
organizations.19 In the same year that the encyclical was issued 
there appeared a study contrasting Nazi racial theories with 
Christian teaching written by Kalman Klemm (later Kalman 
Nyeki), a professor of the Faculty of Catholic Theology at the 
University of Budapest, and entitled Keresztenyseg vagy faji 
vallas? (Christianity or a religion of race?) 20 In 1939 a book 
entitled Vilagnezeti valaszok (Ideological Answers) by the 
immensely popular Father Bangha, whose Sunday sermons were 
regularly carried by the radio, achieved such unprecedented 
success that three new editions had to be printed during that 
same year. In this work, written in ordinary language, the 
learned Jesuit defended the tenets of the Catholic Church against 
teachings branded erroneous by the Church, such as Nazi ideas 
on race, the nation, the state, the individual and the community, 
religion and anti-Semitism. 21 
In the meantime both the Catholic and the Protestant press 
followed with close attention domestic and foreign political 
events and on occasion sharply criticized the activities of the 
German Nazis as well as of the Hungarian extreme right. 
The banned Catholic weekly Korunk Szava (Word of Our Age) 
soon reappeared under the new name of Jelenkor (The Present 
Age) and, together with the Magyar Nemzet (Hungarian Nation), 
which was also edited in a strongly Catholic spirit, it continued to 
fight courageously against the spiritual poison of Nazism until its 
closure under the German occupation in the spring of 1944. 
In providing the opportunity for a public confession of the 
Christian Catholic faith by hundreds of thousands, the 
celebrations in 1938 commemorating the nine-hundredth anni-
versary of the death of St. Stephen, first king of Hungary, and the 
XXXIV Eucharistic World Congress held at the same time in 
Budapest served to strengthen spiritual resistance to Nazism. 
The pride of Catholics was much increased by the great respect 
with which the Protestant Head of State Miklos Horthy received 
the papal legate Eugenio Cardinal Pacelli (later Pope Pius XII) 
and extended hospitality to him in the Royal Palace. The 
Regent's Catholic wife took part with exemplary piety in all the 
religious celebrations, as did Prime Minister Bela Imredy and the 
Catholic members of his government. At the same time it was 
impossible not to notice that the invited guests from Germany, 
and from recently annexed Austria, were missing from among 
the ecclesiastical dignitaries and pilgrims who came in great 
numbers from every continent to be present at these magnificent 
festivities in Budapest. It was also painfully offensive that of all 
the European radio networks only the German (and Austrian) 
stations refused to transmit the closing speech of the papal legate, 
which because of heavy rain he delivered in the studios of the 
Hungarian radio. They did so in spite of the fact that Cardinal 
Pacelli spoke on this occasion in German. Or could this be 
precisely the explanation for their refusal? 
The extreme right in Hungary was emboldened by the success 
of the Anschluss and started to throw its weight around ever more 
audaciously. To bring it under control Imredy forbade soldiers 
and public employees to be members of any political party or to 
be active in party politics at all, and he had Ferenc Szalasi, who 
by this time was indisputably the most popular leader of the 
National Socialist movement in Hungary, imprisoned. However, 
the self-abasement of the Western democracies at Munich caused 
Imredy to abandon his Anglophile and anti-German policies, 
and this change manifested itself in a strong shift to the right in 
his domestic policies as well. Because of this, Horthy forced 
Imredy to resign in February, 1939, and chose as his successor 
Count Pal Teleki, who was an irreconcilable foe of Nazism. 
Teleki organized a secret resistance movement with threads 
extending over the entire country, which he called "intellectual 
defence of the nat ion."2 2 The Churches were the mainstay of 
this "resistance." Their priests and ministers utilized the various 
institutions and movements under their direction to educate the 
youth and the broad masses of the people to adhere to the truly 
Christian and Hungarian view of the world, in accordance with 
the wishes of the Prime Minister. Nothing illustrates conditions 
at that time and the unreal quality of Hungary's independence 
better than the fact that the secretariat of this "intellectual 
defence of the nation," which had been established at the 
initiative of the Prime Minister, was under his personal direction, 
and had its offices in the building of the Prime Ministry, was 
forced nevertheless to operate under a cover name, and that its 
anti-Nazi pamphlets and regular newsletter had to be printed in 
a hidden printing shop and distributed secretly. It happened 
more than once, anomalous though it was, that the organs of the 
Ministry of the Interior, mainly the county authorities, 
confiscated the "subversive" writings originating in the Prime 
Ministry and initiated criminal proceedings against those 
distributing them. 
Following the tragic death of Count Pal Teleki, the 
"intellectual defence of the nation" sponsored by him ceased also 
and its secretariat was disbanded.2 3 But there was greater need 
than ever for the dissemination of information and for 
intellectual resistance at this time, especially after Hungary had 
entered the war on the German side. Realizing this, Antal 
Ullein-Reviczky, a highly-placed official of the Foreign Ministry 
and later Ambassador to Stockholm, decided to organize a 
resistance group based on personal contacts and asked Istvan 
Horthy, the Regent's son and later his Deputy Regent, to head 
this undertaking. Prominent among those invited to participate 
were Prince Primate Jusztinian Cardinal Seredi, the Calvinist 
Bishop Laszlo Ravasz, the Lutheran Bishop Sandor Raffay, as 
well as the Provincial of the Franciscan Friars, an order that was 
popular among the lower classes. The task of the ecclesiastical 
leaders was primarily to instruct, through the lower clergy, the 
people and especially the youth in a Christian and Hungarian — 
and thus anti-Nazi —spirit. According to the testimony of 
Ullein-Reviczky, all the ecclesiastical leaders named above gladly 
accepted this task. 24 
Miklos Kallay, who during his tenure of two years (1942-1944) 
as Prime Minister worked to free the country from the fatal 
embrace of Germany and to lead it back from co-belligerency 
into neutrality, also speaks with the greatest appreciation of the 
resistance of the Churches against Nazism. He mentions the 
Catholic hierarchy among those who unceasingly urged him on to 
stronger resistance against the Germans. 25 And in speaking of 
the Upper House of Parliament he emphasizes that both the 
Catholic and the Protestant ecclesiastical leaders —among the 
latter especially the Calvinist Bishop Laszlo Ravasz —opposed 
National Socialist and anti-Semitic agitation in a most coura-
geous manner. 26 
* * * 
During the war years repeated attempts were made by the 
extreme right to merge, in the name of national unity and 
cooperation, the various social organizations of differing 
ideological leanings. In other words, they wished to induct, 
following the fascist and German examples, all university 
students into a single organization, all workers into another, all 
peasants into yet another, and so on. This would naturally have 
meant that all the religiously oriented mass organizations, such as 
the Hungarian Scouts Association, which cooperated closely with 
the Churches, would have been disbanded and right-wing 
ideology would have been granted a position of monopoly. These 
attempts, however, came to naught as a result of the resistance of 
the Churches. And when the Levente organization was 
established for the military training of youth, the Churches were 
able to gain the concession of being allowed to organize, along 
the lines of army chaplaincies, Levente chaplaincies also. They 
attempted to counteract through these chaplaincies the one-sided 
extreme right-wing influence that a considerable part of the 
Levente instructors and military training officers represented.27 
In those areas of Hungary inhabited by a German-speaking 
population the Churches conducted a tenacious struggle for the 
survival of Hungarian feeling and of Christianity against the 
re-Germanizing and Nazi propaganda of the Volksbund. At 
pressure from the Third Reich, the authorities pushed the 
establishment of German-language schools even in communities 
where the majority of the parents had voted for Hungarian as the 
language of instruction. Where there was no suitable 
German-speaking teacher, one was imported from Germany — 
always a thoroughgoing Nazi. Prince Primate Seredi and the 
other ecclesiastical authorities resisted these efforts to the end, 
and in many cases they succeeded in saving the denominational 
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and Hungarian character of schools in German communities. 
The unbridled Pan-German and Nazi propaganda was effective 
primarily among the Germans living in compact settlements on 
the Dunantul. Count Teleki requested Jozsef Pehm, pastor of 
Zalaegerszeg, to undertake the work of counteracting this. 
Father Pehm fought against Nazism in words and writing, 
especially by means of pamphlets printed in the press established 
by him. 2 9 In 1941, when worship of things German reached its 
zenith, Jozsef Pehm changed his German-sounding name to 
Mindszenty, a name by which he later became known all over the 
world. This name-Magyarization signified a courageous 
profession of loyalty at that time when Germans who had in the 
past assumed Hungarian names were re-Germanizing their 
names en masse. 
Finally we should mention one of the most significant literary 
products of the Catholic intellectual resistance, namely the 
Katolikus trok uj magyar kalauza (The new Hungarian guide for 
Catholic writers), which appeared in 1941.30 The title is an 
allusion to a work of Peter Cardinal Pazmany, the great defender 
of the Catholic faith during the Counter-Reformation. His Az 
igazsagra vezerlo kalauz (Guide leading to truth) had provided 
guidance in the chaos prevailing in tenets of faith at the time of 
the Reformation. According to the preface of the editor, Jozsef 
Almasy, the authors of this latter-day work wished, in the same 
way as Pazmany, to act as guides, to show the Catholic faithful 
the road leading out of the ideological chaos of the modern age. 
In this massive volume the intellectual elite of Hungarian 
Catholicism, both priests and laymen, discussed in seventeen 
essays problems of the age which affected everyone and 
expounded the stand of the Church in relation to them. The 
subject matter was comprehensive and varied. Recognized 
authorities discussed the questions of "Literature and Catholi-
cism" (Sandor Sik), "Modern Ecclesiastical Art in Hungary" 
(Antal Somogyi), "Church Music and the Modern Soul" (Alajos 
Werner), as well as "The Hungarian Catholic View of History" 
(Gyula Szekfu). Several essays were devoted to the relationship of 
the individual, society, and the Church for example, "The 
Spiritual Problems of Modern Man" (Jozsef Tiefenthaler), 
"Family and Education" (Mihaly Marczell), "Our Youth and the 
Church" (Gedeon Peterffy), and "Christian Social Reform" 
(Jozsef Cavallier). The most important parts of the Kalauz are, 
however, those chapters in which the writers attempt, by 
expounding Divine revelation and Catholic philosophy, to 
differentiate the Catholic view of the world clearly from the 
erroneous views then in fashion and to point out the correct 
course of Catholic politics. Into this group belong the essays 
"The Lord has Spoken" (Jozsef Ijjas), "The Philosophy of Our 
Age" (Pal Kecskes), "The Ordering Role of Natural Law" 
(Sandor Horvath), "Man and the Realm of T r u t h " (Ferenc 
Erdey), "Religion and Race" (Kalman Nyeki), 31 "Politics and 
Morality" (Ferenc Ibranyi), and "The Bases of Hungarian 
Catholic Politics" (Jozsef Almasy). 
Among the above essays we should single out, as most 
significant in extent and scholarly weight, Professor Sandor 
Horvath's seventy page discussion of natural law, in which this 
Dominican priest, who was known all over Europe, 32 combats 
the totalitarian state and its demands with the weapons of 
Thomistic philosophy. We should also make special mention of 
the essay by Ferenc Erdey, in which he criticizes the bible of Nazi 
racial theory, Alfred Rosenberg's notorious Der Mythus des XX 
Jahrhunderts. The article by Kalman Nyeki examines the 
"Germanic religion," built on the worship of blood and race, 
which was propagated by Professor J. W. Hauer of the University 
of Tubingen and points out its incompatibility with Christian 
teaching. Noteworthy further is the article by Jozsef Almasy, in 
which he criticizes Hungarian Catholic politics but at the same 
time points out the path to a worthier future. Shortly after the 
appearance of the Kalauz, Almasy published a small volume 33 
that attracted much attention in which he applied the yardstick 
of the Ten Commandments to Hungarian public life and found, 
beneath the varnish of "Christian Hungarian politics," very little 
of true Christian attitudes and actions. Almasy, in the footsteps 
of Old Testament prophets, did not merely castigate the violation 
of the Lord's commandments but exhorted his readers at the 
same time to a more faithful adherence to them in the future. In 
his book he presented the outlines of a Christian political course 
which, based on faith in God and love for man, would seek the 
good of society without sacrificing the dignity and freedom of the 
individual and would rest firmly on justice and truthfulness. 
It can well be asked, of course, how many people read the 
writings enumerated above and others similar to them, and 
whether they had any effect. We cannot answer these questions. 
We have merely attempted here to show that the challenge of 
Nazism did not go unanswered: there was an intellectual 
resistance in Hungary, there were politicians, priests, writers, and 
scholars who, realizing their responsibility as educators of the 
nation, confronted the tide of brown paganism, which seemed to 
be sweeping everything before it, and took up the battle with pen 
and word against its propaganda warfare. Anyone who had ears 
to hear and eyes to read could not have remained ignorant of the 
Christian teaching that condemned Nazism.34 
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Attila Jozsef wrote in a poem about his Fatherland, a few years 
before World War II: 
Let man be more human 
and the Hungarian be more Hungarian 
so the country not become a German colony... 
He did not live long enough to see his country subjugated by the 
Germans. Neither he, nor other Hungarian poets had the power 
to do anything about that subjugation. 
The scope allotted to this paper is both too tight and too 
generous to explain why progressive thinkers and politicians in 
Hungary failed to maintain the country's neutrality and 
independence. Certainly too generous, if we must appraise 
resistance by the number of sabotage acts committed, occupation 
troops killed, or tanks disabled. There were a few acts of 
sabotage perpetrated by Hungarian patriots during the war, such 
as the bomb planted at the foot of the statue of Gyula Gombos, 
the first prime minister with a clearly pro-Nazi foreign policy. 
All these actions, however, occurred towards the end of the war. 
As far as I have been able to ascertain, no Hungarian soldiers or 
gendarmes were killed for political reasons until the fall of 1944. 
The same applies to the members of the German occupation 
force stationed on the territory of Trianon Hungary.1 
On the other hand, if we measure resistance by the number of 
victims, the numbers of those suffering or killed, or by the extent 
of pain, this article would require considerably more time and 
space. It is not easy to explain why Hungarian resistance deserves 
to be mentioned alongside movements in countries that have 
earned themselves a reputation for heroism. Conversely, how 
could there be victims of resistance, if there was no organized 
resistance? Equally paradoxically, why did Nazi Germany decide 
to invade and occupy a country which fought as its ally in the 
war, and was even regarded as a fellow Fascist nation, a member 
of the anti-Comintern pact? It would take more than a paper to 
explain these paradoxes and anomalies. 
Nevertheless, we can begin to make distinctions based on com-
mon sense. What sort of acts can be classified as resistance in 
the Hungarian context? Who may be included among those who 
resisted? Is it proper to dismiss the actions of Jews, or of 
Hungarians of Jewish descent, on the grounds that it was only 
natural for them to resist, as a matter of self-defense and survival? 
For example, it is hardly possible to speak of organized Jewish 
resistance in Hungary. Jewish intellectuals were persecuted and 
struck down not simply because they were Jews, but because they 
were anti-Fascist. In fact, most of them tended to be 
"assimilated" rather than Jewish hence, when they acted 
politically they acted not only as anti-Fascist, but as Hungarian 
patriots, in what they conceived to be the best interest of the 
Hungarian nation. 
Our biggest dilemma, however, concerns the period from 1941 
to 1944, when Hungary fought as an ally of Germany, but was 
able to preserve a certain freedom of action. Against whom did 
the Hungarian patriots resist in this period? Was it against the 
Horthy regime, against the establishment? Against pressures 
from Nazi Germany? Or against the pro-Nazi and pro-German 
aspects of the policies of the Hungarian state? 
It may be more appropriate to speak, not of a Horthy regime, 
but of a conservative establishment in which two conflicting 
tendencies struggled for supremacy. These tendencies were 
manifest in foreign rather than domestic affairs, a) to align the 
country's policies with those of Germany, either as a matter of 
sympathy and preference, or because it seemed unavoidable b) to 
resist German pressures, and curry favour with the Allies, 
preferably the Anglo-Americans. Hence, in the Hungarian 
context then, the term resistance may mean one of two things, 
resistance against the established conservative regime, regardless 
of whether it was pro-German or not; or resistance against the 
German pressures and the German orientation. 
If we are talking about resistance against the established 
regime, several factors deserve to be mentioned. We should 
include the legal and usually loyal opposition the Social 
Democratic party, almost unique within the German sphere of 
influence the party of Rassay, the most prestigious leader of the 
liberal bourgeoisie 2 and the National Peasant Party, founded by 
members of the March Front back in 1939. 3 There was also a 
true opposition, usually underground: the newspapers of the 
period continually report on individuals or groups arrested for 
illegal organizing, for dissemination of "Communist 
propaganda," or for membership in "cells." For instance, in Cluj 
(Kolozsvar) under Hungarian jurisdiction as a result of the 
Second Vienna Award, 664 persons were charged with 
"Communist activities" in the fall of 1943; they were "mostly 
Jews," specified the correspondent. 4 Unlike in neighbouring 
General government, or in Croatia and Serbia, only few of these 
"subversives" were hanged, but the judges seemed firmly 
convinced that the victims would be compelled to sit out their 
harsh prison terms to the bitter end. As in Germany, the public 
was hardly aware that the war was lost, even after Stalingrad and 
the rout of the Hungarian army at the Don River. It is only fair 
to add, however, that by 1942 agitators from the Arrow-Cross 
and other parties of the radical right were also officially 
persecuted. 5 
In most of Europe, the term resistance implied resistance 
against Nazi oppression. Thus we may plausibly argue that the 
first victim of this struggle in Hungary was Prime Minister Count 
Pal Teleki, who committed suicide as German troops were 
entering Hungarian territory in preparation for an attack on 
Yugoslavia. One of the later victims of this same struggle was 
Prime Minister Miklos Kallay, in charge from March of 1942 
until the country's occupation by the Germans two years later; he 
was eventually deported to the concentration camp at Mauthau-
sen. The Kallay regime had done nothing in an open or dramatic 
fashion against German interests, but its caution, designed to 
forestall a German invasion, proved futile. The stance of the 
regime was not cautious enough to delay the German invasion 
until the arrival of an Allied rescue force, nor was it clearcut 
enough by far to earn the country good points in the eyes of the 
Allies. Nevertheless, the Teleki government, and especially the 
Kallay government were covertly anti-Nazi and this atti tude was 
understood by progressive and liberal intellectuals, even without 
tangible evidence. (It was also understood by the Germans who 
did have tangible evidence thanks to their efficient intelligence 
work and their awareness of secret Hungarian peace 
negotiations.) 
This line of hesitant, often half-hearted official resistance did 
not cease with the arrival of the German occupation forces. It 
surfaced again at the time of the Geza Lakatos cabinet in the 
summer of 1944. This time the Regent took a more determined 
stand as well and, as we know, the Hungarian government was 
able to halt the deportations and save the lives of close to 200,000 
Jews, in spite of the presence of German troops. 
What course of action was left open to the progressive 
intellectuals in the period 1941 to 1944? To be sure, they might 
have joined the underground Communist party. Few people did, 
however the Communist party in Hungary had no more than a 
handful of members, intellectual or otherwise. On the other 
hand, the progressive intellectuals could support the timid, 
wavering policies of the regime, encouraging it, perhaps, to 
follow a steadier, more decidedly anti-Nazi course. Indeed, 
many noteworthy intellectuals had decided to take precisely this 
line of action, or of inaction, and thus their resistance remained 
invisible, discounted by the historians. They had little impact, 
either in the short run or in the long run, much like the Kallay 
government itself. 
There was, however, another alternative. Let us take a closer 
look at two particular groups of intellectuals who constitute 
something of an exception, who did have an impact. These two 
groups were the March Front of populist writers, and certain 
organizations of lower-class university students. My selection is 
not altogether arbitrary, for we know that writers, including 
poets, have often played a role of moral and political leadership 
in Eastern Europe, more so than anywhere else. Imre Kovacs 
himself has gone so far as to claim that "Hungarian literature is 
perhaps the most political literature in the world." 6 University 
students were chosen as well not because they played a special 
function in Eastern Europe, but because so often they have been 
in the forefront of political agitation the world over. 
Some of Hungary's most eminent young writers came together 
in a group that called itself the March Front, in homage to the 
spirit of March 1848. The cause that brought them together in 
1937 was the neglect and exploitation of the Hungarian peasant 
and the misery of the country's villages. Politically, the Front had 
little impact, although their program was spelled out in "points," 
and included demands for individual freedom, universal 
suffrage, a minimum wage, a forty hour work-week, but most of 
all for the expropriation of the large estates. ' Among the 
members of the Front Imre Kovacs, Peter Veres, Gyula Illyes. 
Istvan Bibo and Laszlo Nemeth can be described as fellow-
travellers of the Front. Each had produced novels, tracts and 
monographs revealing the plight of the peasant the best known, 
perhaps, being the autobiographical masterpiece of Illyes, A 
pusztak nepe (People of the puszta).8 
Hungary's entry in the war did not elicit a united stand from 
these writers; several seemed impressed by the series of spectacu-
lar German successes. As Veres, one of the most prominent and 
progressive members of the Front stated, "the leaders of 
authoritarian and anti-Semitic movements in all countries were 
intellectuals." Only a minority of intellectuals had the courage, 
or even the inclination, to protest. 9 As progressive as he was, 
Veres himself attempted to make a distinction between "anti-
Semite," a label he rejected, and fajvedo (rassen-schiitzlerich), 
one who defends his race, the latter a trait to which he 
ascribed a positive value. 10 The distinction strikes me as being 
rather subtle, not convincing. 
The members of the Front, never a close-knit organization in 
any case, did not take a public stand against Hitlerism, whether 
in Germany or in Hungary; but several of them wrote of the 
"tradition" of Hungarian humanism, of the need to preserve the 
country's independence and its freedom of action. At the same 
time, they were unhesitatingly anti-regime, against the "semi-
feudal system" which seemed to have survived in Hungary long 
after its demise elsewhere. It is not surprising that some of them 
were victimized alongside writers who were more explicitly 
socialist. 11 Thus Kovacs was imprisoned in 1940 and charged 
with "lack of respect for the Hungarian nation, and agitation 
against the class of landowners."1 2 
The organs of the Front were literary periodicals such as the 
Magyar Csillag (Hungarian Star), which was initiated in August 
or September 1941, under the editorship of Illyes and Aladar 
Schopflin. This review was bold enough to publish poetry by Jews 
and crypto-Communists such as Miklos Radnoti, or by the 
worker-writer-artist Lajos Kassak, who had established his 
reputation as leader of the avant-garde during World War I. 
The periodical occasionally reviewed books published in Allied 
countries, including Joe Davies' Mission to Moscow and Wendell 
Willkie's One World rather favourably, in spite of both authors' 
sympathetic portrayal of the Soviet Union. 1 3 
The distinguished literary historian, Gyula Borbandi, wrote 
that the Magyar Csillag was a centre of spiritual resistance 
against Nazi ideas, and that only because of the caution and 
diplomatic ability of Illyes could the periodical continue to 
appear until the German troops marched in. 14 Borbandi used 
the term resistance somewhat loosely, however. It is not easy to 
tell, perusing the volumes of the journal, that a world war was 
being fought, a total war in which Hungarian soldiers and 
civilians were tragically involved. Unlike its predecessor, the 
more bourgeois Nyugat in the period of World War I, the 
Magyar Csillag did not challenge the censors, did not deplore the 
war openly, did not discuss Hungary's fateful predicament, and 
published no passionate pacifist poems like the ones Mihaly 
Babits had had the boldness to write and recite (although those of 
Illyes came close). 
As for daily newspapers, the Nepszava (People's voice), the 
official organ of the Social Democratic party, continued to 
appear during the war. Apart f rom an outspoken issue published 
at Christmas 1941, which included articles by Communists and 
anti-Nazi intellectuals, its most progressive aspect was its ongoing 
polemics with members of the Arrow- Cross movement and the 
radical right-wing press. There was also the Magyar Nemzet 
(Hungarian Nation) and the Magyarorszdg (Hungary), which 
dared to praise democracy at a time when democracy was a bad 
word, and reported on the events of the war in such a way that it 
was possible to read the truth between the lines. For instance, the 
August 17, 1943 issue of Magyarorszdg reported without 
commentary the ridiculously bloated figures supplied by German 
propaganda agencies: 43,642 Soviet aircraft downed since the 
beginning of the war, and a daily toll in Allied aircraft over 
Germany that often exceeded three hundred. On the other 
hand, I have pored through the daily papers in vain in search of 
direct or indirect evidence of sabotage or of active resistance. 
The March Front, and other progessive writers, often 
collaborated with groups of university students, especially those 
with a peasant background, in evoking the heroic past and in 
honouring the heroes of the Hungarian revolution of 1848-49. 
Some of them organized the Historical Memorial Committee, 
which is considered by some historians as a Communist "front ," 
by others as a front for the resistance in general.15 The specific 
task of the Committee was to lay wreaths at the monuments 
dedicated to Lajos Batthyany, to Lajos Kossuth, to Mihaly 
Tancsics. The gesture could not be misinterpreted, all were 
leaders of the movement of independence from the Austro-
Germans in the 1840s, whereas Tancsics was also the most 
eminent representative of the left or even socialist wing of that 
revolutionary period. 16 Similar demonstrations took place on 
March 15 of each year by the statue of the poet Petofi. Moreover, 
if we discuss the resistance of intellectuals, or of the political 
function of literature, then surely Petofi deserves mention, even 
though the poet has been dead for almost a century. 
During the war some university students participated in the 
so-called "People's Colleges" or NEKOSZ. At the outset, it is 
true, these colleges were not political associations, but merely 
dormitories specially funded to house impoverished indigent 
students, particularly those of a peasant background. The 
residents of the first and most prominent of these, the Istvan 
Gyorffy College in Budapest, soon recognized the need for 
political involvement. The tenor of the involvement was 
provided by a cell of Communist students instrumental in 
organizing conferences dealing with Marxism, socialism and 
related themes, at a time these were proscribed all over the 
country. The students at this College were present at or leading 
the anti-Nazi demonstrations. Many of them attended the 
writers' conference at Szarszo in August 1943, where resistance 
against Nazi domination was explicitly discussed by Laszlo 
Nemeth and others.17 The College dissolved itself, under 
official pressure, on April 22, 1944, shortly after the arrival of the 
German occupation force.1 8 
It is not helpful to compare resistance in Hungary to French, 
Belgian, Yugoslav, Polish, Slovak, or any other kind of 
resistance. Nor is it helpful to claim, as a number of Hungarian 
authors have done, that Hungary was a Fascist country by 
predilection, or that practically all Hungarians had accepted, 
passively or actively, German tutelage throughout the war.1 9 It 
must be conceded, however, that resistance was almost always 
passive, seldom armed. This was particularly true of the 
intellectuals who tend to be a timid lot in any case. This was also 
true of the churches, of course, although religious organizations 
and individual clergymen directly or indirectly intervened to save 
the lives of many thousands of Jews, jeopardizing their own in the 
process. 20 The one pistol shot fired by the opposition member 
of parliament Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, when a Gestapo unit 
banged on his door on March 20, 1944, was the lone heroic 
gesture of the day. Arrested, but released by the Horthy regime, 
Bajcsy-Zsilinszky and others had the opportunity to organize a 
resistance group, but the group was wiped out, and its leaders 
executed, before it could cause damage. Bajcsy-Zsilinszky was 
not a writer but he had regularly met with, and enjoyed the 
support of many Hungarian intellectuals. 21 
What may be more pertinent would be to explain and 
understand why resistance in Hungary assumed such a passive 
form. I have discussed one of the reasons: resistance to Nazi 
pressures was carried out, in however lukewarm a fashion, by the 
regime itself. Acts of physical violence against the Germans 
could have frustrated the government's efforts to resist Nazi 
pressures. Another factor, however, needs to be emphasized: the 
impact of a constant bombardment of anti-Semitic and 
anti-democratic propaganda over the years. It is debatable that 
Hungary was a dictatorship, let alone a totalitarian regime or a 
Fascist country between 1920 and 1944; but the anti-Semitic 
propaganda directed at the working-class and the petty 
bourgeoisie remained unchecked for twenty years. 
At the same time, the Hungarian public was wounded in its 
nationalist sentiments by the punitive peace treaty of Trianon. 
The "average" Hungarian fell for Hitler and for Nazi Germany 
for the same reasons as the "average" German, a) because Hitler 
catered to the petty bourgeois mentality that felt its livelihood 
threatened by the presence of a sizeable Jewish minority, b) 
because Hitler presented the prospect of the recovery of lost 
territories, the revision of the treaties signed at Versailles in 1919 
and 1920. Indeed, Hungary did increase temporarily as a result 
of Hitler's intercession and Hungarian nationalists would have 
required unusual acumen and self-denial not to feel gratitude, 
not to accept the gift they felt they deserved. Any act against 
Hitler or against his policies must have seemed an act of 
ingratitude. The resisters, those who denounced German 
pressure or Nazi Germany itself, could be seen as ungrateful, at 
best. Unlike the Yugoslav partisan, or the fighter in the French 
maquis, those who resisted in Hungary had to brave public 
opinion in their own country. 
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The Peace Seekers: 
The Hungarian Student Movement for 
National Independence in 1944 
Recollections by 
Janos Horvath 
On December 14, 1944, I was arrested by the Nemzeti 
Szamonkero Szek (Court of National Reckoning), an Arrow-Cross 
detachment of the Hungarian military police operating in 
collaboration with the Gestapo.* They wanted to liquidate the 
Szabad Elet (Free Life) student movement, a network of 
resistance activists that served as a focal point of a broader 
alliance, the Hungarian Youths' Freedom Front. My captors 
employed an assortment of tortures in pursuit of their goals. 
They possessed fragmentary knowledge about our movement and 
sought details regarding specific activities and organizational 
arrangements, such as (1) the production and dissemination of 
leaflets, pamphlets, manifestoes, newsletters, posters, (2) our 
underground bureau issuing false identification documents, (3) 
the sabotage project, (4) coordination with the Hungarian 
Youths' Freedom Front, (5) contacts with the political and 
military leaders of the Hungarian Independence Movement, (6) 
contacts and collaboration with communists, (7) contacts with 
Jewish organizations, (8) international contacts. 
Driven by passionate vengeance, the Court of National 
Reckoning proceeded to court-martial our group of twelve young 
* Editor's note: The literal translation of this term is Chair 
(Bench) of National Reckoning (or Retribution). One North 
American author describes this "blood court of the Arrow Cross 
party" as a reorganized unit of the "field gendarmerie." See 
Nicholas M. Nagy-Talavera, The Green Shirts and the Others 
A History of Fascism in Hungary and Rumania (Stanford, 
California Hoover Institution Press, 1970), pp. 235f. 
men and promulgated several death sentences. We were saved 
only by the unexpected advance of the Soviet Army to the 
immediate neighbourhood of the Margit Boulevard Military 
Prison on Christmas night. During the subsequent confusion we 
were transported numerous times, to be held in turn by the 
German Gestapo, Hungarian jail-guards and Arrow-Cross 
brigades. While being passed from one stage to another on 
January 17, 1945, I found a miraculous escape at a schoolbuild-
ing's basement water tap by stumbling into Gyula Gombos and 
was led by him to the hiding place of Zoltan Tildy, Albert 
Bereczky, Viktor Csornoky and their families. 
My brief compendium of events that unfold here will touch 
upon episodes remaining thus far only fragmentarily recorded by 
participants and historians alike. I hope that my present writing 
may turn out to be an encouragement to others to describe their 
own role and experience. 
The Underground Student Resistance 
On March 19, 1944 the German military occupation of Hungary 
brought to a grinding halt the government's effort to scale down 
and abandon participation in the war. In spite of the imposition 
of a pro-Hitler regime, the nation's desire for peace and reforms 
could not be halted. The occupying power forced the Hungarian 
Independence Movement underground. 
I gradually found myself involved with underground activities. 
What might count as a first step was that I did continue meetings 
with others to plan for peace and reforms even after the banning 
of organizations and the arrest of leaders. The substance of our 
discussions was how to bring about peace and how to prepare for 
the building of a new Hungary. We envisioned reforms for a just, 
enlightened and prosperous country. We wanted a parliamen-
tary democracy to stimulate self-determination and decentralized 
decision-making in all political, economic, social and cultural 
matters. The populist literature of the immediate past decade 
was our much cherished food for thought. 
The inherent dynamics of an underground movement carried 
us toward activism. When the freedom of speech and assembly 
are banned, the written word is the next available method of 
sharing one's thoughts. But the writing down of things in 
defiance of prohibition tends to generate symbolic attributes. 
The idea receives more careful clarification and expressions 
become more polished, as if subconsciously suspecting that a 
particular piece of writing might turn out to be the last 
composition in the author's life. The pressure is intensified by the 
awareness that the illegal text, if discovered by the authorities, 
will incriminate not only the writer, but also the reproducer, the 
reader, the transmitter and, not infrequently, even some totally 
uninvolved individuals. 
Our initial writings drew heavily on quotations from poems 
and excerpts from prose. The selections were arranged so as to 
accentuate the country's predicament. Poet Endre Ady was 
quoted most frequently while excerpts were also drawn from a 
broad assortment of writers, philosophers, scholars, scientists, 
artists and statesmen. In due course the quotations and excerpts 
shrank while the commentaries grew in length to expand into 
full-blown articles. With the passage of time, we recognized the 
need for disseminating news so that information could be spread 
regarding vital issues. The main themes were (1) the 
unconstitutionality of the German-imposed regime and the arrest 
of Members of Parliament and other national leaders, (2) the 
inhuman treatment of the Jews and efforts to sabotage Eich-
mann's schemes, (3) data on the Allied Powers' superiority and 
the inevitability of German defeat, (4) Hitler's design to sacrifice 
Hungary in rear-guard fighting, (5) the Atlantic Charter and 
other pronouncements of the Allied Powers to guarantee 
Hungary's independence after the war, (6) the brutality of 
German occupation forces in Poland, Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union, (7) the ever-widening Hungarian resistance and the 
sabotaging of efforts, (8) glimpses into the future era of peace 
and reconstruction. 
While engaged in creating this information, we came to 
recognize that our efforts became true underground operations. 
Such quantitative growth and qualitative refinement could have 
resulted only from the peerless leadership of Sandor Kiss, a 
Professor of Philosophy at the Teachers' Academy. Indeed, the 
history of 1944 Hungary remains incomplete until taking into 
account Kiss' role. At the year's beginning the unity council of all 
democratic student assemblies had claimed him as their leader. 
By the summer's end he was drafted to preside over the evolving 
alliance of national youth organizations student, worker, peasant 
and church-affiliated associations. By November he was 
co-opted an insider of the underground national political 
leadership. 
I had known Sandor Kiss since 1941. We became friends after 
1943 when he came to a workshop meeting of the Kalaka 
Szolgalat (Kalaka Service) held at the premises of the Pozsonyi 
Street Reformed Church in Budapest. I was a co-organizer of the 
event jointly with Istvan B. Racz and Lajos Imre. The main 
theme of the symposium was a fashionable topic: Hungary's 
gloomy future between the grindstones of German and Russian 
empires. The tone of the meeting resounded cherished chords in 
the mind and heart of Sandor Kiss. He was moved by the 
participants' objectivity and humility. This was unusual 
considering the status of several participants, including Albert 
Bereczky, and Klara Zsindely Tiidos. Bereczky, a Reformed 
Church minister, was highly respected in the society. He was an 
effective intermediary between the political establishment and 
the left-wing opposition, and also a behind-the-scenes adviser to 
Regent Miklos Horthy. Klara Zsindely Tiidos, with her 
cabinet-minister husband, was perceived as one of the guardians 
of Pal Teleki's political heritage. She was a charming socialite, a 
patron of the leftist Gyorffy College and a prosperous fashion 
designer. Sandor Kiss felt comfortable with this group and was 
readily accepted as a full partner. He was impressed enough to 
accept our invitation to join Kalaka Service's Executive 
Committee, which thereafter consisted of Lajos Imre, Sandor 
Kiss, Istvan B. Racz, Rezso Szij and myself. 
In the course of the forthcoming year Sandor Kiss viewed his 
role truly seriously at Kalaka and participated in all its activities, 
including frequent membership meetings and special projects 
which all coalesced into various blends of Bible reading, poetry 
recital, folksong practice, theatre goings and weekend hiking. A 
popular and well-endowed Kalaka project was the sending of 
books into Hungarian villages expected to become again part of 
Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia after the war's end. 
Beyond its declared merit, this project served as a cover of 
legitimacy during the subsequent underground activities. 
My own involvement in the student independence movement 
consisted of the operation of the centre responsible for the print 
shop, documents and liaisons. As I held a full-time job with 
managerial responsibilities, I was able to secure the facilities, 
equipment and resources essential for the operation. Because my 
workplace became the main centre of the student underground 
activities, it is important to describe some of the pertinent 
arrangements. 
Back in 1940 when I initially enrolled as a student in the 
Faculty of Economics of the Jozsef Nador Polytechnic and 
Economics University, Budapest, I also took a job with the Futura 
National Marketing Centre. I was assigned to work in the 
accounting department of a major subsidiary, the Nostra 
National Warehouse Corporation with headquarters in Budapest 
and about 45 plants across the country. Within a few years I was 
advanced to the position of Deputy Chief Accountant an unusual 
career for a young man which could be explained by innovative 
adaptation of the latest accounting techniques just evolving in the 
university seminar to problems of a fast-growing business. 
Consequently, in 1944 I was in charge of a sizeable operation with 
control over substantial resources as well as freedom of movement 
across the country. 
In April 1944 when the Allied Powers inflicted heavy bombing 
damage on Budapest, my department was evacuated to the 
village of Abony, on the Budapest-Szolnok road. Within weeks 
there evolved an auxiliary of the underground Free Life Student 
Movement with Istvan B. Racz and myself in residence, Sandor 
Kiss and Lajos Imre frequent guests for days. The Kalaka Service 
also branched out to Abony where we established friendly contact 
with Rezso Sedhy-Lengyel, a chaplain at the Roman Catholic 
parish. It was here that my two co-workers at the office, Erzsebet 
Beke, accountant, and Margit Hollo, secretary, became deeply 
involved with Kalaka and subsequently with the underground 
print shop. My offices in Abony and Budapest had daily contact 
by a courier automobile in which we easily travelled and 
transported underground material. By the second half of the 
summer I kept reproducing a variety of manifestoes and leaflets 
as manuscripts reached me from Kiss, Racz and others. In the 
meanwhile the dangers of underground activities became 
increasingly real. Arrests, interrogations and surveillance 
compelled caution. A group of students, including some Free 
Life activists, were seized at the Harsfa Street Student Home. 
Vilmos Fitos was arrested by the Gestapo. Laszlo Vatai was held 
by the Gestapo for weeks. Although each of these persons was 
released, we could no longer ignore the chilling fact that the 
intelligence agencies were working hard to discover us. 
Perils did mandate caution, yet the very dynamics of the 
underground resistance movement prompted us to seek to 
mobilize additional persons and to seek to enhance effectiveness 
through collaboration with like-minded groups. These were the 
motivations that caused me to travel to Kecskemet around 
mid-August where I was introduced to and, quite unexpectedly, 
initiated into the Magyar Kozosseg (Hungarian Community). 
The message arrived through Andras Hamza, a trusted friend, a 
relative, as well as partner in the underground, inviting me to 
come for a weekend jointly with Sedhy-Lengyel. In Kecskemet, 
the two of us were received by Barnabas Kiss, law professor, 
Balint Kovacs, pastor of the Reformed Church, and Andras 
Hamza. The five of us discussed at length the miseries of German 
occupation, the cruel deportation of the Jews, the gloomy 
prospects of the peace treaty with Hungary after the war, and the 
compelling necessity of severing ties with Germany as well as 
re-establishing good relations with the Allied Powers. 
All of us recognized that at this particular time of national 
emergency, immediate organizing for action was imperative. At 
this point our host confided that they already belonged to an 
association, named the Hungarian Community, through which 
individuals reinforced their struggle for independent Hungary. 
In the spirit of Endre Ady, Dezso Szabo, Laszlo Nemeth and 
other populist writers, the association's operational method was 
to lobby for the filling of decision-making positions with 
individuals whose past record revealed no loyalty risk. We were 
invited to join. Thus our student independent movement gained 
new allies who could be mobilized. (I had not even the faintest 
notion that two-and-a-half years later this event could be twisted 
around by Rakosi's secret police to suspend my parliamentary 
immunity, to forge the charge of my conspiring against the 
democratic system of government and to keep me in prison for 
four years.) 
The summer's end in 1944 saw renewed initiatives by the 
Horthy regime to ease Hungary out of the Axis orbit. We were 
informed about these efforts through Albert Bereczky, Miklos 
Mester and Klara Zsindely Tudos. In the student underground 
publication we chose themes that dealt with national survival and 
the lone Magyar island in the German and Slavic ocean. The 
tragic outcome of October 15 proved the darkest of the gloomy 
prophesies. The old political establishment failed its last 
comprehensive test. The coup failed to force out Hitler's war 
machine partly because some Hungarian military command posts 
were infiltrated with persons whose German background and 
loyalties prevailed over their Hungarian citizenship. At this 
crucial point they betrayed their Supreme Commander Horthy 
and denounced their fellow officers. Hitler succeeded in 
establishing Szalasi as the Fiihrer of Hungary. 
For the student underground movement the October 15 
tragedy signalled the compelling necessity to mobilize everything 
and to accept greater risks. Kiss' leadership was characterized by 
dedication, talent, innovativeness and coordination. Hence-
forth, he spent substantial time in the operation centre attached 
to my office at the Nostra corporation headquarters near 
Vorosmarthy Square. Adhering to underground operational 
rules, to my superior and colleagues he was introduced under the 
name of Pal Juhasz, adjunct professor from the University of 
Kolozsvar, with whom I was supposedly writing an accounting 
manual for agricultural cooperatives. I assigned to him a desk 
with telephone, access to a conference room and a key to the 
basement pretending that he drew case-study materials out of the 
old files stored there. It was in this basement that I established 
the print shop of the Free Life Student Movement. We worked 
with two automatic stencil duplicators, three vintage mimeo-
graphs and several typewriters. We had practically unlimited 
supply of stencil, paper and copying ink. The supplies had been 
accumulated to hedge against wartime shortages. These facilities 
produced between 200,000-300,000 sheets of underground 
material. 
The prime printed product was the periodical, Szabad Elet 
(Free Life), which had under its title a caption "Journal of the Free 
Life Student Movement." It was published about eight times. 
The issues consisted of varying lengths, from five to ten pages. 
These issues were produced in 1,000 to 3,000 copies. The content 
included editorials, news, essays, documents, poems, letters, etc. 
The editor was Laszlo Vatai and subsequently Istvan B. Racz. 
The list of contributors included Sandor Kiss, Emil Majsay, Pal 
Jonas, Vilmos Fitos, Andras Hamza, Lajos Imre and others. One 
recurring feature of the publications was poetry, mostly from 
Ady. Co-editor Istvan B. Racz stood always ready to insert a 
befitting line, or a stanza, or a whole poem. A sample may 
suffice to show the thrust of the message 
Presently it is the orgy of the inferior epigons, 
But we ready the stones and tools, 
Because we shall bring forth the grand design, 
To build the magnificent, and beautiful, and human, and 
Magyar. 
If fate demands we shall die, 
But it remains our blessed reward, 
That after the cataclysm honorable men will rest under the 
ruins 
Then after the hiatus, others may reassert life to cont inue— 
Presently during the blind night of shamelessness, 
Every noble outcast must guard jealously his h o n o r — 
The editorial policy and production techniques of the 
periodical applied to the other publications, namely leaflets, 
posters and manifestoes. Some were excerpted from Free Life 
most were original manuscripts, which then were reproduced in 
numbers of a few hundred to several thousands, and this latter 
group of writings were targeted at specific places, groups and 
occasions. In general, all publications communicated the 
message that the puppet Szalasi regime was illegal and that the 
Hungarian people wanted peace immediately. A recollection of 
some of the topics appears appropriate here. 
(1) Reports were written about the events leading to Horthy's 
Proclamation which called for the preservation of national 
integrity, the announcement of armistice negotiations with the 
Soviet Union, the order to military commanders to establish 
contacts with the Red Army commanders so as to hasten German 
withdrawals. 
(2) Descriptions of the arrest of Horthy in the Buda Castle and his 
appointed deputy, General Lajos Dalnoki Veress, at the 
Trans-Tisza headquarters, by German SS commandoes. 
(3) Reports that in September Horthy had already sent to Moscow 
a distinguished delegation consisting of Geza Teleki, Domonkos 
Szent-Ivanyi and Gabor Faragho. 
(4) We urged nationwide protest of the atrocities against Jews on 
the grounds of humanity, Christian ethics and Hungarian 
chivalry. 
(5) Eyewitness reports f rom the Warsaw uprising and its bloody 
oppression upon Hitler's special instruction. 
(6) News of Arrow-Cross officials slaughtering Hungarian soldiers 
and civilians attempting to return to their homes in Transylva-
nia. 
(7) News of the torture and execution of three military officers of 
the Hungarian Independence Movement: Janos Kiss, Jeno Nagy 
and Vilmos Tarcsay. (The Movement's political head, Endre 
Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, was executed after another month.) 
(8) A call for peace entitled Igaz szo igaz magyarokhoz (True 
word to true Hungarians) based on a joint-statement by Istvan 
Vasary, Mayor of Debrecen, Imre Revesz, Bishop of the 
Trans-Tisza Reformed Church, and Istvan Balogh, the Roman 
Catholic priest of Szeged-Alsovaros. 
(9) Appeals to resist orders for the evacuation of people and 
national wealth to Germany. 
The distribution of all student resistance publications pro-
duced in the Nostra basement were arranged by Kiss. 
Occasionally, I could hear him saying into the telephone "Here is 
Pal Juhasz speaking Have you shipped away the potatoes? 
There is another consignment for transit " Also, we sent copies 
by mail to a variety of addresses using postage-free envelopes of 
governmental bureaux and military authorities. Furthermore, 
each of us yielded to the temptation to hide copies at places where 
they would be discovered by certain persons. 
Even a cursory inventory of underground resistance material 
produced at the Nostra premises would remain incomplete 
without accounting for work done for at least four other groups. 
Here follows a sketchy description. First, the Magyar Ifjusag 
(Hungarian Youth), a periodical published by the Freedom Front 
of Hungarian Youth, a broad coalition f rom communists on the 
left to senior scouts on the conservative wing, held together by 
Kiss. Under his direction we typed and duplicated three issues in 
about 1,000-2,000 copies of each. Second, the periodical Eb Ura 
Fako edited by middle-of-the-road intellectuals in the spirit of 
Pal Teleki. Its stencilled copies were taken away from the print 
shop by Istvan Csicsery-Ronay who always appeared in the 
elegant uniform of an artillery lieutenant. Third, the Occasional 
Papers of a group of policy analysts, namely Baron Ede Aczel, 
Jozsef Dudas, Miklos Csomos and Erno Peter. I recall the 
duplication of four pieces one lengthy (around 20 pages) position 
paper in 100 copies and three shorter (one-two pages) leaflets. A 
fourth group of clients represented by Esther Valkay and two 
lieutenants received bundles of published material f rom me four 
or five times. 
The print shop's efficient and secure operation can be 
attributed to the fortunate physical facilities and a faultlessly 
working team. The former attribute has been mentioned earlier. 
The latter should be acknowledged at this point. I had felt that 
the particular combination of efficiency and security criteria 
required a technically competent and well-disciplined small 
workforce whose members were each capable of maintaining the 
equipment as well as spending long blocks of time on the job. 
Actually, the team consisted of four persons: Istvan B. Racz, 
Sandor Kiss, Lajos Imre and myself. Each of us was able to stay 
in the print shop at any hour of the day or night. I was home at 
Nostra here, my full-time job encompassed a broad range of 
managerial responsibilities that took me to places in which my 
absence from the desk should not catch attention. Besides, my 
secretary and my associate accountant were sufficiently aware of 
my off-desk involvements to hold a facade in case of need. 
Sandor Kiss was known as the workaholic research professor now 
tangled up in locating case studies in the archives. His coming 
and going at odd hours was substantiated. Racz was employed by 
Futura, the parent corporation of Nostra, one short city block 
away. He had one rather peculiar need: he came with two guns in 
his pocket, placed them conspicuously on the table, saying, "Now 
I feel like working." The irony was obvious: if the Nazi troopers 
found this hideout then our guns would have been of no avail. 
Imre poked fun at this as well as some other illusions that blurred 
our sense of proportions. In any case, the hideout was optimally 
safe from accidental discovery. As a matter of fact, this place was 
not the weak link in the student resistance movement which 
would cause our arrests in mid-December. 
The print shop's smooth operation paved the way toward 
involvement in additional projects in the student underground 
movement. By the end of the summer, and particularly after 
October 15, the safe in my office became a clearing house for 
personal documents. Initially, the task appeared rather simple as 
long as I adhered to the strictest rules of precaution. Sandor Kiss, 
assuming for this operation the name of Gabor Toth , asked me to 
accept, safekeep and distribute blank documents issued by 
governmental departments and military headquarters. We were 
using them illegally, but in appearance these documents were 
perfect: printed on the appropriate paper, stamped with the 
official seal and signed by the appropriate office holder. I was to 
complete such a document by writing in the user's name. 
Usually, the object was to facilitate safe conduct for someone to 
accomplish a mission. Quite often, however, the objective was to 
assist a person to escape persecution. With the passage of time 
these documents became used in increasing number simply to 
shelter deserters from the armed forces. In exchange for a 
military passport, the bearer agreed to deliver our printed 
publications to distant places and then to return for another 
sojourn. In time things became quite complex. At the outset I 
stored military documents from a few auxiliary commands. 
Later I was in charge of impressive looking documents from the 
Supreme Command supplied by General Staff Captains Istvan 
Toth and Zoltan Miko. One innovative distributor of these 
rather sensitive papers was Foreign Ministry officer Geza Kadar 
with whom I regularly met in the bookstore on Muzeum 
Boulevard. It was also here that I repeatedly met Raoul 
Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who coordinated a network 
involved in saving Jews in Budapest from Nazi brutalities. 
Occasionally I supplied him with military documents issued for 
names he specified and subsequently we met twice at the Gyali 
Road Nostra warehouse to work out special arrangements for a 
consignment. 
Another project of the Free Life Student Movement wherein I 
had a role was the Gorgey Zaszloalj (Gorgey Batallion). I recall 
the initial discussions to form a batallion of volunteers with the 
ostensible purpose of defending Budapest against the Russians, 
but with the real aim of preventing the use of the unit elsewhere. 
The secret design was to pull together several hundred men into a 
military unit that would seek contacts with the Red Army 
approaching Budapest in order to collaborate with them in 
minimizing destruction and loss of lives. Captains Miko and 
Toth secretly endorsed the plan and appointed Vilmos Bondoi as 
the unit's senior lieutenant as supply officer. Three friends, 
Endre Csohany, Karoly Nagy and Kalman Drozdy, became the 
commanding officers. Additional posts were filled with people 
recommended by the Free Life Student Movement and many 
from the Harsfa Street Student Home. Zoltan Nyeste and Istvan 
Fiizesi became influential activists. The Kalaka Movement and 
the Tu ta j Street Apprentices' Hostel became briefing stations as 
we covertly campaigned to fill the ranks with trustworthy young 
students and workers. During this process I had given out many 
of the conventional auxiliary command forms entitled "Order to 
Report ." Noteworthy among our schemes was an attempt to 
divert the Arrow-Cross snoopers' suspicion. T o this end we 
wanted to create the impression that the batallion was a hot-bed 
of right-wing extremists who were despised by the left-wing 
underground. We planned an attack on the guard post. Three 
students, Tibor Zimanyi, Karoly Derecskey and Geza Bodolay, 
implemented the plan, throwing a hand grenade while 
ascertaining that no one should be hurt. The next day Free Life 
reported that the event was only a first warning to the pro-Szalasi 
Gorgey Batallion. Apparently, the deception did work because 
the suspicions of Arrow-Cross functionaries subsided for a while. 
Perhaps the most daring of our ideas was the "Second Szalasi 
Manifesto." Although never fully implemented, it might be 
appropriate to outline the project here in order to shed light on 
the resourcefulness of the individuals involved. In short, the 
project was to write, print and post in several thousand copies a 
manifesto patterned after the one by Szalasi during the October 
15 coup d'etat. Tha t time Szalasi in his "Supreme Command to 
the Armed Nation" gave reasons for his assuming power, for 
pursuing the war on Hitler's side until the end, and for re-shaping 
Hungary in the Arrow-Cross spirit. This time we designed a fake 
"Second Supreme Command to the Armed Nation" in the name 
of Szalasi, which declared that (1) the Germans use Hungarians 
as cannon fodder in the war; (2) Germany betrayed the alliance 
with Hungary; (3) honourable peace will be worked out with the 
Russians, British and Americans; (4) the armed forces including 
the Party Brigades will offer free passing to the Russian Army in 
forcing out the German Army. This bogus manifesto carefully 
imitated the jargon of Szalasi and copied phrases from his 
genuine manifesto a few weeks earlier. The printing itself was to 
imitate fully physical appearances: typeset, paper quality and the 
size of the poster. Therefore, the work was to be done at the 
Pester Lloyd Printing Company, the producer of the original 
manifesto. The place was the right choice also because it 
produced no newspaper currently—merely governmental sup-
plies—and therefore it was guarded by soldiers and not Party 
armed guards. The whole process at the printing plant was 
spelled out in minute details by Andras Hamza and his team, 
including Gyula Ibranyi, Imre Bense, Sandor Arany, with the 
assurance of support from the Gorgey Batallion. The special 
written order to assure access to the printing press was forged in 
the name of Bela Kerekes, Deputy Minister of Justice, and 
endorsed by Emil Kovarcz, Propaganda Minister. The project 
was aborted because of security considerations one day before 
operation, and was to be re-scheduled later. There was no 
second chance for this mission, nor was there a chance to pursue 
others in progress because of several arrests. 
In Captivity 
My recollection is that the day was December 14, Thursday 
morning, as I began to work at my desk, when two men in civilian 
clothes entered my office while a third one stayed at the door. I 
guessed their business as my eyes surveyed the three figures: one 
wrestler-framed, one girlish-faced and one lanky. The wrestler 
moved behind my chair while the girlish-faced said, "We are 
looking for Mr. Horvath." Pretending absent-minded shuffling 
of account vouchers, I attempted to bury my coded notebook. 
"We want that ," he continued in a steely voice while flashing an 
identification card, "and you come with us." The wrestler 
pushed a gun against my shoulder blade and with his chest 
shoved me toward the room's centre. They tied my hands tightly 
and led me to the street where I was ushered into a limousine 
marked, "Voluntary Ambulance Association of Budapest." A 
resourceful decoy, I thought while I was being rushed 
inconspicuously through the avenues of Buda into the yard of the 
Military Prison on Margit Boulevard. 
Immediately I was led into a large room where each of the 
three men took note pads and pencils into their hands. The 
wrestler said, "You talk; we write." As I remained silent they 
looked at me and at each other with apparent surprise. When I 
continued with silence the girlish-face stepped toward me and 
said in a flat tone, "Mr. Horvath, you got nabbed. Your friends 
are arrested also. Almost the whole crazy group got caught. We 
need you to piece together all the details. Realize it; you made 
mistakes of judgment and you became involved in a deadly, grave 
underground conspiracy. You assist us so that we can help you. 
Think for a few minutes. We will leave you here alone." All 
three left the room and then came back parading before me two 
fellow students. The episodes were intended to prod me to talk. 
By now all three argued that I should talk. Indeed, having seen 
two of my friends in captivity, I felt that it would not be a viable 
strategy to remain speechless. I remembered a scenario 
rehearsed a few times during the previous weeks: the rational 
behaviour should be to devise a scaled-down story made up of 
events, places and persons obviously known already to the 
interrogators. Notwithstanding the risk involved in their 
discovering my scheme and therefore retaliating with harsh 
treatment, still this appeared to be the logical attitude when 
loyalty and self-preservation complement one another. 
Soon it turned out that my captors were in a hurry. They 
escalated the process of interrogation by resorting to a whole 
gamut of physical and psychological cruelties during the 
subsequent days * I surmised from the thrust of the inquiry 
that my interrogators' prime target was to capture more of our 
fellow students still at large. They kept throwing names at me; 
with some I was in direct underground operation, others were 
part of our movement, still others I had met in the past but had 
no current operational ties with, some were persons I had only 
heard about, and finally, some were wholly unfamiliar 
individuals. Within the student movement Emil Majsay, Vilmos 
Fitos and Antal Gyenes were the main targets. Within the higher 
political sphere they scrambled the names of Zoltan Tildy, Bela 
Varga, Ferenc Nagy, Pal Auer, Vince Voros, Imre Kovacs, Gyula 
Dessewffy and others. Three questions dominated this wrangle: 
(1) When did I see him? (2) When will I meet him next? (3) 
Where was he at this time? So they were on a fishing expedition, 
I inferred, and risked dodging as many questions as I felt 
possible. Apparently, they were frustrated with my lengthy 
stories 
Shortly I was back in the interrogation room. Again Lajos 
Feher, Vilmos Fitos and Emil Majsay were the targets of inquiry. 
I claimed that I was scheduled to meet Majsay that week one 
afternoon on the Kalvin Square, but could not remember the 
exact day and hour without deciphering my pocket calendar. 
They produced my calendar pages for the week, and I pretended 
that a disguised entry on the day after tomorrow, Saturday 
* Editor's note: Many personal details of Horvath's interrogation 
have been omitted. 
afternoon at two o'clock, was a coded reminder to meet Majsay. 
Whether the gamble worked or the captors needed a rest, I was 
led to the prison building. 
Cell 105 of the Military Prison was a large room at the 
northeast end of the third floor. In two lines on straw sacks there 
were about 25 men lying. My escort meditatively assigned a cot 
to me around the middle of the left side row I awoke with a 
sharp pain in my feet and head. It was daylight and my 
roommates told me that I missed the breakfast because I did not 
respond either to words or shaking. 
As I recall this was the morning when Gyula Szentadorjany was 
added to the cell's population. The interrogation resumed just 
before noon and lasted until evening. For a change there was no 
beating.... They took me into a group meeting with the three 
inquirers, occasionally with only one of them. Repeatedly there 
were other people in the room behind me, but I was forced to 
look into a bright flourescent light. The questioning added up to 
a potpourri of everything: the review of hundreds of photo-
graphs, how could religious people talk with communists, who 
was Jewish or communist in the student resistance, who were 
communists in the Peasant Federation; have Zoltan Miko, Istvan 
Toth and Vilmos Bondor visited the Nostra office, how to locate 
Tibor Ham, Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Peter Veres, Pal Fabry, 
Gyula Totka; what did I know about the disguised ambulance 
limousine, etc. Whenever in talking I mentioned the name of 
Count Pal Teleki, the former Prime Minister and boy scout idol, 
they showed irritation. Next morning I was shaved, given a 
bigger pair of shoes and even my torn winter coat got mending. 
Repeatedly they rehearsed with me the anticipated rendezvous 
with Emil Majsay. I went through the motions with mixed 
feelings because in truth there existed no arrangement with 
Majsay. The decoy ambulance limousine took us to the Kalvin 
Square; four persons sat with me and they pointed at another 
civilian automobile in escort. They impressed me with the loaded 
guns in their pockets so that I should not think of any careless 
move while awaiting Majsay on the street. After 25 minutes of 
waiting, I was led back to the limousine and the caravan returned 
to the prison. 
Their disappointment was not disguised. While riding in the 
limousine they gave me the ultimatum: "Lead us to the hiding 
place of Majsay if you want to save your skin!" I did not know his 
hideout and noted that he must have learned about the arrest of 
all his colleagues, so he obviously disappeared. I even 
complimented their remarkable skill in catching all of us. 
Presently their furour was poured on me 
In cell 105 the evening of December 24, Christmas Eve, was the 
ending of another routine day. We could hear from the constant 
coming and going in the building that the investigating squads 
did not slow down; they wanted to wind up the case of the student 
underground movement. The news spread that they will take no 
holiday recess; the first day of Christmas they write the 
indictments, the second day the martial court will pronounce the 
sentences, and a minimum of three persons will be executed 
immediately —Sandor Kiss, Tibor Zimanyi and myself—yet the 
number may go up to six. By midnight the place quieted down, 
but not for long; and then the approaching gunfire could be 
heard. These were the hours when the Soviet Army encircled 
Budapest and among other advances one tank unit reached Szena 
Square, about one kilometer from our prison. The next morning 
all the prisoners—about 80 persons —were led to a courtyard and 
one-by-one ushered into waiting buses. My name was read off 
among my colleagues' by the sergeant-major. Indeed, these were 
the short minutes when I saw my four captors in gendarme 
uniforms with sickle feather at the cap, each also displaying the 
Arrow-Cross ensign. 
Swiftly the bus convoy started to move but instead of travelling 
the highway toward Germany, they approached the Pest District 
Prison on Main Street. This had been for months the German 
Gestapo prison. Immediately after registration, German officers 
with swastika arm bands began to deal with our case. Within 
hours I was taken to an SS Captain who quickly perused the 
documents on his desk and apparently noticed the name of 
Nostra Warehouse Corporation and inquired about my role in 
the arrangements at the Gyali Street depot for the Swedish Red 
Cross and other international agencies. Obviously, he had been 
investigating something about that because in short intervals two 
men and a woman prisoner were brought in testing if we knew 
each other. To this SS Captain I explained in a professional 
manner the procedures a warehouse employs in dealing with 
clients in general and regarding the Red Cross consignments in 
particular. After about an hour of inquiry, suddenly the 
telephone rang and the Captain must have received a call from a 
higher authority because he stood up and clicked heels. Within 
seconds he rushed out of the room in overcoat, and after another 
hour one of his deputies took me back to a prison cell. In this 
room there were several people; among them two French 
prisoners of war, one Polish officer and Count Miklos Eszterhazy, 
a member of the Upper House of Hungarian Parliament. 
Our stay in the Main Street Prison turned out to be brief 
because in a few days we were transferred into the base-
ment of the Parliament building. Instead of automobile 
transportation, we were lined up in pairs to walk, guarded on 
both sides by German SS soldiers. Several episodes of this march 
have been inscribed in my memory. The incentive to cross the 
bridge fast was obvious because of the scattered artillery fire. Yet 
the trudging column could move only as fast as some of the 
prisoners could drag themselves. On the bridge pavement there 
were dead bodies, defunct vehicles and bomb craters. My 
wretched feet could hardly carry me, so my colleagues offered 
assistance. One memorable assistance was offered in the form of 
a walking stick by Istvan Kemeny, a medical student, who had 
permission to keep it due to a lame leg. Dragging on with the 
column was a must because of the familiar rule: whoever held up 
the process or fell out of line could be shot on the spot. Leaning 
on the borrowed cane and limping in stride, suddenly the end of 
my stick got stuck in an ice cleft. It did not yield and as I tried 
with a jerk to free it, the handle separated from the stick and 
there was in my hand a two-foot long dagger. A terrifying 
experience: could the Gestapo guards miss noticing the event and 
had they any alternative but to shoot the holder of the dagger? 
Perhaps the lifesavers were those two artillery mines that 
exploded on our half of the bridge at this very second. The 
guards shouted, "Take cover! Lie down!" Everybody did; guards 
and guarded ones shared a divine community of interest for a few 
seconds. In this melee I managed to free the butt of the walking 
stick so as to re-assemble it with the handle. My miraculous 
survival here became fatally accentuated only a few seconds later, 
when a member of our column slipped into a bomb crater to 
disappear into the icy Danube River. After another trying half 
an hour we were herded into the Parliament building to be kept 
there in the basement of the Upper House for about ten days. 
The German Gestapo unit guarding us was commanded by a 
reserve officer Captain, a medical doctor in civilian life. He kept 
shouting with a high-pitched voice and accused Hungarians of 
being ungrateful to the Germans; his oratory usually ended with 
hailing Hitler, and predictions of final German victory. His unit 
was charged with investigation as well as with meting out 
sentences. There was some investigation because there were 
delays during which certain contacts with the outside world 
evolved. A few persons received medicine, blankets and food 
from outside. I was the beneficiary of all these goods brought by 
the Reverend Andras Hamza. His courage was quietly 
appreciated by those of us who knew his prominent role in the 
preparation of the fake Szalasi manifesto and in other projects. 
During our stay in the basement of the Parliament building, we 
recovered somewhat from the tortures at the Military Prison. 
The twelve students of the Independence Movement were able to 
exchange words. These twelve were: Sandor Kiss, Tibor 
Zimanyi, Pal Jonas, Zoltan Nyeste, Istvan B. Racz, Lajos Imre, 
Istvan Fiam, Istvan Kristo-Nagy, Miklos Takacsi, Erno Balint, 
Otto Elek and myself. Also, Istvan Kemeny allied himself with us 
during those concluding weeks, even though his arrest was due to 
activities separate from ours. During these days we could pull 
together for meditation over the Bible and the quiet singing of 
psalms, usually around Sandor Kiss. Poetry became another 
source of sustenance with contributions from everyone and 
marathon recitals of Ady by Racz. 
Starting around January 10, 1945, there followed several 
transfers in succession. From the Parliament we were taken to 
the City Hall where the officials claimed unpreparedness for 
accepting us. During the negotiations we were held in a corridor 
when one of our group, Istvan Kristo-Nagy, disappeared. Upon 
discovering the escape, our guards furiously threatened to 
decimate us in retaliation, and we were already lined up when a 
higher-ranking officer reappeared with orders to transport the 
group. Next, we arrived at the Arrow-Cross National 
Headquarters at Andrassy Street 60. Here our stay lasted one 
night. Our next stay was at the Gestapo Headquarters in the 
Buda Castle. The discipline was strict, and it was felt that the 
highest ranking security officers of the besieged city might deal 
with us summarily; but fortunately, they had only blurred vision 
of our identity and were busy interrogating prisoners of war just 
captured on the front line. During the whole night we were 
seated on chairs shivering under the broken windows. The next 
morning we were loaded on four trucks. While speeding through 
the district of Taban, our convoy was attacked by airplanes 
spreading machine-gun volleys. The driver halted the trucks; the 
guards ran into the buildings and the prisoners followed. Here, 
instead of seeking shelter in the basement, I ran up to the second 
floor, but could not devise a reasonably safe escape. However, it 
happened that on this occasion Jonas, Zimanyi and Racz 
successfully hid in a basement to find their escape. The trucks 
crossed the bridge to Pest to continue driving northward until 
another air attack compelled stoppage at the Kossuth Lajos 
Square. Again everyone tried to find hiding. Running, I just 
reached the wall of the Parliament building when a volley of 
bullets swept the pavement only inches before my shoes. Soon we 
were in the Marko Street Prison, where the warden, seeking 
instruction from the Ministry of Justice, was referred to the 
district Arrow-Cross Headquarters. 
Soon an Arrow-Cross brigade came to escort us to their 
headquarters at 2 Szent Istvan Boulevard. By now I gambled my 
defense on the hope that the investigation papers might have 
been delayed somewhere in the transfers and therefore I could 
invent a story of lesser crime or even a simple bureaucratic 
bungle. But the style of the crew dispelled any illusions. They 
displayed the most menacing blend of dilettantism, uninhibited-
ness and self-conceit. They appeared and sounded just as fearful 
as their reputation while ordering us to march in single line. 
They kept talking. A very young man at my side holding a 
submachine gun explained that it took only less than one inch 
turn of the disc to finish a case and that it was their responsibility 
to perform all functions of emergency governing. Upon arrival at 
their headquarters, we were immediately subjected to a screening 
in the courtyard. One of the staffers —scrutinizing the slope of 
my forehead and my curly raven black beard —speculated that I 
was a Jew, and he dropped the hypothesis only after further 
anatomical inquiry. Then I countered claiming that they ought 
to send me back to my job at Nostra, a business corporation 
charged with such vital things as rationing grain supply. Further, 
I claimed that I was in captivity only because of an incompetent 
sentry who detained me when one particular identification 
document remained accidentally in the pocket of another jacket. 
Soon we were all led to the basement where not much later a 
small group of us were ordered to stand in the light of an electric 
bulb to be viewed by a higher official. This man wore the 
soldier's uniform, but without insignia. Looking us over, 
occasionally holding a flashlight into the subject's face, he 
demanded quick answers. Suddenly, he spotted a grey-haired 
man and after prodding him to say something, the fatal 
recognition followed: "I know you. I remember that eight years 
ago I spoke about National Socialism in Csepel and you ridiculed 
my speech. You caused the audience to laugh at me. Now you 
will admit that I was right." This was the interrogation as well as 
the sentence. The few of us there, including his son, saw him 
dragged out. He was killed on the Danube bank instantly as the 
news spread a few weeks later 
The next day I was among forty men taken by guards to the 
Vdrosmarty Street School of the Scottish Mission, which this time 
was a station of the punitive platoons. We were summoned to 
join the fight; the ones excelling and surviving would be forgiven, 
but any sign of hesitation or speculation would be punished with 
instant death. In the school's auditorium there were about 150 
men guarded by Arrow-Cross troopers. In scheming to learn 
more about the place and conditions I grabbed two buckets and 
asked a guard to take me to the water tap. He guided me into the 
basement where after two turns along the semi-dark corridors we 
spotted the building's only functioning water tap. Having 
returned with the full buckets and distributed the contents, I set 
out to repeat the journey alone. At the tap while I was filling the 
bucket there appeared from around the corner a man with a 
bucket in his hand. Suddenly I had to rub my eyes. Wrapped in 
lilac-coloured morning gown there stood Gyula Gombos. A 
writer himself in the underground movement and fully aware of 
my predicament, yet at this instant he could hardly decide what 
was more surprising—that I was alive, or that I was next to him. 
Quickly he signalled to follow him toward escape. I answered 
that I wanted to go back for Sandor Kiss, and I hoped to return 
within a few minutes. So I went back for Sandor, and we met 
Gyula who led us through an elaborate labyrinth into a remote 
part of the basement. There in a good-sized family quarter, we 
were most warmly embraced by other friends: Zoltan Tildy, 
Albert Bereczky, Viktor Csolnoky, Zoltan Tildy, Jr., and Laszlo 
Tildy. The secluded air-raid shelter household included the wives 
and other family members. Indeed, the most hunted leader 
of the Hungarian Independence Movement, Zoltan Tildy —who 
became Prime Minister in 1945, President of the Republic during 
1946-48, a leader in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 —this 
time was hiding here under the assumed name of Lajos Nagy, a 
land surveyor from Transylvania who had actually died a few 
weeks before. 
There was no time to celebrate our escape but only to exchange 
vital information. It was obvious that we two newcomers had to 
be whisked out of this place immediately. Shortly, Sandor and I 
were fed, shaved, clothed for departure. The two Reformed 
Church ministers, Tildy and Bereczky, lent their clerical dark 
suits and ecclesiastical mantles to us so that we could walk 
through the streets pretending to bury the dead of the war. We 
walked to the Thanksgiving Reformed Church at 58 Pozsony 
Street where friends—Mihaly Hogye, Jolan Tildy and o t h e r s -
sheltered us through three more days until the Russians finally 
cleared that particular part of Budapest of Germans. In the 
meanwhile, contemplating the danger of discovery by Arrow-
Cross search troopers, we opted for an alternative risk. One 
might regard it as an application of risk minimization calculus. 
Even though the tower was riddled with holes from repeated 
artillery strikes, we chose to await freedom inside a battered nook 
of the church tower. 
Postscript 
During the subsequent months, I learned that the twelve 
members of the Free Life Student Movement survived the last 
days of Nazi German rule in Hungary. Beginning with early 1945 
I observed these people in public life. When the next wave of 
regimentation hit Hungary, this time sponsored by the imperial 
overlord Stalin and perpetrated by his domestic viceroy Rakosi, 
then, alas, the survival rate worsened.* When the Revolution of 
1956 shook Hungary and surprised the world, most of us were still 
there attempting to revive the 1944 platform, namely, represen-
tative government, progressive reforms and national independ-
ence. Subsequently, almost as an afterthought, several of us tried 
to preserve the Revolution's real spirit in exile. 
* Out of twelve persons, seven were imprisoned for years. 
The fact that I myself survived the turn of 1944 into 1945 could 
be thought of differently according to the commentator's 
predilection: either as a random event with very low probability, 
or as the Almighty God's loving care. Documents in archives 
subsequently revealed that the Court of National Reckoning had 
condemned me to death and that only the unexpected encircle-
mend of Budapest by Russian forces prevented it from carrying 
out the order. The court-martial prosecutor's role went to Balint 
Balassa, Juris Doctor, a senior lieutenant of the gendarmerie. My 
"execution" was reported throughout the German-occupied 
regions of Hungary. But unexpectedly, Christmas night my 
would-be executioners were ordered to the front line and soon 
after they became part of the elite contingent which fought its 
way out of besieged Budapest. Additional ironies might be noted 
at this point. A year later, when Balassa was on trial with his 
companions, it became public knowledge that his taste for 
debonaire dressing was complemented with other refined 
attributes, such as being an accomplished piano player. I neither 
went to his trial nor gave testimony. He was sentenced to death, 
but the Head of the State, President Zoltan Tildy, commuted the 
sentence to life imprisonment in response to pleas from Mrs. 
Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, the widow of the nation's highest martyr, 
and from Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty who, as Bishop of Veszprem 
had been detained by Balassa in January 1945. At the request of 
these two persons, I also signed the recommendation for 
clemency. Three years later a new trial was scheduled and he was 
executed. In the meanwhile, however, I had met Balassa as a 
fellow inmate while the Stalinists held me in prison. During those 
months, at one of the recurrent shuffling of inmates, he and I 
were temporarily in the same cell where we carried on a 
conversation. I was quite conscious of how moral indignation 
inside me became subdued by contemplative curiosity. 
The Hungarian Independence Movement received national 
and international recognition during 1945. The student 
resistance movement was highly praised and I, among others, 
received prestigious awards. On occasions, these awards were 
further accentuated by recognition from the Allied Control 
Commission, specifically by the three generals who represented 
the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain 
respectively. Certain events were specially noted, among others 
my presence at two receptions given by Marshal Voroshilov, who 
was the Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary. 
Thus according to the inherent dynamics of those times, I was 
drafted into public life. The political parties of the governing 
coalition competed for identification with the surviving members 
of the national resistance movement. I joined the Independent 
Smallholder Party and working through it, I was elected Member 
of Parliament and Member of the Budapest Municipal Council. 
There followed appointments to several advisory, policy-making 
and executive positions both in the private and public sectors. 
Indeed, it appears quite difficult to simply summarize this period 
without running the risk of overstating or understating the 
process. Let the generalization suffice here that I was involved in 
economic policy-making, I sponsored a major piece of legislation 
in Parliament, yet my primary task was to work on a daily basis 
with Sandor Kiss as Deputy Director at the Hungarian Peasant 
Federation. 
As I look back on the content of this essay, I can think of no 
more dignified stopping point than to write down that the most 
important and most meaningful experience of all my working life 
has been the opportunity to work at the side of Kiss. Because my 
own participation in the student movement was intertwined with 
the personality of Kiss, I know that my behaviour and activities 
were rooted in our friendship. In fact, much beyond the time 
period recollected here, the two of us maintained and enjoyed 
through 39 years, until his death in 1982, an unparalleled 
friendship of warmth, trust and partnership. I never doubted his 
leadership and he never doubted my loyalty. The very 
opportunity to work with him amounted to the highest reward I 
could ever attain. 
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Warmonger or Peacemaker: 
The Role of the Church Re-Examined 
in the Light of Cardinal Seredi's Diaries 
Leslie Laszlo 
A Hungarian Marxist historian, Sandor Orban, in discussing the 
role of the Church in the Second World War , 1 assigns to the 
Vatican —in addition to the intrigues of American imperialism — 
the decisive role in the attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet 
Union. From him we learn also that the Hungarian Catholic 
Church pursued the same policy as the Vatican and incited the 
fascist leadership of the country, goading it on to war against the 
Soviet Union. And following the declaration of war, "the 
organized propaganda of the Hungarian Catholic Church during 
the first phase of the predatory war against the Soviet Union 
vindicated and abetted the aggressors to the fullest extent ." 2 
The author then attempts to prove the complicity of the Church 
in the grave injuries inflicted on the Soviet Union by quoting 
priests exhorting the soldiers. According to Orban, during the 
entire course of the war the Church did nothing in the interest of 
peace. He wrote, "the leaders of the Hungarian Catholic Church 
were far removed from helping the country, even by one step, 
down from the road of war against the Soviet Union and from 
freeing her from the camp of the aggressors."3 And when he 
described the sufferings of the Hungarian people during the war 
and the deportations and mass executions under the German 
occupation and Arrow Cross rule, Orban emphasized that 
The leaders of the Church did not raise their voices 
against the domestic bloodshed either that accompan-
ied the continuation of the war Not only did the 
Church fail essentially to raise her voice against Hitler 
and his Hungarian accomplices, but she hastened to 
their aid. She saw her chief task in not allowing the 
war against the Soviet Union, in the service of which 
Hitler wanted to deploy all the resources of the 
country, to be abandoned. Herein lies the explanation 
for the fact also that she even cooperated with the 
supporters of National Leader Szalasi's band in the 
battle against the Soviet Union and against the 
liberation of the country 4 The Church joined 
forces in its entirety with the Arrow Cross, which was 
waging an all out struggle against the liberation of the 
country 5 The leaders of the Church hated their 
own people and the liberating Soviet Union so much 
that they would not make common cause with them in 
the interest of saving the country.6 
These are definitely grave accusations, and if they were based 
on facts then we would have to agree with their author that "the 
historical blame which the Hungarian Catholic Church must 
bear for the country's participation in the war and for its 
consequences is very significant and heavy." 7 However, this is 
not the way things were. When Hungary, following the bombing 
of the city of Kassa —the responsibility for which has not been 
established to this day8 —declared war against the Soviet Union 
without first requesting or obtaining the approval of Parliament 
as required by the Constitution,9 Prince Primate Jusztinian 
Seredi lodged a protest both with Regent Horthy and with Prime 
Minister Laszlo Bardossy. In his diary,10 Seredi noted that 
It is probable that Parliament, together with me, 
would have voted against a declaration of war even if it 
had been quite clearly established that Kassa had been 
bombed by Russian planes, a note of protest, 
demanding compensation, could have settled this 
incident far more practically than by entering into a 
war in which hundreds of thousands of our country's 
youth were bound to perish, immense damage be 
suffered and millions of money spent not to speak of 
the constant uncertainty and the tormenting, unspeak-
able suffering caused by the war to every Hungarian 
citizen.11 
This declaration of war on the Soviet Union was followed 
several months later, on December 6, 1941, by Great Britain's 
declaration of war on Hungary. In connection with this, 
Cardinal Seredi wrote: 
Through the Holy See I tried to prevent this 
declaration of war, but Cardinal Maglione, the 
Secretary of State, replied in a telegram that all 
intervention was now useless as this step had now been 
fully and irrevocably decided on. Yet I still hoped that 
it might not go beyond the breaking off of diplomatic 
relations that the conflict could be still avoided, and 
especially that air attacks on our country could be 
prevented.12 
About the circumstances surrounding Hungary's declaration of 
war on the United States, the Prince Primate wrote the following: 
After the British declaration of war the Bardossy 
government decided to forestall the United States by 
declaring war on America first. Again without 
obtaining the consent of Parliament. Perhaps the 
Government thought that America was far away and 
that therefore this declaration would have no practical 
consequences for us on the other hand, they were 
doing something to please their German ally. Since 
then often enough we have experienced the practical 
consequences in destructive air attacks 
Before the declaration of war I had two long 
conversations with the American Minister to Hungary. 
He told me that he had studied conscientiously the 
history and present situation of our country. And as he 
saw that many injustices had been done to Hungary, 
he considered it the purpose of his mission to try and 
support the just causes of Hungary. I quoted some 
instances (the question of Anglo-Italian sanctions, 
etc.) and pointed out that, in the outside manifesta-
tions of our political life and in judging these 
manifestations, the circumstances of heavy pressure 
must not be forgotten, for they had had a great 
influence on our decision. The Minister understood 
my allusion and when he called on Bardossy to be 
handed the declaration of war, he said himself that 
according to his knowledge the Hungarian Govern-
ment was acting under pressure, which had given him 
a certain reassurance. 
How the declaration of war actually took place I 
cannot elucidate. But it is the naked truth that we are 
in the war up to our neck and that all its terrors have 
been let loose upon our much-suffering nation. I told 
Bardossy and the Regent as well that it might not be 
difficult to enter the war, but it would be most difficult 
to get out of it unharmed. 1 3 
In spite of the lack of success that attended his attempts to 
prevent the declaration of war, Cardinal Seredi continued to 
work for the cause of peace. When in early March of 1942 the 
Regent appointed Miklos Kallay Prime Minister,14 giving him 
instructions to try to extricate the country f rom the German 
alliance and to restore peace with the Allied Powers,15 the 
Prince Primate, as well as all other ecclesiastical leaders, 
endorsed and supported this policy of the government directed 
toward peace.16 Cardinal Seredi assisted Kallay in drafting the 
memorandum which the latter submitted to Pope Pius XII in 
January of 1943 and in which he requested the intervention of His 
Holiness in the interest of the restoration of peace. 17 Kallay 
wrote in his memoirs, "the memorandum was a cry for help, a 
supplication from the eastern borders of Catholicism to the head 
of the Roman Catholic Church and through him to the Catholics 
and Christians of the whole world." 18 Unfortunately, although 
Pius XII received the memorandum with the greatest sympathy 
and discussed in person the matters contained therein with Kallay 
during the latter's visit to Rome in March, it could not bear 
results, since the Pope was himself powerless to do anything the 
belligerents did not want to hear of any peace mediation by the 
Holy See. From the description of Kallay's lengthy audience with 
the Pope, 19 it becomes clearly evident that Pius XII was 
tremendously moved by the horrible inhumanity of bolshevism, 
and even more of German Nazism, as well as by the suffering 
which the war caused all over the world. As a result, his most 
fervent wish and all his efforts were directed toward the 
achievement of a just and equitable peace at the earliest possible 
time, which would involve abandoning total war and the mad 
idea of unconditional surrender. The Pope did not, however, see 
much hope for this so long as the opposing Great Powers, namely 
the German Reich and the Soviet Union, languished under the 
terroristic rule of fanatical dictators. His Holiness nevertheless 
expressed his willingness to undertake an initiating step in the 
interest of peace, if Italy would request this of him. Kallay 
hastened to inform Mussolini of this. The latter listened with 
great attention, but made his answer conditional on the consent 
of Hitler.20 With this, Kallay's grandiose plan to induce 
Mussolini to break with Hitler, after which Hungary, Finland 
and possibly the other East European and Baltic states allied with 
Hitler would, under Italy's leadership, cease hostilities and 
conclude a separate peace with the Allied Powers, came to 
naught. 
To return to events in Hungary, we should mention that Prince 
Primate Seredi approved of the plan that the government 
entertained to declare Budapest an open city, but he desired to 
include also the holy places of Hungarian Catholicism, Esztergom 
and Pannonhalma.2 1 During the last days of the war, which 
inflicted the most devastation on Hungary, the Prince Primate, 
by then very seriously ill, joined in the demand which the bishops 
of the Dunantul addressed to the Arrow Cross government urging 
the abandonment of the hopeless struggle and the conclusion of 
an immediate ceasefire.22 And when the German high 
command ordered the evacuation of the city of Esztergom, which 
was the Primate's see, Cardinal Seredi bravely confronted the 
authorities and called upon the population to remain. 23 
The few facts enumerated above should be sufficient to refute 
the communist contention that the Church had incited the war 
and had been an enemy of peace. 24 The even more serious 
accusation, that the Church collaborated with the Nazis and the 
Arrow Cross and was their accomplice in the horrible crimes 
committed against humanity, has been answered elsewhere and 
need not be repeated here. 25 
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Julian Borsanyi. Das Ratsel des Bombenangriffs auf Kaschau, 
26Juni 1941. (Studia Hungarica, 16) Munich: Ungarisches 
Institut, 1978, 260 pp. 
Who bombed Kassa? Embodied in this succinctly stated ques-
tion is perhaps the greatest puzzle of modern Hungarian history 
and one of the major remaining enigmas of World War II in 
Europe. Hungary's entry into the war was provoked by the 
bombing of Kassa (Kosice) by several aircraft on 26 June 1941. 
The Hungarian government, ascribing responsibility for the 
bombing raid to the Soviet Union, quickly enlisted in Hitler's 
crusade against Communist Russia. From the start, however, 
questions were raised about the identity of the bombers, and 
ever since a variety of theories have been proposed in an attempt 
to explain the mysterious circumstances of the Kassa bombing. 
One of the first investigations of the bombing of Kassa was 
conducted in 1941 by Julian Borsanyi, at the time a captain 
in a technical branch of the Hungarian General Staff. After a 
hiatus of three decades, Borsanyi returned to his investigation. 
The results of his labours are contained in this book, which 
represents the most exhaustive study to date of this historical 
puzzle. 
Borsanyi has closely examined, and in some cases discredited, 
some of the traditional sources, accounts, and theories. The 
testimony of the most famous eyewitness of the bombings, Adam 
Krudy, is shown to be inconsistent and unreliable. A similar 
skepticism is displayed toward the postwar statements of Istvan 
Ujszaszy who was head of Hungarian military intelligence in 
1941, and Rudolf Bamler, a former officer in the Abwehr. Both 
Ujszaszy, and Bamler claimed that the Kassa bombing was a 
conspiracy devised by military circles in Germany and Hun-
gary who were eager to draw Hungary into the war. Borsanyi 
is unconvinced. He points out that not a single document re-
lating to a German-Hungarian conspiracy has ever been dis-
covered. Moreover, he finds it "morally and psychologically" 
impossible to believe that any Hungarian officers could have 
condoned or participated in an attack on a Hungarian city. 
Yet Borsanyi also finds serious weaknesses in the other 
theories that have been put forward. Could the bombers have 
been Soviet after all? Despite the discovery of bomb fragments 
with cyrillic lettering, Borsanyi regards this as unlikely. All 
eyewitnesses, the author asserts, report that the attacking planes 
had no markings, yet no instance is known in World War II of 
Soviet planes flying without insignia. In any case, no purpose 
would have been served by such an attack at a time when the 
Soviet leadership hoped to keep Hungary neutral. 
Another popular theory holds that Slovak (or Czech) pilots 
were responsible for the bombing. Borsanyi acknowledges that 
there is some circumstantial evidence to support this idea, which 
apparently was widely accepted in Kassa after the bombing. 
The pattern of the dropping of the bombs (the post office was 
a major target) perhaps suggests an act of vengeance by Slovaks 
unhappy over the cession of territory (including the city of Kassa) 
to Hungary in 1938. Moreover, in an appendix to his study, 
Borsanyi reports on some new evidence that may, after being 
verified, strengthen this "Slovak alternative." 
After examining all of the evidence and the various theo-
ries, Borsanyi is forced to concede that the "fundamental 
questions — who dropped the bombs on Kassa and why — 
remain open." The author has nonetheless been able to draw 
several credible conclusions. The bombers, he suggests, came 
from an east or southeast direction and left in the opposite 
direction. The aircraft had no insignia, and were not the same 
planes that had attacked a train in Ruthenia earlier. The Kassa 
attack was not unsystematic and terroristic, but a planned 
bombing of specific targets. The bombs that were dropped bore 
cyrillic lettering. 
Although these conclusions and the supporting argumen-
tation represent an important contribution to the study of this 
controversial question, Borsanyi's book is by no means a 
definitive study. It is true that scholars will be greatly indebted 
to Borsanyi for undertaking the monumental task of contact-
ing virtually every surviving Hungarian who might have pertinent 
firsthand information about the Kassa bombing. On the other 
hand, Borsanyi himself admits that he is not a trained historian, 
and his occasional biases and sometimes haphazard treatment 
of source materials tend to reflect this. Borsanyi is too polem-
ical in his evaluation of the work of Marxist historians, even if 
his criticisms are often justified. By contrast, his sympathetic 
portraits of Laszlo Bardossy and Henrik Werth will seem to 
some readers to be both uncritical and unwarranted. 
Too often Borsanyi draws conclusions on the basis of evidence 
from individuals who remain anonymous. On one occasion 
he even cites material from a book whose author and title he 
no longer can recall. Equally frustrating is the fact that 
Borsanyi's use of published works is less than thorough. For 
example, though he refers briefly to the important article by 
Nandor Dreisziger on the Kassa bombing, he does not deal 
with its thesis or arguments in a systematic way. Only indirectly 
does he touch on the pertinent works of such historians as Mario 
Fenyo and Gyorgy Ranki. My own modest contribution to the 
historiography of the Kassa bombing appears to be unknown 
to Borsanyi. 
Thus, the pursuit of a solution to what Borsanyi calls this 
"tragic mystery" will continue. The true explanation may never 
be known, at least not until the opening of the pertinent Soviet 
archives. Until that time, however, Julian Borsanyi's book will 
be a valuable guide and reference work. 
University of Cincinnati Thomas L. Sakmyster 
Anthony Tihamer Komjathy. A Thousand Years of the 
Hungarian Art of War. Toronto: Rakoczi Foundation, 
1982, 210 pp. 
This survey of Hungarian military history is the first attempt 
to address an existing conspicuous vacuum. The author's purpose 
in presenting this survey in the English language was to heighten 
awareness of the present Hungarian situation by outlining the 
country's history from a military perspective. In doing so, he 
has geared the book to a wide readership, namely: military 
historians, second and third generation Hungarians, academics, 
statesmen as well as a general readership. 
To gain insight into the formidable task taken on by Professor 
Komjathy, one must examine the subject from two angles: scope 
and intensity. Hungary was an established state with Western 
Christian orientation years before the battle of Hastings and 
almost 500 years prior to Columbus' landing on Watling Island. 
Hungary's geographic location invited incursion and occupa-
tion by the prominent powers of the time: Mongols, Turks, 
Austrians, Germans and Russians. In short, Hungary's mili-
tary history is vitally linked to its national development. Any 
attempt to address a subject that is as intense as it is long is a 
considerable undertaking. 
The task is not made easier by the destruction of Hungarian 
documents and manuscripts in the wars that ironically enough 
made that history. Most existing texts (in Hungarian) have strong 
socialist or pro-Russian slants and are thus too one-sided to 
be of great value for the serious historian. 
Professor Komjathy has opened the door to a subject that 
has eluded military historians of the West for some time. His 
book neatly categorizes the periods and highlights the prominent 
features such as the little-known lightning raid of Andreas Hadik 
on Berlin in 1757. He also provides an interesting chapter en-
titled "Hungarians in Foreign Armies," that documents the 
activities of Hungarians under foreign flags. Even here he could 
only skim the surface, not noting the hundreds of Hungarian 
Hussars who accompanied Emperor Maximillian to found the 
ill-fated Mexican Empire. Nor does the author mention the 
Hungarian engineers and artillerymen who cast their lot with 
Abd-el-Kader in his struggle to resist French penetration of 
Algeria in the 1840s. T h e magnitude of the subject is simply 
too great. 
Nonetheless, a balanced criticism calls for comments in 
the spirit of academic circumspection. First, the title is a curious 
one. What is the "Hungarian art of war" (not to mention 1000 
years of it)? One would be hard pressed to imagine a British 
or American art of war. Art is the practice and while Hun-
garian military history does have its peculiarities, the practice 
of war by Hungarians cannot be ascribed to a single national 
entity. It is hoped that readers will not judge the book by its 
title since the book itself is highly worthwhile. Secondly, as 
Professor Komjathy has pointed out, Hungarian military his-
tory is strongly interwoven with the national spirit. Given this 
relationship, one would have expected the volume to provide 
more extensive treatment of the remarkable activities of 
1848-1849 that caused an Emperor to abdicate, Metternich 
(whose very name was synonymous with reaction) to flee into 
exile, and Austrian armies to fall back on all fronts. It is 
questionable under these circumstances whether the Russian 
intervention provided "only the final blow for the Hungarian 
freedom fight," as stated by the author. The intense energy 
of national-liberal feeling provided a force so great that Austrian 
imperialism simply could not contend with it. The intervention 
of 200,000 Russians under General Paskievich is better viewed as 
the turning point to a situation that had chances of success 
despite the triumph of reaction elsewhere in Europe. 
A Thousand Years bears out the anguish of a proud nation 
struggling for national survival and self-esteem, a nation that 
because of its location so frequently had to confront a hostile 
environment. The book shows the pain of the politicians who 
so frequently had to sacrifice national pride for the nation's own 
future survival. As well, it provides an insight into the plight 
of soldiers who too often could not fight for their country and 
had to leave Hungary because the political realities did not allow 
them to fight for their cherished ideals. Hungarian military 
history is also a saga of the conflicts in civil-military relations. 
The volume covers much ground. Professor Komjathy 
intended it to be a survey that would generate further interest 
in the area of Hungarian military history. His book is bound 
to raise questions and spark interest in this previously neglected 
area. 
National Defence Headquarters, Captain Sandor Antal 
Ottawa, Canada 
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Appendix 
Pictures of the Kassa Bombing 
The following pages show photographs related to the Kassa raid 
of June 26, 1941. The first two pictures were taken at the airfield 
of the Hungar ian military aviation school at Kassa on the 25th of 
June. They show a German warplane and its crew that made an 
unscheduled landing at the airfield. T h e two Hungar ian air 
force officers seen in one of these pictures are Adam Krudy and 
Eugene Chirke. When unknown aircraft approached Kassa at 
about the same time the following day, some of the people at the 
airfield presumed that they were coming in for an unscheduled 
landing. 
The following pages contain photographs that had been 
delivered by Hungar ian authorities to Major R.C. Partridge, the 
American Military at tache to Hungary, dur ing July, 1941. They 
illustrate a small par t of the damage that had been inflicted on 
Kassa during the raid of the 26th of June, as well as close-ups of 
parts of an exploded bomb with Russian markings. From U.S. 
military intelligence records we know that some pictures, showing 
general damage in Kassa after the raid, were given to the 
American military at tache at the time of his visit to Kassa on the 
1st of July, while pictures of close-ups of bomb fragments were 
sent to him by the head of the Hungarian information service at 
the end of the month. In forwarding the latter pictures to 
Washington, Partridge remarked that their "value rests entirely 
on the good faith of the Hungarian Government." (Major R.C. 
Partridge to Washington, supplement to Report no. 1344, 31 July 
1941. New Military Records, Department of War, National 
Archives of the United States.) 
The first two pictures are courtesy of Mr. Eugene Chirke of 
Montreal. The rest of the photographs were requested f rom the 
National Archives of the United States in 1972. They were 
declassified in 1973 and delivered to us subsequently. 
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